2022.01.16 05:22 throwaway_aconscious Thanks for reading. I really appreciate it.
2021.05.11 04:25 jose1988x test p2
[Continued from Part 1] submitted by jose1988x to u/jose1988x [link] [comments] That's it for the NEOTEC reasons, but I wanted to add a few more of my own. Here's an example of an ignored correction which reveals an aspect of the system not mentioned in any of the reports. Evidently, this system had a sanity test to prevent verifications in cases where there were more votes than registered voters. An example of this occurred with #81281: Correction: UCS = 0, MAS = 35. (Juror miscopied vote totals from worksheet.) https://preview.redd.it/tltm4nblhey61.png?width=3679&format=png&auto=webp&s=7ce8e2f40c8e520e3a4158348d2a2bb8179d7248 All the vote totals match, so you'd think it would get verified, but the second row is an ESPERANDO APROBACION event (ie. a failed verification). It failed because both operators ignored the correction and gave a transcription with more votes than registered voters, which the system rejected. There are also cases of tally sheets which were transmitted but never processed at all. In other words, there's a REGISTRADA event, but no other events after that, so there was no effort to validate the vote totals. One of the explanations for this is that the REGISTRADA event occurred after 15:00 on the day after the election, which is when the verification operators packed it in after having worked from 14:40-15:00 on the resumed TREP. There are a few mysterious cases, though, where the REGISTRADA event occurs before that, and somehow it was never processed. For example, #1250: https://preview.redd.it/lg0o3l4rhey61.jpg?width=4128&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=b88321b8ea411829c50629c49286a30c760a9d86 https://preview.redd.it/fdhgqbophey61.png?width=3671&format=png&auto=webp&s=67e5148714c9b27fd34f6c7c23c4af454ae3495c It's not clear why this happened, or why the sheet was transmitted so late. Tally sheets like these represent one of the only real question marks I have about the data, but it's been my experience that the answers to these sort of questions are almost always dull and non-fraudulent. [NOTE: 66 ACTA COLUMNS (43 PREZ, 23 UNINOMINAL DEPUTY) HAD THIS SAME THING HAPPEN. NO ATTEMPT AT ALL TO VALIDATE THE TALLY SHEET, DESPITE IT BEING SENT BEFORE VERIFS ENDED. LOL - WHAT IF THE 'FLAT DE COMPUTADO' THING AFFECTED THE TREP TOO? WHO KNOWS.] The last reason for a tally sheet to fail is a simple but important one: dumb mistakes. Sometimes, even when the tally sheet is legible and complete and there are no issues with it, one of the operators will transcribe it incorrectly, causing the verification to fail. There were about 34,000 sheets that went into the TREP, and about double that if you consider all the individual columns, so mistakes are to be expected. Such cases should've been resolved by the reviewers, but for reasons I'll explain later, those reviewers almost certainly didn't get to all the tally sheet columns that failed verification. Take #34125, for example: https://preview.redd.it/luj4qpbvhey61.jpg?width=3264&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=4da26bb8112563ecfc52a46ec5a584b2002528e9 https://preview.redd.it/wc8l2hawhey61.png?width=3684&format=png&auto=webp&s=69051dad5fafd818340f7947e1653685ed1d9e22 This one should've been a slam-dunk, but the transmission operator hit the '2' key twice on FPV's vote total, which ruined the verification and pushed the tally sheet to the review process, but it was never approved, almost certainly because no reviewer ever got the chance to look at it. Or #40210: https://preview.redd.it/3e5xy1k4iey61.jpg?width=4128&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=34dc71a5bb130d12207db755e9bdc7c93ef83ef1 https://preview.redd.it/bhizkqm0iey61.png?width=3676&format=png&auto=webp&s=f84e1771ee074e65b8117ca79baaa6cb137beda3 Another slam-dunk, but the verification operator missed FPV's vote total, so the verification failed and then the tally sheet was exiled to the review process, never to return. In a series of public demonstrations of the system before the election, the TREP's developer said the system warned verification operators when their transcription didn't match the one sent from the polling place, giving them the chance to revise the non-matching vote totals, but it seems the verification operator didn't correct the simple error they made here, perhaps due to carelessness and/or time pressure. [PROVIDE CITATION] There are many cases of dumb mistakes, each with its own dumb explanation, but the real question isn't what caused the verifications to fail but rather why a reviewer didn't approve them later. I think I have the answer, though: There were only six reviewers. In NEOTEC's report, it was said that there were 20 of them, but the TREP logs only show six. What's more, the specific mix of reviewers depended on the moment, with a max of four active at any given time. These four reviewers couldn't keep up with the failed verifications generated by a much larger group of about 350 verification operators. The logs show 3922 cases in which a tally sheet column failed verification, requiring intervention from a reviewer to resolve the non-matching transcriptions. This is a lot of work for four people, especially in a compressed time-frame in a 'quick count', so it's no surprise they only approved 1363 of the 3922 columns. What's more, only 25% of those approvals came on Election Night. The rest are from the day after, between 15:00-21:44 after the TREP had resumed, when four of them trudged their way through some of the unverified crud that had built up over the course of the vote count. To get an idea of how overwhelmed they were, consider this graph of the review process starting at 16:00 on Election Day. During that period, 3149 failed verifications piled up and the reviewers, who started late, only approved 322 before the SERECI's power was cut at 20:07: failed_verifs - approvals = columns stuck in the review process. Some of the columns trapped in the review process are ones that didn't meet the criteria, but a lot of them did. It's clear that the reviewers on Election Night were either setting aside difficult cases in search of low-hanging fruit or they simply didn't get to many of them. A fair number of columns that failed verification on Election Night were approved after the TREP was resumed the next day. The crew of reviewers on the following day was a bit different from the day before, as two of the ones from Election Night didn't work the next day and were replaced by two others, one a sort of super administrator who'd worked early on Election Day and the other a user who first appears in the logs at this time. These reviewers worked at a similar pace as the day before, but they did so for a longer period of time, from 15:00 (or 16:00) to 21:44, then gave up and left what remained. 