Georgian peanut roaster

The US Department of State (DoS) announced on May 1 that it has determined that Russian forces are violating the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), to which Russia is a signatory.
The US DoS stated that it made a determination under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) that Russian forces have used chloropicrin and riot control agents (RCAs) against Ukrainian forces in Ukraine in violation of the CWC. Chloropicrin is a pesticide and lung damaging agent, and Ukrainian officials have previously reported that Russian forces are increasingly equipping grenades with chloropicrin.

Russian regional and opposition outlets reported that the Russian military, in October 2023, recruited two convicts who were charged for cannibalism and a gruesome murder.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report on May 2 in which it confirmed that Russian forces have executed at least 15 surrendering Ukrainian soldiers since December 2023. [...] HRW noted that in one case Russian commanders explicitly ordered Russian forces to execute Ukrainian soldiers instead of letting them surrender.

The Georgian parliament passed Georgia’s Russian-style “foreign agents” law in its second reading on May 1 amid continued protests against the law in Tbilisi.

Russian opposition news outlets widely reported that the 83 of 150 Georgian parliament members voted for the bill – the same number of members who supported the bill in its first reading on April 17 since the Georgian opposition refused to participate in both votes. The Georgian parliament is expected to vote on May 17 on the third and final reading of the bill, after which the bill will go to the Georgian president for the final signature. Georgian President Salome Zurabishvili has stated her intent to veto the bill, but the BBC noted that the ruling Georgian Dream party has sufficient numbers to overrule that veto.

Ukrainian intelligence officials identified three Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine and achieve victory, and both Ukrainian and US intelligence officials issued assessments about the battlefield situation that are consistent with prior ISW forecasts that Russian forces may take Chasiv Yar but are very unlikely to seize major Ukrainian cities.

Ukrainian Khortytsia Group of Forces Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Nazar Voloshyn reported on May 2 that Russian forces control part of Ocheretyne, while Ukrainian forces have fire control over the remainder of the settlement.[75] Voloshyn reiterated that Ukrainian forces have deployed additional reserves and resources to the area to stabilize the frontline and counterattack.

The Russian military is reportedly redeploying elements of the 76th and 7th airborne (VDV) divisions from Zaporizhia Oblast in the direction of eastern Ukraine, likely to reinforce and intensify ongoing offensive operations. [...]
The Russian military may seek to redeploy elements of the 76th or 7th VDV division or both to eastern Ukraine to support Russia’s offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast and to capitalize on the current window of vulnerability before American military aid begins reaching the frontline at scale.

The United Nations (UN) and Western organizations continue to demonstrate how North Korea and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are directly and indirectly helping Russia’s war effort.
The Economist noted that Russian imports of goods from the PRC appeared to surge following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with PRC President Xi Jinping in Moscow in March 2023. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated on May 1 that Russian imports of dual-use items from the PRC have helped Russia significantly increase its defense industrial production and that 70 percent of Russia’s machine tools and 90 percent of its microelectronics come from the PRC.

ISW previously reported about the recent uptick in public meetings between Russian, PRC, North Korean, Iranian, and Belarussian officials that underscores these countries’ deepening mutual partnership aimed at confronting the West.

Bloomberg reported that four sanctioned Russian oil tankers have changed their names and are sailing under new flags.
Bloomberg reported on April 30 that tankers from Sovcomflot, Russia’s state-owned oil tanker company, renamed four of its sanctioned vessels: the NS Columbus to the Kemerovo, the NS Bravo to the Belgorod, the NS Captain to the Kaliningrad, and the NS Creation to the Krasnoyarsk. Bloomberg reported that these ships are now flying Russian flags after previously sailing with Gabonese flags. [...] It is unclear why these ships changed their names and flags to highlight their connection with Russia, and this decision seems counterproductive if these vessels hope to distance themselves from international sanctions against Russia.

1. These vessels are about as obviously Russian as it gets. The Kremlin might not think it’s worth their time to hide their movements.
   
2. Gabon kicked them out and they can’t find another country stupid and desperate enough to expose themselves to international condemnation by registering their vessels.
   
3. International waters are about to get a lot less copacetic, and a vessel’s flags will become relevant again.
   

Russian state-run news outlets appear to be amplifying anti-Western rhetoric from former Georgian Prime Minister and founder of the Georgian Dream party Bidzina Ivanishvili and are negatively portraying Georgians protesting against Georgia’s “foreign agents” bill, likely in an attempt to destabilize and divide Georgia.

Ukrainian forces struck an oil refinery in Ryazan Oblast for the second time in less than a month on the night of April 30 to May 1.

