Christa mcauliffe and allstate lawsuit

It wasn't just about Jeff.
Someone digging in a dumpster outside Lionel Dahmer’s home recently found this 1992 letter to Jeff Dahmer from Allstate Insurance. It was then offered for sale on the website Cult Collectibles. It was a lucky find because it contains revealing information about what really happened to Steven Hicks in 1978:
Letter to Jeff Dahmer from Allstate Insurance
In November 1992, the family of Steven Hicks filed a civil action against four people - Jeff Dahmer, Lionel Dahmer, Joyce Dahmer, and Shari Dahmer - for “wrongful death, survival action, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence and loss of consortium.”
There were additional causes of action against Lionel Dahmer, Shari Dahmer, and Joyce Dahmer for negligent entrustment and negligence.
The letter above was issued within days of Allstate receiving the complaint from the Hicks family. (The claim was made against Lionel's home insurer, Allstate, because home insurance policies provide cover for liability protection. A typical homeowners insurance policy provides liability coverage when someone not living with you is injured while on your property.)

Why is Shari Dahmer named in the lawsuit?

Note that at the time Steven Hicks died in June 1978, Shari Dahmer was not Lionel Dahmer’s wife. She married him in December 1978. However, she’s named in the lawsuit, which is curious.
Here are the legal definitions of wrongful death, survival action, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, loss of consortium, and negligent entrustment:
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• Wrongful death - Wrongful death is a civil cause of action brought by family members and dependents against individuals who knowingly or negligently cause the death of another person. A wrongful death action may be brought against a person also facing criminal charges for the same event, and even if the person is not found guilty of a criminal charge, the person may be found liable for the wrongful death action because it has a lower burden of proof. The action is governed by state statutes which limit the damages and who can benefit from such suits. The statutes allow children and spouses to receive damages from wrongful death suits, but some states extend this to parents*, siblings, and other dependents. Damages for wrongful deaths compensate for the lost financial support and suffering due to the death, and juries award damages based on a variety of factors including the person’s income beforehand, expected future income, and the level of family members dependence. Sometimes juries may award damages for funeral expenses, pain, and emotional harm caused to the person injured* when they suffer before dying*. Also, some states allow punitive damages to be awarded where the person causing the death does so out of intent or recklessness.*
• Survival action - A survival action is also a type of personal injury lawsuit that is filed on behalf of the victim and involves damages that the deceased individual would presumably have been entitled to had he or she survived their injuries. This type of legal action is usually filed in situations where a victim is injured by another party’s negligence, but survives the initial event only to succumb to their injuries later. It’s also used in medical malpractice lawsuits involving a gross medical oversight, surgical mistakes, or misdiagnosis that later leads to a patient’s untimely death. The greater the period of time between the initial injury and death, the stronger the case that the deceased individual’s family has for a survivor action lawsuit.
• Intentional infliction of emotional distress - Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) is a tort that occurs when one acts in a manner that intentionally or recklessly causes another to suffer severe emotional distress, such as issuing the threat of future harm.Prima Facie Case
  • The defendant acts
  • The defendant's conduct is outrageous
  • The defendant acts purposely or recklessly, causing the victim emotional distress so severe that it could be expected to adversely affect mental health
  • The defendant's conduct causes such distress
• Negligent infliction of emotional distress - Negligent infliction of emotional distress (NEID) is a tort, defined as emotional distress caused by negligent action. States differ greatly as to when they allow a cause of action for NEID and exactly how damages are calculated, unlike intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). States mostly fall into three categories on how they allow NEID claims:
  • Most states allow NEID claims when the defendant’s actions were reasonably foreseeable to cause the emotional distress.
  • Some states only allow for an NEID claim when nearly missing physical harm and fearing such harm, termed being in a zone of danger.
    • For example, if someone assaulted a server, anyone sitting by the server could be in the zone of danger as they may have thought they were also going to be assaulted.
  • A few states require at least some physical injury to the plaintiff in order for NEID to be claimed at all.
• Negligence - Negligence is the failure to behave with the level of care that a reasonable person would have exercised under the same circumstances. Either a person’s actions or omissions of actions can be found negligent. The omission of actions is considered negligent only when the person had a duty to act (e.g., a duty to help someone because of one’s own previous conduct).Negligence is a foundational concept of tort law. Some primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether a person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the conduct would result in harm, the foreseeable severity of the harm, and the burden of precautions necessary to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm. The following five elements may typically be required to prove negligence:
  • The existence of a legal duty that the defendant owed the plaintiff
  • Defendant’s breach of that duty
  • Harm to the plaintiff
  • Defendant’s actions are the proximate cause of harm to the plaintiff
  • Defendant’s actions are the cause-in-fact of harm to the plaintiff
• Loss of consortium - Loss of consortium refers to the loss or impairment of the intangible benefits of a relationship. When it is found that loss of consortium is caused by a tortfeasor, the victims’ loved ones may be able to recover reasonable damages arising from their loss of consortium. Loss of consortium claims were created in recognition that severe injury or death of a married person would cause great injury to their spouse. Who may claim a loss of consortium? The ability to sue for loss of consortium is governed separately by each state. Typically, states have opted to heavily restrict consortium claims. Siblings, friends, and extended family typically have no right to recover for loss of consortium, even if they were very close to the victim. Traditionally, consortium claims only applied to:
  • A widow or widower whose spouse was wrongly killed.
  • A wife or husband whose spouse was severely injured by a tortfeasor.

Unmarried couples are typically not able to bring a consortium claim, regardless of the length of time they have been together or the nature of their relationship.
Many jurisdictions now allow for parents to recover for loss of filial consortium, meaning the loss of consortium from their child. However, many states only allow filial consortium claims where the child was fatally injured. A minority of states also allow children to make a loss of consortium claim in instances where their parent(s) were wrongfully killed.

• Negligent entrustment - The tort of negligent entrustment is based upon the principle that a person should not entrust a dangerous instrumentality to an unfit individual who may use it in a manner involving an unreasonable risk of harm to that individual or others. The “crux of the negligence is the knowledge of the entrustor of the youth, inexperience, known propensity for reckless and irresponsible behavior, or other quality of the entrustee, indicating the possibility that the entrustee will cause injury.”1 If the supplier of a dangerous instrumentality permits its use by a person that the supplier knows, or has reason to know, is unfit to have control over it, the supplier will be held accountable for all causally-related injuries to others.

