Giants @ Pirates - Tue, May 21

Game Status: Game Over - Score: 7-6 Pirates

Links & Info

• MLB Gameday
• Game Graphs
• Savant Gamefeed

Decisions

• Winner: David Bednar (3-3, 7.45)
• Loser: Erik Miller (0-2, 4.50)

Division Scoreboard

*Heading ** Job name: SpringStiffnessVariation Model name: Model-1 ** Generated by: Abaqus/CAE ** ** PARTS ** *Part, name=SpringPart *Node 1, 0., 0., 0. 2, 1., 0., 0. *Element, type=SPRINGA 1, 1, 2 *Elset, elset=SPRINGA 1 *Nset, nset=ALLNODES 1, 2 *End Part ** ** ASSEMBLY ** *Assembly, name=Assembly *Instance, name=SpringPart-1, part=SpringPart *Spring, elset=SpringPart-1.SPRINGA SpringMaterial, 1.0 *End Instance *End Assembly ** ** MATERIALS ** *Material, name=SpringMaterial *Elastic, dependencies=1 1.0, 0.0 ** ** AMPLITUDE ** *Amplitude, name=StiffnessAmplitude 0.0, 1.0 1.0, 1.5 2.0, 2.0 ** ** INITIAL CONDITIONS ** *Initial Conditions, type=FIELD, variable=1 SpringPart-1.ALLNODES, 1.0 ** ** STEP: Apply Load ** *Step, name=ApplyLoad, nlgeom=NO *Static 0.1, 1.0, 1e-05, 0.1 ** *Boundary SpringPart-1.1, 1, 1, 0. ** *Boundary SpringPart-1.2, 1, 1, 0.1 ** *Output, field, variable=PRESELECT ** *End Step 

1. Import model to Abaqus, that gives an adequate response:The model "ABQdummy" has been created. The model "test_spring_one" has been created. The part "SPRINGPART" has been imported from the input file. The model "test_spring_one" has been imported from an input file. Please scroll up to check for error and warning messages.
2. Then I create a job, the response is:The job "Job-1" has been created.
3. Then I submit the job and I get:The job input file "Job-1.inp" has been submitted for analysis. Error in job Job-1: THIS MODEL HAS EITHER INCORRECT OR NO ELEMENT DEFINITIONS. Job Job-1: Analysis Input File Processor aborted due to errors. Error in job Job-1: Analysis Input File Processor exited with an error - Please see the Job-1.dat file for possible error messages if the file exists. Job Job-1 aborted due to errors.

The model "Model-1" from model database "C:/PhD/abaqus/MassSpring.cae" has been imported as "Model-1". The job "Job-1" has been created. The job input file "Job-1.inp" has been submitted for analysis. Job Job-1: Analysis Input File Processor completed successfully. Job Job-1: Abaqus/Explicit Packager completed successfully. Job Job-1: Abaqus/Explicit completed successfully. Job Job-1 completed successfully. 