94.8% of these approvals were of columns that failed verification the day before. Like I said, it seems that their capacity to review tally sheet columns was limited, which allowed a build-up of failed verifications on Election Night and then, the following day, when they set to reviewing what had accumulated, they were only able to approve 1018 columns before the day ended and they retired. They could've continued, I suppose, but a three-day quick count seems like an oxymoron, right? Still, when I did a little research into previous elections like the 2017 Judicial Elections, it seems like the TSE continued the TREP for several days and ultimately tried to take the count as far as it could go. [CITATION] It's not clear why that didn't happen here, but I imagine it's another facet of the 2019 TSE's disastrous mismanagement of the preliminary count. Also, the review process would've moved faster if there had been more reviewers, but it's worth considering that these reviewers are likely to be TSE managers of some sort, since they have individual power to determine published vote totals, and there probably aren't too many people like that. That could also be the reason the reviewers seem to start late on both days, as they might have tended to other tasks at first. [WRITE ABOUT UNSENT ONES] [TRANSMISSION DELAYS + RURAL AREAS? - basically, there are some places in bolivia where there's no mobile internet service at all, so to mitigate this issue the oep did two things (source: first neotec report): they deployed a fleet of over 600 vehicles whose job it was to go on 'pick-up routes' and ferry transmission operators from precincts without internet service to other places which did have service. also, they set up 51 satellite posts where you could send your data from. the satellite posts were placed in strategic locations so that transmission operators in the surrounding area could travel to them, then upload their data upon arrival at the satellite post. the way the mobile app was set up was that you captured your data (photo and transcription of acta), then if you had internet service, the mobile app would send that data immediately. however, if you didn't have service (as with these deep rural transmission operators), then it would hold onto that data and wait for you to enter a service area. once you entered a service area, it would automatically send all of the data you had recorded. this has a few consequences. first, even if all precincts counted their votes and filled out their sheets at the same exact speed (they didn't, obviously), these rural areas without internet service would be transmitted late, since both the 'pick-up route' vehicles and the satellite posts methods imply a delay in the transmission of tally sheet data. second, you can tell when someone had some kind of internet service issue if you check for instances when a transmission operator transmitted data in very, very rapid succession - far too fast for them to have done it manually one after another. you can't exactly capture the deep rural no-internet areas like this, since most places had mobile internet service and weren't rural (basic urban/rural split is like 80%/20%) and you can have internet problems just if you're at the center of a building or in a basement or had your mobile data turned off or whatever, but you can get an idea of the general incidence of internet service issues at any given point in the count if you check how prevalent these instant-transmissions occur within a given time frame. i should look at the data to see if the transmission of multiple columns *from the same acta* in rapid succession is very common and more thus likely to reflect the normal functioning of the mobile app, or if such transmissions are uncommon and thus more likely to be due to internet service problems. almost without a doubt, though, if a single transmission operator sends multiple columns *from different actas* in rapid succession, then that's an internet service issue. this excludes single-mesa precincts, but i could create a geographic prediction map based on multi-mesa precincts that could probably do a fair job at predicting which single-mesa precincts had internet problems. i mentioned this to someone else, and they took a quick look at the numbers and concluded that the incidence of rapid-transmission events was high very early in the count (small rural towns that reported early because everyone knows each other, so there was no need to wait for the end of the day) and high very late in the count (rural areas with internet issues, plus some urban precincts that had problems of some kind (ie. basements or whatever, etc)), but otherwise was quite low, which is what you would expect, i think. i want to repeat that analysis on my own and i have a few ideas about how to do some related analyses as well, but i'm not sure i'll ever get to all that. zzz.] [ODDITY: verifications slow super hard after 17:03:00 on election night. between 17:07:16 - 17:14:23, no verifs at all. next verif after 17:14:23 is at 17:18:32, then all back to normal. what were they doing for 15 minutes as transmissions started to come in? 'mandatory bathroom break' lol] [WRAP UP] [Here's a simplified version of the TREP event log that I used for the screenshots in this post. When I first got the logs, I spent an hour or two in which I selected random photos from the 710 unverified TREP images, searched for the relevant entries in the log, then attempted to determine why they had failed verification. You could do this too to check that I'm not bullshitting you about all this. Likewise, you can check the images against the scans from the official count here.] [Also, do not come at me with a bunch of nonsense about how the TREP data used here is fake. The claims of data manipulation are a hoax, as I explained eons ago. This data is real.] So far, all this has been kind of bland and educational, but if you want to stick around to hear me rant about bad fraud claims made about this same topic, then Part 3 is for you. |