The press article about the lawsuit stated that Jeff Dahmer's parents “knew or should have known” that Jeff was destined to cause injury and death to others:
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Dahmer lawsuit ruling
But, as noted above, the lawsuit also named Shari Dahmer as a defendant. However, Shari Dahmer was not Jeff's parent. In fact, in June 1978, Shari Dahmer wasn’t even married to Lionel Dahmer. She was still Shari Shinn.
When the incident with Steven Hicks happened in June 1978 - whatever it was - Lionel Dahmer was still married to Jeff’s mother, Joyce Dahmer. Lionel and Joyce weren’t divorced until July 1978. Lionel Dahmer then married Shari Shinn in December 1978.
So, when this incident happened in June 1978 that resulted in the death of Steven Hicks, Shari Dahmer was nothing more than Lionel Dahmer’s girlfriend. She also wasn’t living in the house on Bath Road. She was staying with Lionel Dahmer in a motel down the road. Yet she’s named as a defendant in the lawsuit.
Why?
Lionel and Joyce Dahmer divorced July 1978 (Source: My Heritage)
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Here’s a video of Shari Dahmer “crying” on TV:
Shari Dahmer \"crying\"
As noted above, the Allstate claim letter notes that there were additional causes of action made against Lionel, Shari (Shinn) and Joyce Dahmer for “negligent entrustment and negligence.” Here are the definitions of negligent entrustment:
Negligent entrustment is a cause of action in United States tort law which arises where one party ("the entrustor") is held liable for negligence because they negligently provided another party ("the entrustee") with a dangerous instrumentality, and the entrusted party caused injury to a third party with that instrumentality. The cause of action most frequently arises where one person allows another to drive their automobile.'
'One of the earliest reported cases under this cause of action, the 1915 Mississippi case of Winn v. Haliday, concerned the negligence of the father in entrusting a dangerous agency to a son known to be negligent, based on the allegation that the appellant knew his son to be given to 'joyriding'.
The key allegation that must be proven in such a case can be described as follows:
A plaintiff who invokes that doctrine must present evidence which creates a factual issue whether the owner knew, or had reasonable cause to know, that he was entrusting his car to an unfit driver likely to cause injury to others. Furthermore, in order to impose liability upon the owner, the plaintiff must prove that the negligent entrustment of the motor vehicle to the tortfeasor was a proximate cause of the accident.'
Negligence (Lat. negligentia*)*is a failure to exercise appropriate and/or ethical ruled care expected to be exercised amongst specified circumstances. The area of tort law known as negligence involves harm caused by failing to act as a form of carelessness possibly with extenuating circumstances. The core concept of negligence is that people should exercise reasonable care in their actions, by taking account of the potential harm that they might foreseeably cause to other people or property.
Someone who suffers loss caused by another's negligence may be able to sue for damages to compensate for their harm. Such loss may include physical injury, harm to property, psychiatric illness, or economic loss. The law on negligence may be assessed in general terms according to a five-part model which includes the assessment of duty, breach, actual cause, proximate cause, and damages.
Elements of Negligence
Some things must be established by anyone who wants to sue in negligence. These are what are called the "elements" of negligence.
Most jurisdictions say that there are four elements to a negligence action:

1. duty: the defendant has a duty to others, including the plaintiff, to exercise reasonable care,
2. breach: the defendant breaches that duty through an act or culpable omission,
3. damages: as a result of that act or omission, the plaintiff suffers an injury, and
4. causation: the injury to the plaintiff is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act or omission.

Some jurisdictions narrow the definition down to three elements: duty, breach and proximately caused harm. Some jurisdictions recognize five elements, duty, breach, actual cause, proximate cause*, and damages. However, at their heart, the various definitions of what constitutes negligent conduct are very similar.*
Proximate cause in this context means the primary cause. In law and insurance, a proximate cause is an event sufficiently related to an injury that the courts deem the event to be the cause of that injury.
So what brought forth the allegation of Negligent Entrustment?
What was Jeff negligently entrusted with by Lionel Dahmer, Shari Shinn, and Joyce Dahmer? One of the earliest cases under this cause of action involved “joyriding.”

Judge Rules in Favor of the Hicks Family

Judge James R. Williams ruled in favor of the Hicks family. So, Lionel Dahmer, Joyce Dahmer, and Shari Shinn Dahmer were all found guilty of these allegations.
How did the judge decide that the parents - and Shari Shinn Dahmer - knew or should have known Jeff was “deviant and destined to cause injury and death to others”? We don’t have the details of the decision. However, consider what Jeff Dahmer told Dr. Fosdal (see our previous post about Jeff Six.):
First mistake that led up to all this. Had I driven past, all this would not have happened.
That’s a rather strange statement coming from someone who, according to the official narrative, had supposedly been fantasizing about corpses and killing people since the age of 15. A person with such fantasies would have killed someone sooner or later anyway.
Did Steven Hicks’ parents know what really happened? Could it be that Steven Hicks was accidentally injured, and Jeff Dahmer panicked and didn’t call for help? That could explain a wrongful death suit. (Wrongful death lawsuits are based on a lesser burden of evidence than a criminal case).
News article reports note that Steven Hicks’ father was reluctant to discuss the anomalies in his son’s disappearance:
Steven Hicks' father refuses to talk
It should be pointed out that the same judge ruled on both the criminal and the civil suits.

Following on from the previous Post about this claim (please have a read of this if you can as it outlines the nature of the claim).
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I'm going to break down the definitions of the actions against Shari, Lionel and Joyce, as this is very important. The significance of this is key.
As previously mentioned, additional causes of action were also made against Lionel, Shari and Joyce for 'negligent entrustment and negligence'.
​
This was written in the letter of claim from Lionel's home insurer Allstate Insurance Company:
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Allstate insurance acknowledge the claim & reserve their rights
The press article stated that Jeff's parents 'knew or should have known' that Jeff was 'destined to cause injury and death to others':
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(*Source - FBI vault)
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However, the lawsuit also named Shari as a defendant.
But Shari was not Jeff's parent. Lionel was still married to Joyce in June 1978, when the Hicks incident happened. Lionel & Joyce were not divorced until the following month, in July 1978. Lionel and Shari married in December 1978:
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Lionel & Joyce divorced in July 1978 (*Source - MyHeritage genealogy site)
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So why is Shari named in the case as a defendant?
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Shari is named as a defendant in the wrongful death lawsuit, along with Lionel & Joyce
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So, back to the additional causes of action made against Lionel, Shari and Joyce for 'negligent entrustment and negligence' as shown in the Allstate claim letter.
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Definition of 'Negligent Entrustment'
'Negligent entrustment is a cause of action in United States tort law which arises where one party ("the entrustor") is held liable for negligence because they negligently provided another party ("the entrustee") with a dangerous instrumentality, and the entrusted party caused injury to a third party with that instrumentality. The cause of action most frequently arises where one person allows another to drive their automobile.'
'One of the earliest reported cases under this cause of action, the 1915 Mississippi case of Winn v. Haliday,[1] concerned the negligence of the father in entrusting a dangerous agency to a son known to be negligent, based on the allegation that the appellant knew his son to be given to 'joyriding)'.
The key allegation that must be proven in such a case can be described as follows:
A plaintiff who invokes that doctrine must present evidence which creates a factual issue whether the owner knew, or had reasonable cause to know, that he was entrusting his car to an unfit driver likely to cause injury to others. Furthermore, in order to impose liability upon the owner, the plaintiff must prove that the negligent entrustment of the motor vehicle to the tortfeasor was a proximate cause of the accident.[2] '
(*Source - Negligent entrustment - Wikipedia)
​
That's not to say the negligent entrustment in this case involved a car, but this is a good example. Jeff had a drinking problem, from all accounts.
​
Definition of 'Negligence'
'Negligence (Lat. negligentia*)*[1] is a failure to exercise appropriate and/or ethical ruled care expected to be exercised amongst specified circumstances.[2] The area of tort law known as negligence involves harm caused by failing to act as a form of carelessness possibly with extenuating circumstances. The core concept of negligence is that people should exercise reasonable care in their actions, by taking account of the potential harm that they might foreseeably cause to other people or property.[3]
Someone who suffers loss caused by another's negligence may be able to sue for damages to compensate for their harm. Such loss may include physical injury, harm to property, psychiatric illness, or economic loss. The law on negligence may be assessed in general terms according to a five-part model which includes the assessment of duty, breach, actual cause, proximate cause, and damages.[4]
Elements of Negligence
Some things must be established by anyone who wants to sue in negligence. These are what are called the "elements") of negligence.
Most jurisdictions say that there are four elements to a negligence action:[5]

1. duty: the defendant has a duty to others, including the plaintiff, to exercise reasonable care,
2. breach: the defendant breaches that duty through an act or culpable omission,
3. damages: as a result of that act or omission, the plaintiff suffers an injury, and
4. causation: the injury to the plaintiff is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act or omission.