DIRECTIVE FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE EAST PRUSSIAN OFFENSIVE OPERATION
TO THE CORPS COMMANDERS AND CHIEFS OF THE TROOP BRANCHES OF THE 2ND SHOCK ARMY
When preparing for a breakthrough, I require you to focus particular attention on the following issues:
PREPERATORY PERIOD
[1)]
a) Study in the entire tactical depth of the enemy’s defense his engineering structures and obstacles, infantry and anti-tank fire systems, artillery and mortar groups, and the system of observation posts.
b) Know the areas where reserves are concentrated and the possible directions of counterattacks. Senior commanders (commanders of rifle corps and rifle divisions) must also know the operational depth of the enemy’s defense, the location of his operational reserves, the possibility of meeting them and on what lines.
c) Know where tanks are concentrated and the possible directions of their actions.
d) Using an observation system and studying all intelligence data in detail, establish the combat routine of the defending enemy.
2) Organization of observation
a) No later than December 25 the army headquarters will equip one OP [Observation Point] (main) in each direction and two auxiliary ones, providing them with communications equipment, surveillance equipment and specially trained officers.
b) Corps and division commanders must determine places for OPs and report to me no later than 12/18.
All OPs from the platoon commander and above must ensure complete observation of the terrain from the starting position according to the principle - every commander must see the battlefield.
Telephones should be placed at the OP for those where the commander is monitoring the battlefield.
c) Artillery and infantry observation should be organized by the army headquarters from 12/20/44, corps and divisions - by special order with the obligatory keeping of observation logs and a report to the top.
Observation data for the day should be submitted to corps headquarters and artillery headquarters to army headquarters by 10 p.m. daily.
d) At the OP from regiments and above, specially trained and instructed officers (3-4 people), headed by a staff officer and provided with security (2-3 machine gunners), must be located and monitored.
Observers should change every 2 hours.
The senior officer must visit the OP at least once a day.
e) Each commander must have a map with data from his personal observation and data received from other commanders (in different colors).
Artillery and infantry commanders should compare the data received by each of them about the enemy to clarify them.
f) By 12/28, the Army Headquarters will provide the corps and divisions with maps filled with the situation about the enemy based on data received from the defenders, observation from the OPs and from other sources.
3) Study the area
a) Study in detail the features of the terrain in front of the enemy’s front line of defense, in the tactical depth of his defense, and for higher commanders in the operational depth. Pay special attention to studying the terrain in tank terms.
b) Keeping in mind the open nature of the terrain, carefully study all approaches to the enemy’s front line, possible starting positions for the attack and the directions along which the artillery will advance.
Know the roads leading to the front line from the depths, and the roads in the depths of the enemy’s defense in the zone intended for the offensive.
4) Secrecy and camouflage of measures taken to prepare the operation
a) Regrouping of troops (infantry, artillery, tanks) should be carried out only at night.
Carefully camouflage the areas where troops are located, preventing the appearance of smoke during the day and the lighting of fires at night.
b) Eliminate any possibility of communication and conversations with the local population. Under no circumstances should commanders and fighters be allowed to be housed with local residents.
The headquarters of units and formations are usually located in a forest.
c) Warn all personnel about the inadmissibility of revealing the numbering of army units and formations.
d) Avoid talking on the phone about ongoing events. The commanders of the formations personally approve the lists of persons to whom telephone numbers are left and the right to converse.
Strictly prohibit the use of radio equipment until the moment of the attack.
e) Do not allow signs indicating unit numbers, field mail and commanders' names, as well as identification marks of hospitals and rear institutions to be displayed at intersections and at entrances to areas where formations and units are located. The latter will be displayed by special order.
f) Take the strictest measures to protect documents and maps, preventing their loss. Do not take maps with the details of your units to the front line.
g) Army headquarters, rifle corps headquarters, rifle divisions and rifle regiments organize a commandant service, establish commandant posts and patrols and carefully instruct them.
Commandant posts and patrols should not allow accumulations of vehicles, horse-drawn vehicles and manpower, especially in areas of visibility, and ensure strict compliance with all camouflage instructions.
Inform all personnel that the requirements of commandant posts and patrols are mandatory for all officers, regardless of official position.
h) All reconnaissance should be carried out in accordance with special instructions.
5) Combat training
Combat training begins on 12/20/44.
Combat training of troops differs from general combat training in that it is carried out in a specific environment.