Russian forces did not make any confirmed advances in the Avdiivka area on April 30 for the first time in several days, while Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces conducted several more attacks in the Bakhmut-Chasiv Yar direction than near Avdiivka.
The Ukrainian General Staff’s morning and evening reports on April 30 stated that Ukrainian forces repelled a total of 47 Russian attacks in the Avdiivka direction and 57 Russian attacks in the Bakhmut direction throughout the day, notably a much higher number of attacks in the Chasiv Yar direction than Ukrainian sources have recently reported out on.[1] One day’s worth of reporting is not sufficient to establish a pattern, but it may suggest that Russian forces are somewhat slowing down the rate of attacks around Avdiivka while re-committing to offensive pushes around Chasiv Yar, as ISW recently forecasted they would.

Russian forces may decide to push from their salient north of Avdiivka towards the Toretsk area to complement Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, which would likely require Russian forces to conduct a tactical pause to concentrate forces for such a drive.

Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a short-range MGM-140 ATACMS strike against targets in occupied Crimea on the night of April 29 to 30. [...]
Russia opposition outlet Astra reported that Ukrainian missiles, presumably ATACMS missiles, struck facilities of the Russian 31st Air Defense Division in Chornomorsk and Saky raions and the Dzhankoi airfield, causing a fire and wounding several Russian servicemen.

Former Georgian Prime Minister and founder of the Georgian Dream political party Bidzina Ivanishvili reiterated a series of standard Kremlin information operations during his first public speech since announcing his return to Georgian public politics in December 2023.

The situation in the area of Ocheretyne in Donetsk region is complicated: in an attempt to capture the locality, the enemy uses the entire available arsenal of weapons against our units, including chemical poisons, and tries to consolidate in the southern part of Ocheretyne.
At the present time, the majority of the settlement is controlled by the Defense Forces, the southern part of the locality is under the fire control of our artillery, and exhaustive measures are being taken to drive the enemy out of the southern part of Ocheretyne and stabilize the situation in this direction.

• https://t.me/Khortytsky_wind/183

United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Rishi Sunak announced the UK’s largest ever package of military assistance to Ukraine valued at 500 million pounds (around $662 million) on April 23.
Sunak announced on April 23 that the UK will provide over 400 vehicles, 4 million rounds of small arms ammunition, 60 boats, air defense equipment, and Storm Shadow missiles to Ukraine. Sunak also stated that the UK will increase its military spending to 2.5 percent of its GDP by 2030, with spending gradually increasing to 87 billion pounds (about $108 billion) in the next six years. Sunak stated that the increased defense spending will put the UK “on a war footing” as the UK is facing an “axis of authoritarian states with different values...like Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China.”

Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu highlighted ongoing Russian offensive operations near Chasiv Yar, Avdiivka, and Donetsk City and announced Russia’s intent to intensify its strike campaign to disrupt Ukrainian logistics.
Shoigu’s focus on striking Ukrainian logistics suggests that Russian forces may shift their target set to hit Ukrainian transportation infrastructure, logistics, and military storage facilities. Russian forces heavily targeted Ukrainian transportation infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on April 19, and Russian forces may intend to replicate and expand these strikes in the coming weeks to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs). The Russian military command may hope that a coordinated interdiction effort will constrain Ukraine’s ability to sufficiently distribute manpower and materiel to critical sectors of the front and delay the improved capabilities that the arrival of US security assistance will afford Ukrainian forces.

Moldovan authorities confiscated over one million dollars from Kremlin-linked Moldovan opposition politicians at the Chisinau airport on the night of April 22 to 23, and the opposition politicians likely intended to use to bribe protestors and voters.
[The Shor Party] reportedly paid demonstrators to protest Moldovan President Maia Sandu in 2022, and Moldovan authorities are investigating the Shor Party for bribing voters during the 2023 Gagauzia gubernatorial election. Moldovan authorities have also detained members of Moldovan parliament who reportedly took bribes from Shor affiliates.
ISW previously assessed that the creation of the Victory electoral bloc would allow the Kremlin to focus on a unified political effort as part of its efforts to destabilize Moldovan society, attack Moldova’s democratic government, and prevent Moldova’s accession to the European Union (EU).

The Chechen Republic appears to be trying to align itself more closely with Iran over the backdrop of intensifying bilateral security cooperation between Russia and Iran.
Head of the Chechen Rosgvardia branch Adam Delimkhanov stated on April 22 that he met with Iranian Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Akbar Ahmadian during a visit to Iran on Chechen Republic Head Ramzan Kadyrov’s orders. Delimkhanov reported that he and Ahmadian discussed security issues in Central Asia and the Middle East and the prospects of Russo-Iranian cooperation in countering national security threats to both states.

WASHINGTON (AP) — House Speaker Mike Johnson is pushing toward action this week on aid for Israel, Ukraine and Taiwan, unveiling an elaborate plan Monday to break the package into separate votes to squeeze through the House’s political divides on foreign policy.
Facing an outright rebellion from conservatives fiercely opposed to aiding Ukraine, the Republican speaker’s move on the foreign aid package was a potentially watershed moment, the first significant action on the bill after more than two months of delay. But Johnson’s intention to hold four separate votes on parts of the package also left it open to being significantly altered from the $95 billion aid package the Senate passed in February.