Some jurisdictions narrow the definition down to three elements: duty, breach and proximately caused harm.[6] Some jurisdictions recognize five elements, duty, breach, actual cause, proximate cause, and damages.[6] However, at their heart, the various definitions of what constitutes negligent conduct are very similar.'
(*Source - Negligence - Wikipedia)
​
Proximate cause in this context means the primary cause. In law and insurance, a proximate cause is an event sufficiently related to an injury that the courts deem the event to be the cause of that injury.
​
So, how were Lionel, Joyce and Shari, found guilty of these allegations? Since the judge ruled in the Hicks' favor.
​
Remember - Wrongful death suits can be bought for situations where the victim would not have died when and how they died, but for the actions or negligence by the defendant/s. The negligence portion accounts for accidents. A wrongful death lawsuit can be based on an intentional act or a negligent act.
​
So what brought forth the allegation of 'Negligent Entrustment'?
What was Jeff negligently entrusted with by Lionel, Joyce and Shari?
​

In November 1992, Steven Hicks' family filed a civil action against Jeff and his parents for 'wrongful death, survival action, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence and loss of consortium'.
'Wrongful death or survival action' lawsuits are both types of personal injury lawsuits that attempt to compensate victims and their survivors for economic and non-economic damages they’ve suffered due to an accident.
Family members may also sue for pain, suffering, grief, and loss of consortium (a legal term used to describe the impact that an accident fatality has on relationships, companionship, and emotional support lost due to an injury or death).
Additional causes of action were also made against Lionel, Shari and Joyce for 'negligent entrustment and negligence'.
​
Definition of Negligence (*source - Wikipedia):
'Elements of negligence claims
Some things must be established by anyone who wants to sue in negligence. These are what are called the "elements") of negligence.
Most jurisdictions say that there are four elements to a negligence action:[5]

1. duty: the defendant has a duty to others, including the plaintiff, to exercise reasonable care,
2. breach: the defendant breaches that duty through an act or culpable omission,
3. damages: as a result of that act or omission, the plaintiff suffers an injury, and
4. causation: the injury to the plaintiff is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's act or omission.

Some jurisdictions narrow the definition down to three elements: duty, breach and proximately caused harm.[6] Some jurisdictions recognize five elements, duty, breach, actual cause, proximate cause, and damages.[6] However, at their heart, the various definitions of what constitutes negligent conduct are very similar.'
​
'Proximate' in this context means a direct cause, an unbroken chain of events.
​
Definition of Negligent Entrustment (*source - Wikipedia)
'Negligent entrustment is a cause of action in United States tort law which arises where one party ("the entrustor") is held liable for negligence because they negligently provided another party ("the entrustee") with a dangerous instrumentality, and the entrusted party caused injury to a third party with that instrumentality. The cause of action most frequently arises where one person allows another to drive their automobile. '
'One of the earliest reported cases under this cause of action, the 1915 Mississippi case of Winn v. Haliday,[1] concerned the negligence of the father in entrusting a dangerous agency to a son known to be negligent, based on the allegation that the appellant knew his son to be given to 'joyriding)'. '
​
A claim was filed against Lionel's home insurer at the time, Allstate Insurance Company:
Allstate insurance company letter addressed to Jeff, regarding the Stephen Hicks murder. Please note, this is Lionel Dahmer’s personal copy which is a photocopy taken from Jeff’s original (*Source - Cult Collectibles)
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Civil action filed by the Hicks family
Case summary naming the Plaintiff and Defendants
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This civil suit was successful. Summit County Common Pleas Judge James Williams ruled in favor of the Hicks family:
Archive news article reports the successful civil suit (*Source - Daily Kent Stater, Volume LXIX, Number 23, 8 October 1992)
An article about Judge James Williams:
In memoriam: Retired Judge James R. Williams The University Akron News Ohio (uakron.edu)
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Why was a claim made against Lionel's home insurer Allstate?
This is because home insurance policies provide cover for liability protection. A typical homeowners insurance policy provides liability coverage when someone not living with you is injured while on your property.
If you are sued by an injured guest, and you’re responsible for the injury, this helps pay for your legal costs.
However, if you or a family member intentionally cause harm to someone, you won’t be able to depend on your personal liability coverage for financial protection. Note that the claim made against the Dahmer family includes negligence.
Wrongful death and aggravated murder are also different things. What's the difference between a civil judgement and a criminal conviction?
The first step to understanding this seeming contradiction is to know that a criminal prosecution involves different laws, a different court system, and different burdens of proof. Specifically, the definition of first degree murder requires that the act be done with malice aforethought and premeditation.
And to convict in the criminal court, the case against the defendant must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (we know that didn't happen with the Milwaukee story).
In a civil case for wrongful death, on the other hand, the plaintiffs had to prove only that the defendant 's intentional and unlawful conduct resulted in the victims' death.. The burden of proof in the civil case was preponderance (strength) of the evidence -- a much lesser burden than is required in a criminal case.
So it is possible to file both a criminal and a civil suit here. Wrongful death suits can be bought for situations where the victim would not have died when and how they died, but for the actions or negligence by the defendant/s. The negligence portion accounts for accidents. The criminal conviction can be used as evidence of liability in civil cases.
​
A wrongful death lawsuit can be based on an intentional act or a negligent act. The criminal case and civil case do not have to 'match'.
The determination is made based on the liability evidence when the action is filed.
Lionel, Shari and Joyce were all found, as parents, to be negligent in this judgement. The lawsuit alleged that 'they knew or should have known', that Jeff was 'deviant and destined to cause death and injury to others'.
How so?
Shari was not even married to Lionel in June 1978. Shari was not Jeff's 'parent' by legal definition. Jeff was also already an adult in June 1978. How could Shari be judged responsible for Jeff, at this time or prior to this?
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And how did Judge Williams find Lionel and Joyce responsible? We do not have the details of this decision.
A contradicting statement from Jeff as quoted by Dr Fosdal (see our previous post about Jeff Six) is this:
'First mistake that led up to all this. Had I driven past all this would not have happened.'
A rather strange statement for someone who, according to the narrative, has been fantasizing about corpses and killing people since the age of 15. A person with such fantasies would have killed someone sooner or later anyway.
​
Could it be that Steven's parents knew what really happened? That it was an accident and Jeff panicked and didn't call for help. That could explain a wrongful death suit (remember, this is based on a lesser burden of evidence than a criminal case).
According to the official version of the story, Jeff fantasized about murder from the age of 15-16 and wanted to get someone at his disposal to fulfil his fantasies, which indicates the intention of the actions. Was this used to support the case?
There is also the question of why Steven was so out of his way from the concert and why the family waited 6 days to file a missing person report for Steven.
His father refused to discuss the matter:
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Archive news article about Steven Hicks (*Source - FBI vault)
The successful claim, although a questionably subjective decision, would have made Allstate liable for the costs under the eligible liability section of the policy (i.e. 'negligence'). The intentional act element would not have been covered however.
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Please enjoy my multi-week project made up of 70 different points and 30 pages of explanation (well, 25 pages of writing and the rest is links to research resources I used.) Maybe one day when I am not busy worrying about my event schedule and anime conventions I will come back with a video deep dive so people don't need to read my ramblings and so I can add personal experience stories, but who knows... Enjoy!
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CESTUI VIE ACT 1666 : NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION BANCRUPCY US COURT DOCUMENTS
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The CONTROLLING LAW on the subject is found in sections 1441 and 1442, as modified by the Convention and PROTOCOL between the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS, the relevant portions of which are quoted above herein. Said statutes, Convention and Protocol are silent as to the type of documentation or proof, and the timing thereof, WHICH MUST BE SUPPLIED TO BY A TAXPAYER such as this petitioner, in order TO SECURE THE BENEFITS of exemption from withholding with regard to the payment of interest to a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION. Respondent's regulation, section 1.1441-6(c), which we have quoted above, in relevant part, does require the execution and filing with PETITIONER of Form 1001. We give every benefit of the doubt to respondent (as we should in testing the adequacy of petitioner's motion for summary judgment), and assume for present purposes that the above regulation is a valid interpretive regulation, issued under the authority of section 7805, the Convention and the Protocol,
Using a FRONT TO HIDE THE TRUE INVESTOR IS AN OLD TRADITION IN THIS COUNTRY. One of the BEST PLACES NOW TO HIDE REAL OWNERSHIP is the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES. Nixon's home on Key Biscayne has been bought with cash and bulldozed, and a new $1.2 home, also PAID FOR WITH CASH, has been erected in its place by "CLEMWOOD N.V.", a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION. Ortega was given POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR CLEMWOOD, N.V. "The Congressional Committee's investigation indicates Ortega is a front for HERMAN BOTERO now waiting TRAIL ON CHARGES of LAUDERING 55 million dollars in drug profits. One of his investments may have been the old Nixon property."
Holding that defendant-appellant NEW YORK CORPORATIONS who held property on behalf of defendants FERDINAND and IMELDA MARCOS could NOT ASSERT FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY.