Commanders of formations and units should organize combat training based on the specific tasks of each unit (being in the first or second echelon, with whom and when it interacts, etc.).
Conduct combat training on terrain as similar as possible to the one on which you will operate.
Corps and division commanders should be ready for an operational game at army headquarters by 12/26/44 based on the materials and conditions of the operation being prepared.
6) Work of headquarters
a) All headquarters prepare a complete schedule of urgent reports and the procedure for its implementation.
Establish a list of officers responsible for information from higher headquarters, formations of supporting and interacting units.
Consider the failure of the transmission of at least one report at any link to be an emergency.
Pay special attention to the truthfulness of the information.
b) Check the readiness of all means of communication: telephone, telegraph, radio, mobile vehicles (liaison officers, cars, motorcycles, etc.).
Have a reserve of radio equipment to create intermediate stations, especially for communication with mobile groups.
c) Check the distribution of functional responsibilities among staff officers and their mastery.
d) Ensure control over the implementation of combat orders of commanders. Following a combat order, an officer of the operations directorate (department) must be sent to the troops to monitor the implementation of this order.
The officers sent must be instructed by the formation commander or chief of staff and have a firm knowledge of the mission of the formation, unit or subunit to which they are sent.
e) Minimize the production time for operational documents, without in any way “eating up” the time of lower headquarters.
f) Carefully work out in advance all interaction documents for the entire depth of the battle.
g) Prepare SUV (Covert troop management) documents in advance and send them to the troops.
Immediately upon receipt of them, organize training and ensure free use of them by all officers, especially officers and administrators.
7) Logistical support
a) Carefully check the condition of automatic weapons. Each fighter must have the prescribed number of cartridges, each machine gun must have the prescribed number of belts and disks. Belts should not be damp.
Check the winding of the seals, the tension of the return springs, the availability of spacer rings (spare), extractors and antifreeze fluid.
In rifle platoons, which are intended for special work in clearing mines and laying paths for infantry, have carts for pulling away wire and other obstacles.
b) Check the ammunition from the rifle to the gun. Determine where to store ammunition, who, how and where to supply it.
c) The equipment of each fighter must be checked (fitting of uniform, equipment, contents of duffel bag, etc.).
d) Prepare a backpack supply for soldiers in the amount of one daily allowance, the issuance of which will be carried out by special order of division commanders.
Check the feeding arrangements, especially on the first day of the fight.
e) All vehicles must be repaired, possible routes determined, fuel depots installed. Each driver must be familiar with these routes and road conditions in advance. Cars must have chains and tools (shovels, axes).
f) Put horse-drawn transport in order.
g) On roads in the army zone, install signs at all intersections indicating populated areas, marking altitudes and azimuths of directions.
h) In crossing areas, prepare gaps and exits from roads every 50 m in both directions. Crossings should be distributed among commanders of formations and a commandant service should be established on them, avoiding the accumulation of vehicles, horse-drawn vehicles or manpower.
i) Establish a procedure for evacuating the wounded. Designate sanitary picket points.
Explain to the soldiers that the wounded must bring their weapons to the dressing station, and the weapons of the seriously wounded must be picked up by orderlies.
j) Explain to all fighters the inadmissibility of using captured products and “junk”.
k) All commanders should check the unit’s logistics on a daily basis.
PREPARATION AND OCCUPATION OF THE STARTING POSITION FOR THE ATTACK
1) The day before the troops reach their starting position, mark the routes to it for each company to prevent wandering and mixing of units. Set up beacons.
Take the most decisive measures so that soldiers and officers cannot get lost and fall into the hands of the enemy. Under no circumstances should you allow yourself to go over to the enemy’s side.
2) Study the starting position and equip it so that the infantry and materiel are completely covered. Eliminate the possibility of exposure and losses of manpower and materiel.
Considering the dampness of the soil and the appearance of track marks on it after turning off the road, these marks should be immediately smoothed out.
3) Regiment commanders prepare and fix roads to pull everything necessary to the starting position.
4) Consider the organization of communication when reaching the starting position.
5) Reach the starting position over two nights.
On the first night, bring out heavy infantry fire weapons and direct fire weapons. Those guns that can be seen in positions by the enemy should be brought out on the second night.
On the second night, bring out the infantry.
6) When taking over a combat area from defending units, carefully study your own and enemy’s minefields.
Clear your minefields located in the depths of the defense in advance; those located in front of the front line should be cleared of mines two to three days before the offensive, organizing the protection of the passages.