1. 40 Wall Street, a 71-story office building owned by Nyland (CF8) Ltd., a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION which in turn is OWNED BY THREE PANAMANIAN CORPORATIONS that issued "BEARER" SHARES TO UNKNOWN PERSONS.

P, a DOMESTIC UTILITY COMPANY, formed F as a Subsidiary CORPORATION in the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES. F's only activity was to borrow money by issuing Euronotes and then lend the proceeds to Pat an interest rate that was 1 percent greater than the rate on the Euronotes. Sec. 1441, I.R.C., generally requires a domestic taxpayer to withhold a 30-percent tax on interest paid to nonresident aliens. However, payments to NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATIONS were exempted from this TAX pursuant to treaty. R determined that F was a mere conduit or agent of P, that P should be treated as having paid interest directly to the Euronote holders, and that P is therefore liable for the withholding tax.
In Manrique, the SUPREME COURT of Florida upheld the enforcement of a forum selection clause mandating the NETHERLANDS as the proper forum for all disputes arising under the contract.
Fabbri, an Italian citizen living in Buenos Aires, established the Argoville Corporation in the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES, the principal asset of which is a single parcel of property in Dade County, Florida. He subsequently sold the company to Continentales, another NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION. The sale was effectuated through several contracts, including a stockholder's settlement agreement and an option agreement. These agreements specifically contemplated the possibility of a future dispute. The stockholder's settlement agreement provided:
HOLDING CORRESPONDENT BANKING relationships not enough to support general jurisdiction over nonresident defendant under Florida long-arm statute
The facts that control the jurisdictional issue are not in dispute. Maduro Curiel's Bank is a Netherlands Antilles bank which acts as a correspondent bank for VARIOUS MIAMI BANKS. It received sale documents from Flagship Bank of Miami, along with a sight draft and an airway bill for goods sold by plaintiff. Prior to that, the president of Oriental Imports had gone to CURACAO in the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES and obtained an order from JOSE FAERMAN COMPANY, a NETHERLANDS ANTILLEN CORPORATION. Oriental Imports had then delivered certain sale documents (invoices, packing lists and a letter of authority) to Flagship Bank which forwarded them to defendant for delivery to the purchaser Jose Faerman Company upon receipt of payment for the goods. If the transaction had gone as planned, the customer would have made payment to MADURO CURIEL'S BANK, which would have notified its correspondent bank in Miami. The MIAMI bank would have then debited Maduro Curiel's account and credited the seller's account. Although some facts are disputed, it is clear that Jose Faerman Company eventually received possession of the goods, and that no payment was ever made to Orie
In Rev. Rul. 84-153, 1984-2 C.B. 383, the Commissioner took the position that a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES financing subsidiary was a mere conduit for interest payments to foreign bondholders even though the subsidiary was adequately capitalized. The facts in Rev. Rul. 84-153, supra, are essentially as follows: (1) P, a CORPORATION organized under the laws of the UNITED STATES, owned 100 percent of the STOCK of S, an ANTILLES CORPORATION; (2) to upgrade the production facilities of P's wholly owned domestic subsidiary, R, S SOLD BONDS to foreign persons in public offerings outside the United States on Sept. 1, 1984; (3) S lent the proceeds from the bond offerings to R at a rate of interest that was 1 percentage point higher than the rate payable by S on the bonds; (4) R made timely payments to S and S made timely payments to its bondholders; (5) S's excess revenue after expenses was retained by S; (6) neither P, R, nor S was thinly capitalized. The revenue ruling does not mention any debt-to-equity ratio, nor does it explain the meaning of "thinly capitalized". The revenue ruling concludes:
The NETHERLANDS ANTILLES frequently has been used as the country of incorporation of an offshore finance subsidiary. In addition to THE ANTILLES CORPORATION'S avoiding the requirement of withholding under the United States federal tax laws, a TAX TREATY between the NETHERLANDS and the United States eliminates the 30% United States withholding tax on United States Corporate interest received by an ANTILLES CORPORATION, provided the interest income is not "effectively connected" with a United States "permanent establishment." Income Tax Convention, Apr. 29, 1948, United States-NETHERLANDS, art. VIII(1), (2), reprinted in 2 Tax Treaties (CCH) ¶ 5812. The United States corporation thus can pay interest to an ANTILLES CORPORATION on money loaned to it by the ANTILLES CORPORATION without withholding any federal income taxes. Moreover, the ANTILLES government does NOT impose any withholding tax on interest paid by AN ANTILLES CORPORATION to its foreign bondholders, and does not impose an estate or inheritance tax on nonresidents with respect to the debt obligations of an
Second, even if the PCGG's determination could be deemed to be a public act by a sovereign nation, the act-of-state doctrine would not apply, at present, because there is an insufficient showing that the PCGG determination applies to the Seven Properties. The PCGG Resolution and Certification did not themselves list the properties beneficially owned by CAMPOS; instead, they relied upon a list of properties included within another document — Attachment A. (Defs. App. at 114-15 (Resolution); 139-40 (Certification).) Attachment A contained a list of several NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATIONS that held properties in the United States for the rightful ownership of CAMPOS. ( Id. at 105-06 (Campos Sworn Statement).) Five of the defendants in this suit are listed in Attachment A as NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATIONS owning property for Campos; another defendant, who is not listed, has a predecessor in interest on the list (collectively, "the listed defendants"). ( Id.)
Minion Corporation N.V. (a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION)
Oriel Tananta, a Peruvian seaman, injured his back in a slip and fall accident aboard the cruise ship Costa Marina, while the ship was in international waters off the coast of Argentina. Tananta is a waiter employed by Cruise Ships Catering and Service International, N.V. ["CSCS"], a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION: he executed his employment contract in Peru. Prestige Cruises, N.V., a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION, bare-boat chartered the ship, which is owned by Costa Crociere, an Italian corporation. None of the defendants have offices in Florida. However, Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., the marketing agent for Costa Crociere, is located in Florida.
Holding that a NETHERLANDS COURT satisfies the adequate alternative forum requirement
Although the M/V Getafix officially is owned by a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION, The NETHERLANDS CORPORATION which manages the vessel will be the entity to supply necessary testimony and documentation at trial. The uncontested finding of the district court is that "[t]he vessel is managed by a DUTCH CORPORATION which is responsible for the technical maintenance and manning of the vessel."
Under NETHERLANDS TAX LAW, if a DUTCH Corporation holds a substantial block of the stock of a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION, the DUTCH Corporation can receive dividends from the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION exempt from taxation in the Netherlands. Furthermore, a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION owned by a Netherlands holding company is subject to a maximum tax rate of 3 percent in the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES. The low rate of NETHERLANDS ANTILLES TAX, coupled with the Netherlands tax exemption for dividends received, result in high after tax earnings for a Netherlands holding company. Consequently, Group insisted that its share of earnings from the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION be declared and paid as dividends to Group's Netherlands parent corporation.
The controlling law on the subject is found in sections 1441 and 1442, as modified by the Convention and Protocol between the United States and the Netherlands, the relevant portions of which are quoted above herein. Said statutes, Convention and Protocol are silent as to the type of documentation or proof, and the timing thereof, which must be supplied to or by a taxpayer such as this petitioner, in order to secure the benefits of exemption from withholding with regard to the payment of interest to a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION. Respondent's regulation, section 1.1441-6(c), which we have quoted above, in relevant part, does require the execution and filing with PETITIONER of Form 1001. We give every benefit of the doubt to respondent (as we should in testing the adequacy of petitioner's motion for summary judgment), and assume for present purposes that the above regulation is a valid interpretive regulation, issued under the authority of section 7805, the Convention and the Protocol,
(1) 40 Wall Street, a 71-story office building owned by Nyland (CF8) Ltd., a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION which in turn is owned by three Panamanian corporations that issued "bearer" shares to unknown persons
On December 9, 2003 the M/V STELLAMARE lay at the port of Albany, New York for the purpose of loading a large, heavy generator for ocean carriage. The STELLAMARE flew the flag of the Netherlands and was registered in the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES. She was owned by defendant Jumbo Navigation, NV ("Jumbo"), a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION.
The remaining Defendants consist of the following parties. Prestige, a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES COMPANY, acted as the bareboat charterer of the vessel at certain times. (Order at 4 (citation omitted)). CSCS International, also a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION, was Plaintiff's employer. ( Id. (citation omitted)). Costa Cruise Lines, another subsidiary of the Costa group, is the sales and marketing agent for Costa Crociere's vessels that call in the United States. ( Id. (citations omitted)). Costa Cruise Lines is organized under the laws of the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES and does business in the United States. ( Id. (citation omitted)).
a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION; Hal Holding N.V., A NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION; and HAL TRUST, a BERMUDA TRUST, Respondents. No. 46815-4-I. Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 1. November
WASHINGTON CORPORATION; OPT Holdings, Inc., a Washington corporation; OPT II, Inc., a Washington corporation; OPT III, Inc., a Washington corporation; OPT IV, Inc., a Washington corporation; OPT V, Inc
Defendant Jamal Radwan, a United States citizen, is the Chairman and Managing Director of defendant Saudi European Investment Corporation N.V. (" SEIC" ) (a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION), and the former Managing Director of defendant Alef Investment Corporation N.V. (" AIC" ) (a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION). SEIC was incorporated in 1979. Until 1984, SEIC's balance sheet showed a total capital base of $40,000,000, comprised of $20,000,000, which represented 20,000 issued and fully paid shares, and $20,000,000 in " convertible capital notes." The capital note holders-AIC, Dalia Products Corporation (" Dalia" ) (a PANAMANIAN CORPORATION), and NORTH SOUTH Finance Corporation (" North South" ) (a Panamanian Corporation)-were contractually obligated to pay a total of $20,000,000 into SEIC upon the call of SEIC's Managing Director. Twenty thousand authorized but unissued shares were reserved for the convertible capital note holders.
The Crown Building was purchased in September 1981 in the name of Lastura Corporation, N.V., a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION, now called the Canadian Land Company of America, N.V. JOSEPH BERNSTEIN served as director from 1982-84. Its shares were held by two Panamanian companies issuing bearer shares: Trade and Commodities, S.A. and Yewell Compagnia Immobiliera.
Cruise Ships Catering and Services International N.V. (hereafter "CSCS"), is also a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION that purports to have its principal place of business in CURACAO, NETHERLANDS ANTILLES. CSCS was responsible for hiring and placing each of the claimants aboard one of the ships. CSCS contracts with various independent contractors in Monaco with regard to the accounting and personnel related aspects of these vessels, and similarly contracts in large part with a Hollywood, Florida company — International Risk Services, Inc. (hereafter "IRSI") — to administer medical benefits and claims for its unlicensed crew member-employees.
In late 1965, ABC, which then owned all the McAvoy stock, sold 98.53% of it to 30 individuals (the "McAvoy investors") at an aggregate price of $6,800,000, paid by individual unsecured promissory notes in favor of ABC in the full amount of the purchase price for the individual's portion of the stock. The notes bore 10% annual interest, with the first interest payment due by December 31, 1965. Payments on principal were deferred until maturity of the notes in 1972. The investors were primarily clients of Kahan and/or Margolis. ABC assigned the notes to World Minerals, a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION. Before December 31, 1965, the investors paid a total of $475,000 interest to World Minerals, most of the investors borrowing funds for that purpose from Universal Decorating Leasing Company, whose counsel was Harry Margolis. Each investor deducted his payment of interest on his personal income tax returns for 1965, but the Commissioner disallowed the deductions. The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner.
In Hoffman, the court noted that the action did "not involve the policy or management of the corporation," id. at 426, and "only collaterally involve[d] the corporation."
The plaintiff Louis Hoffman, a resident of Baltimore, Maryland, and the defendant Allan N. Goberman, a resident of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, are the sole owners of the capital stock of the St. Maarten Isle Hotel Corporation N.V., which was organized under the laws of the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES. This action, founded on diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount, was brought in the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the judicial district in which the defendant resides. The complaint alleges, inter alia, the following facts:
Taxpayer's use of a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES subsidiary to borrow funds in the EUROPEAN MARKET was a financially-strategic measure. During the early 1980s, domestic interest rates hovered around twenty percent. To circumvent the high interest rates, United States companies turned to FOREIGN investors. By using a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES SUBSIDIARY to borrow funds in the EUROPEAN market, United States companies were able to obtain tax advantages not available through direct borrowing in that market. Section 1441 of the Internal Revenue Code generally requires a domestic taxpayer to withhold a thirty-percent tax on interest paid to nonresident aliens or foreign corporations. However, at the time the transactions in this case occurred, interest payments by a United States corporation to a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION were exempt from withholding tax pursuant to Article VIII of the United States-Netherlands Income Tax Convention ("the Treaty"
Noro-North was a corporation organized under the laws of the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES and maintaining its principal place of business there. All of its stock was owned by a holding company, Noro Sunbelt, N. V., another NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION. Noro Sunbelt was not registered in the United States and all of its stock was foreign owned. Noro-North obtained a certificate of Authority to transact business from the Georgia Secretary of State in 1979, pursuant to OCGA § 14-2-310. The registered agent for service was a law firm.
Nevertheless, despite contacts to other maritime nations, this Court is convinced that the contacts to the United States by the location of the base of operations here are substantial. It is not misled by the "facade" of Panamanian vessels and NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 310, 90 S.Ct. at 1734. The Defendants operate as a whole throughout the world. This operation is possible because the PARENT CORPORATION, Jackson Marine, Inc., headquartered in Aransas Pass, Texas, controls Jackson Marine, S.A. and Jackson Marine Services, N.V. through stock ownership, interlocking directorates, and control of assets, see discussion part II, B. Looking at the "real nature of the operation," id. at 310, 90 S.Ct. at 1734, this Court is compelled to conclude that for the purposes of subject matter jurisdiction the Plaintiff was employed by an American corporation on an American ship which, for all practical purposes, was operated from a home office in Texas. In fairness, it does not believe that the United States courts can be of a "substantial . . difference of opinion" on this issue.
The tax plan developed by Margolis involved basically the payment of $600,000 by petitioners to World Minerals, N.V., a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION, for the purchase of 40,000 shares of common stock of Associated Care Enterprises (Care), a Delaware corporation operating in the health care field. Petitioners were to borrow the $600,000 from Alms, N.V., another NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION, and to pay the first year's interest on the loan, $60,000, before the close of 1969.
In accord with Bankruptcy Court procedures, Treister submitted a matrix of creditors to the Bankruptcy Court. The matrix included the listing of "Oberon Investments, N.V., a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION, c/o Daniel Mones, Attorney, Heller Building, 4500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33137," with a brief description of the case pending in the Florida state court. It is undisputed that the listed address was, and remains, Mones' proper business address. On June 9, 1983, the Bankruptcy Court mailed to all listed creditors a notice stating that September 16, 1983 would be the Bar Date for filing objections to discharge and complaints as to the discharge of any particular debt. The Bankruptcy Court's file contains a certificate of mailing prepared by the Bankruptcy Clerk.
In the first two points of error, appellants contend that the trial court erred in denying their "motion for directed verdict," in concluding that Taher negated all bases of jurisdiction, and in concluding that Taher was not subject to specific jurisdiction in Texas. Under these points, appellants assert that Taher was subject to specific jurisdiction because he had agents who acted in Texas in furtherance of the fraud and whose actions should be imputed to Taher. Appellants allege that SEIC, a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION whose principal asset was a bank in Paris, France; Jamal Radwan, SEIC's chairman; and Ronald F. Reilly, a former resident of Texas who was hired by SEIC in 1983 to work in Europe, were Taher's agents in the fraudulent offering of stock in SEIC.
Defendants have submitted affidavits attesting to the following additional facts in support of their motions. At the time of Decedent's death the Mister Andre was under a bareboat charter to Jackson Marine Services, N.V., a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION (a nonparty), which had in turn, executed a time charter for the year with Brown Root Offshore, N.V., a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION (also a nonparty). The derrick barge Atlas I was also under bareboat charter to Brown Root Offshore, N.V. The Mister John H. was under bareboat charter to Jackson Marine Services, N.V. Prior to the accident, Jackson S.A. assigned Decedent's employment contract to Jackson Marine Services, N.V. with his approval.
Defendant Schlumberger, Limited is a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION and Rochar Electronique was a French corporation. No party, however, contends that the law of France or the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES should be applied in this case.
The Debtor is a Georgia limited partnership. Consulare Corporation, N.V. and Medoff Corporation, N.V., both NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION, are the general partners of the Debtor, and Medoff is currently the Debtor's only limited partner. The Debtor's only asset is an office building located in Cobb County, Georgia. To fully understand the dispute between the Coopers and the Debtor, it is necessary to review the dealings between the parties up to this point in time. The facts recited below are undisputed.
This case arises from the 1992 sale of P.P.I. Del Monte Fresh Produce B.V. (Del Monte) to Trumpet Vine Investments, N.V. (Trumpet Vine). Trumpet Vine is a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION organized by Mexican investors for the purpose of acquiring Del Monte. Trumpet Vine's bid was supported by financing from Nacional Financiera, S.N.C. (NAFINSA), a state-owned economic development bank in Mexico. After the takeover bid was announced, Trumpet Vine filed a declaratory judgment action against Union Capital Partners I, Inc. (UCP) seeking adjudication that UCP was not entitled to monetary damages or injunctive relief arising out of the Del Monte acquisition. UCP filed counterclaims alleging breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, conspiracy to commit fraud and breach of an implied contract. The district court determined that New York law governed each issue and, applying that law, granted summary judgment in favor of Trumpet Vine, dismissing all the counterclaims. This judgment disposed of the litigation. We affirm.
Plaintiff Bartolan, Inc., (Bartolan) a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION registered to do business in the State of Georgia, owns approximately 517 acres of farm land located in Lee County, Georgia. In 1983 Bartolan leased its farm at a fee of $54,000.00 annually to Leon Earl Bass who then sublet the property to Nidrah Peanut Grain, Inc., (Nidrah). The lease agreement was subsequently extended to cover the 1984 crop year and the 1985 crop year. An addendum to the lease and sublease agreements each year set the rental fee at $54,000.00 annually. The sublease agreement was personally guaranteed by the president of Nidrah, Plez Hardin and contains language which grants Bartolan a security interest in all crops growing or to be grown on its farm land. A Uniform Commercial Code Financing Statement pertaining to the 1983 lease agreement and subsequent addendum was executed by Nidrah and presented for filing to the Clerk of Superior Court in Lee County, Georgia.
The traditional view of forum selection clauses is that such clauses are void because they attempt to oust a court of its lawful authority to review a given case. See, e.g., Huntley v. Alejandre, 139 So.2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). However, this view has been severely eroded as is evidenced by our recent decision in Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1986). Manrique addressed the issue of whether Florida courts should enforce forum selection clauses which designate a forum other than Florida for the resolution of the parties' disputes. Fabbri established a corporation in the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES whose principal asset was a parcel of real estate located in Dade County. Fabbri subsequently sold his corporation to another NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION, Continentales. Fabbri sued Continentales in Dade County for breach of contract; Continentales moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the contract at issue contained a clause designating the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES as the forum for litigating any dispute arising between the parties. In finding the clause should be enforced, we rejected the theory that forum selection clauses…
First, the place of the wrongful act factor does not weigh in favor of U.S. law because the alleged wrongful act occurred near the Canary Islands. Second, the law of the flag of the vessel, Allegra, is Liberian law; therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of U.S. law. Next, the allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman is a significant factor.Symonette Shipyards, Ltd. V. Clark, 365 F.2d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 87 S.Ct. 1690 (1967). Because Rodriguez is a citizen of Peru, this factor does not favor U.S. law, it would favor Peruvian law. Further, the allegiance of the shipowner factor does not favor U.S. law because the vessel is owned by either an Italian or NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION. Next, the fifth factor does not weigh in favor of U.S. law either; there is no evidence that Rodriguez entered into an employment contract in the United States. In fact, it does not appear that Rodriguez has even visited the United States.
California is the forum state for the lawsuit initiated by Bioquest. The Technology was initially developed here and is owned by the Regents. VivoRx and its parent Abraxis are California corporations with their principal places of business in California. MedClone, the company that VivoRx replaced as the sublicensee to exploit the Regents’ Technology, is also a California corporation. Bioquest, the other contracting party, is a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION with its principal place of business in CURACAO, NETHERLANDS ANTILLES; its sole shareholder is located in Switzerland; Bioquest has no Massachusetts office. Its former agent and general manager, Aberlyn, did maintain its principal place of business in Massachusetts and administered the 97 Agreement for a time from its offices there, but it has had no connection to the parties to this litigation or their dispute since April 1, 1999, nearly six years before Bioquest filed the lawsuit.
The basic mode of operation of the scheme was as follows. Vogt's illegally obtained money was deposited in various foreign bank accounts in the Grand Cayman Islands and the Netherlands Antilles. From those accounts it was withdrawn from time to time and funnelled through various trust accounts maintained by Levey's law firm and associated law firms and through several foreign and domestic corporations, some formed by Levey or at his direction, ultimately to be used by Vogt for a variety of investments, loans, and luxury purchases. Five corporations, either formed by or at Levey's direction, or sometime clients of his firm, were utilized: Real Tech International, Ltd., chartered in Grand Cayman, British West Indies; Chardon Company NV, chartered in CURACAO, NETHERLANDS ANTILLES; and Silver Realty Corporation, Continental Aero Marine, Inc., and Costalotta, Inc., all chartered in North Carolina, where Vogt maintained his residence and engaged in various ventures following his retirement from the Customs Service in 1979. Also participating in the scheme's functioning, whether or not as culpable principles, were Darryl Myers, a Grand Cayman…
Affirming dismissal of Saudi Arabian investors' suit against NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION over conduct of French bank owned by corporation, where all documents and witnesses were in France or Saudi Arabia and documents were in French and no plaintiffs were American
Judge McKenna properly concluded that the Gilbert public interest factors weigh strongly in favor of France as a forum. First, the interest in having local disputes settled locally weighs heavily against the United States as a forum. This case involves a dispute between a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION and Saudi Arabian shareholders over the conduct of a French bank. Thus, France has a far greater interest in this litigation than the United States. See Allstate, 994 F.2d at 1002.
If this Treaty were given the construction of "party" contended for by Engfar-Manfar, it would follow that unless the States were expressly granted the power to act in some way under the terms of the Treaty, they could not do so. Such an interpretation would lead to absurd conclusions. For instance, since Article XI of the Treaty (tax provision) does not expressly permit the States to impose taxes on NETHERLANDS CORPORATIONS, they would not be permitted to do so. Only the "Parties" would hold this power. Thus, more favorable tax treatment would be accorded to the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION than that granted to the State's own citizens and corporations. This Treaty does not have any such meaning and we would not be justified in so interpreting it.
This brings us to appellants' third line of defense, namely, that the purchaser was not an American but a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION.
World Financial Network National Bank (WFNNB), a national banking association, is a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner. In 1989, WFNNB was organized (and today operates) as a credit card bank to issue credit cards to customers of petitioner's stores. Mast Industries (Far East), Ltd. (MFE), a Hong Kong corporation, also is a wholly owned subsidiary of petitioner. MFE is a controlled foreign corporation within the meaning of section 957 and, with respect to MFE, petitioner is a U.S. shareholder within the meaning of section 951(b). MFE (Netherlands Antilles) N.V. (MFE N.V.), a Netherlands Antilles corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of MFE. On January 28, 1993, MFE N.V. purchased eight certificates of deposit (CDs) from WFNNB in the total amount of $174.9 million (the MFE N.V. CDs). We must determine whether, as a result of those purchases, petitioner must include $174,127,665 in gross income under section 951(a)(1)(B) on account of the investment by MFE of its earnings in U.S. property.
On May 29, 1992, the United States of America, the court-appointed fiduciaries for the four corporate defendants, the District Attorney for New York County, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System filed a joint motion and a proposed Order for the appointment of a trustee to effect the sale or other disposition of all shares of stock in FAC or its assets, including First American Bankshares, Inc. ("FAB") and FAB's subsidiaries. FAC was wholly-owned by a NETHERLANDS CORPORATION named Credit and Commerce American Investments, B.V. ("CCAI"), which, in turn, was wholly-owned by Credit and Commerce American Holdings N.V. ("CCAH"), a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION. Because NETHERLANDS ANTILLES law required authorization of at least 75% of CCAH shareholders before the FAC shares could be transferred to a court-appointed trustee, see Transcript of Motion Hearing, June 16, 1992, at 20-21, the proposed Order and the joint motion for appointment of a trustee had been submitted to the CCAH shareholders for their review and approval prior to being filed with this Court. Over 79% of the CCAH shareholders voted in favor of submitting the proposed…
Plaintiffs, Abdulaziz Alfadda, Abdullah Abbar, Ahmed Zainy, and Abdulla Kanoo, Abdulaziz Kanoo and Yusif Bin Ahmed Kanoo (the latter three plaintiffs referred to as "the Kanoos"), all residents and nationals of Saudi Arabia or Bahrain, filed their complaint in September 1989 naming SEIC, a closely held NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION; Saudi European Bank, S.A. and Alef Bank, S.A., both French banks; Alef Investment Corporation N.V., a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION; Jamal Radwan, chairman of SEIC, and Richard Fenn, former vice-chairman of SEIC, both United States citizens, as defendants.
This is a commercial dispute between fifteen minority shareholders and security holders in Image Sat, a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION whose principal place of business is in Israel, and ImageSat, its two largest shareholders, and about one dozen of its current and former directors and officers. Plaintiff minority shareholders and security holders allege that defendants engaged in various forms of corporate misconduct, and seek compensation for the diminution in value of their holdings. All the defendants but one have moved to dismiss this action under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Their motion is granted, and the action is dismissed.
In 1987, defendant Smith Barney and Primerica merged, with Primerica acquiring all of the shares of Smith Barney. At the time of the merger, plaintiff Lama Holding Company owned approximately 24.9% of the shares of Smith Barney. Lama was at all times the largest single shareholder of Smith Barney. The stock purchased by Lama was designated "Rana Common Stock." Lama, incorporated under the laws of Delaware, was formed expressly to acquire and hold stock in Smith Barney for resale at a profit. Lama had purchased its interest in Smith Barney in 1982, for approximately $40 million, through a tritiered corporate structure. Lama was owned by two foreign entities, with 66.6% owned by Rana Investments Ltd., a British Virgin Islands corporation, and 33.3% owned by Rasha Investments, N.V., a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION. Rana owned 100% of Rasha, and both were part of a Middle Eastern investment group. The acquisition of Smith Barney stock by Lama was part of a complex structure created to take advantage of favorable United States tax treatment under the "General Utilities Doctrine," pursuant to which a domestic corporation could sell its assets under
Through the use of numerous nominees, BCCI owned a controlling interest in CCAH, which is a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION and a bank holding company within the meaning of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. CCAI, a wholly owned subsidiary of CCAH, is also a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION and a bank holding company. CCAH and CCAI were formed in 1978 to acquire control and ownership of Financial General Bankshares, a bank holding company that subsequently was renamed and became FAB, which was wholly owned by FAC.
CIT had letterhead stationary for most of the system entities including Alms, Minerals, Koningsplein, ABC and Entertainers, all of which had been printed in the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES. The law of the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES required that documents, including agreements and notes, to which an ANTILLES CORPORATION was a party, be on official paper embossed with the seal of the NETHERLANDS ANTILLES. Such official paper could be bought only from a government [53 TCM (CCH) 22] office in the ANTILLES. Frequently, in dealing with system entities, Valkenberg was instructed to back date a memorandum or letter and she would follow that instruction as directed.
Eres, a Belgian corporation, chartered the M/T Tabora, a vessel owned by Northern Fox, a NETHERLANDS ANTILLES CORPORATION to deliver a shipment of bitumen from CURACAO, NETHERLANDS ANTILLEN, to a predetermined place just outside Nigerian waters near the port of Lagos, Nigeria. In the fall of 2002 Eres and Northern Fox engaged in a dispute with Fidelity, a bank organized and located in Nigeria that held the bills of lading for the cargo (bitumen), over the failed delivery of the cargo. That dispute eventually led Fidelity to have the M/T Tabora arrested in the port of Baltimore, Maryland, on March 31, 2005, pursuant to a verified complaint, which included Eres and Northern Fox as defendants. The complaint sought $8,871,076 in damages.
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Your insurance policy is a CONTRACT between you and the insurance company. It entitles you to certain rights and imposes certain obligations. As Certified Professional Restoration Contractors we have prepared this BILL OF RIGHTS so that you may better understand the policy you have purchased, and how it relates to the repairs you may undertake. The standard Homeowners policy generally contains the same provisions throughout the United States and Canada; here are some of your rights and obligations under its terms:

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📷1. YOU MAY TAKE, AND BE FULLY COMPENSATED FOR, THE COST OF EMERGENCY STEPS TO SAFEGUARD YOUR PROPERTY FROM FURTHER DAMAGE AFTER A LOSS. In fact you have an obligation to do so under the terms of your policy. The insurance company may not be liable for additional expense if you fail to provide such protection.

1. IF YOU HAVE SECURED ADEQUATE COVERAGE, YOU ARE ENTITLED TO BE PAID FOR THE FAIR COST OF FULLY RESTORING YOUR HOME TO ITS PRE-DAMAGE CONDITION. However, you are not insured for the repair of unrelated problems, code deficiencies, or prior damage.

3.YOU ARE ENTITLED TO EMPLOY AND SHOULD INSIST UPON A FULLY LICENSED AND INSURED REPAIR FIRM OF GOOD REPUTATION. However, if you do not choose to employ such a firm the consequences and liability for any injury, damage, or other action may rest with you.

1. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO EMPLOY A FIRM WITH SUFFICIENT EXPERIENCE AND STABILITY IN THE COMMUNITY TO STAND BEHIND ITS WORK AND WARRANTY RESPONSIBILITIES. YOU ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO USE THE INSURANCE COMPANY’S PREFERRED VENDOR. The repair contract and its performance is strictly between you and the contractor.
   
2. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO MATERIALS AND WORKMANSHIP FULLY EQUIVALENT TO YOUR EXISTING INSTALLATION IN LIKE KIND AND QUALITY. The insurance company has no obligation to improve your existing installation.
   
3. YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO ACCEPT THE LOWEST BIDDER. NOWHERE IN YOUR POLICY DO THE WORDS “CHEAPEST”, “LOW”, OR “LOWEST PRICE” OCCUR. However, repair rates & estimate should correspond to prevailing standards in your area for work of good quality.
   
4. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO AND SHOULD REJECT ANY CONTRACT THAT DOES NOT INCORPORATE ALL FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL REQUIREMENTS FOR RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION WORK. However, you must be familiar with these requirements in order to enjoy the protection the law provides. Ask an Industry Certified Restoration Contractor for this important information.
   

📷8. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO SELECT A FIRM WHO CAN DEMONSTRATE SKILL AND EXPERIENCE IN INSURANCE DAMAGE REPAIR AS A FULL TIME PROFESSIONAL SERVICE. Ask for references, credentials, and association membership that indicate professional training and status in insurance repair, as contrasted with ordinary home improvement work.

1. IF SUBSTANTIAL DISAGREEMENT ARISES BETWEEN YOU AND THE INSURANCE COMPANY OVER THE AMOUNT OF THE LOSS YOU ARE ENTITLED TO REQUEST ARBITRATION (“APPRAISAL”) AS DESCRIBED UNDER THE TERMS OF THE POLICY. LINES 123-140 OF THE STANDARD HOMEOWNERS FORM SPELL OUT THESE PROCEDURES FOR SETTLING DIFFERENCES WITHOUT RESORTING TO LAWSUIT. The restoration company also is entitled to this provision, which may be invoked at any time prior to settlement, whether or not you have received advanced payments.
   
2. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO RECEIVE PAYMENT FROM THE INSURANCE COMPANY WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED BY THE POLICY AND YOUR STATE INSURANCE REGULATIONS, WHICH ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT INSURANCE COMPANIES FROM USING DELAY AND PERSONAL HARDSHIP TO COMPEL A LOWER SETTLEMENT. However, the policy also has time requirements for the policyholder, within which you must prepare and submit your claim. Ask your adjuster or agent about these at the outset, so that you can be in compliance.
   

Flood Insurance Policy Holder

SINCE YOU ARE THE POLICYHOLDER, ONLY YOU CAN DEMAND THAT YOUR INSURANCE COMPANY LIVE UP TO ITS OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE POLICY. As Professional Restoration Contractors, we recommend that you do so, out of a strong conviction that fair dealing, good workmanship, and ethical business practices benefit the insurance industry just as they benefit the public at large.
Note: This “Bill of Rights” has been distributed for educational purposes only. The use of the information contained herein should be done at the best professional judgement of the Restoration Contractor. This “Bill of Rights” has no intended objective other than to inform any interested parties as to their rights and/or obligations when involved in an insurance repair claim.

Flood Insurance Companies

• USAA
• Farmers Insurance
• Liberty Mutual
• Travelers
• Geico
• Allstate