Clear enemy minefields within two nights. This demining is carried out under conditions of careful camouflage from enemy observation.
7) Before leaving for the starting position, explain to all personnel: for what, where and how should they do it, what secrecy and camouflage measures to take.
Bring the combat mission to the fighters 4 hours before the start of the attack.
INFANTRY ATTACK AND COMBAT IN THE DEPTH OF THE ENEMY'S DEFENSE
1) Build battle formations not according to a template, but taking into account the specific actions of each unit and subunit.
During a frontal breakthrough, the battle formation will be straightforward, in a forest battle - along road directions, when crossing rivers - echeloned, and when fighting in the depths of defense - maneuverable.
Pay special attention to the placement of forces and weapons in combat formations at all stages and in all conditions, so that fire weapons do not lag behind the infantry.
Senior commanders check the decisions of subordinate commanders, carefully explain the shortcomings they made in the formation of battle formations and indicate measures to eliminate these shortcomings.
2) Every Red Army soldier must understand that the main goal of an organized breakthrough of the enemy’s defense is to reach the firing positions of his artillery in the first 2-3 hours of the battle.
3) Remind each officer once again that combined arms combat consists of three elements:
a) organizing artillery fire support,
b) organizing close combat between infantry and tanks and
c) organizing close interaction between these two elements.
4) Remember that the basis of artillery fire support is not artillery preparation, but the organization of artillery fire in the depths of the enemy’s defense.
Every officer must know that the success of artillery fire depends on good organization of reconnaissance, on his knowledge of the capabilities of all means of reinforcement and the correct formulation of tasks.
5) An infantry strike must be preceded by a fire strike. This means that it is necessary to follow this order: reconnaissance, then fire strike, then attack, and not the reverse.
6) During the attack, under no circumstances should infantry be allowed to lie in the first trench. It is dangerous because it causes a desire to take cover and, as a rule, is always targeted by enemy artillery.
Don't linger at temporary stops; The longer people lie, the more difficult it is to raise them, the greater the losses.
The attack must be swift.
7) All means must be used to hit one place. Everything must be linked together.
I forbid pointing at others: “The tanks failed,” “The infantry did not rise,” “The artillery did not support.”
Check the implementation of interaction issues at all levels.
The artillery commanders will be with the infantry commanders.
8) During a battle deep in the enemy’s defense, obtaining accurate data on the enemy’s behavior becomes of utmost importance. Report about the enemy only quantitatively, and not organizationally, i.e. 30-40 soldiers and not a company or platoon.
Report exactly where and what enemy firing points are hindering the advance. Do not allow the expressions: “Heavy machine gun or mortar fire.”
9) Each commander knows at any time the position and condition of the formation (unit). The situation report must always be truthful.
The commander must have the courage to report whether his unit can carry out the order at a given moment, and if not, then for what reasons.
10) The depth of the enemy’s tactical defense in front of the army’s front lies at the line of 6-8 km from the front edge (the artillery positions). Until we reached the artillery positions, the breakthrough was not realized.
11) Consider the tactics of using tanks by the enemy:
a) for counterattacks with small groups of infantry,
b) as fixed firing points (armored fortified points) and
c) in night battle conditions.
Introduce to every officer the procedure for organizing anti-tank defense, which should include:
– a two-tier construction of the AT defense is provided;
– measures to combat both counterattack tanks and armored fortified points are indicated.
Take measures to consolidate occupied lines.
The two-tier construction of AT defense should be understood as follows:
– first tier – fire weapons from platoon to regiment (from anti-tank grenades to regimental guns); this tier is mobile and is located in infantry combat formations; his task is to fight enemy tanks and self-propelled guns encountered along the path of troops;
– the second tier is organized in depth from anti-tank fighter regiments and other artillery reinforcement means. This tier moves in jumps from line to line and ensures the advancement of the infantry.
A solid knowledge by officers and soldiers of the order of constructing anti-tank support prevents tank fear.
Each unit should have groups of sapper-hunters to blow up tanks.
12) The battle must be continuous, waged day and night. Continuity is achieved through reserves and the use of battalions specially trained for night combat. When issuing an order to commit a reserve to battle, the same order should also indicate the creation of a new reserve.
The order for a night battle should be given in such a way that the unit is not late in starting action.
13) The attack must be general. Do not allow the formation's battle to turn into battles of individual units. This can only be achieved by good observation of the enemy, knowledge of the situation, immediate response to the course of the battle, and solving the problem using fire weapons.
14) The battle must be deep, which means that commanders are required to know not only the object they are attacking, but also what is behind it, by organizing deep reconnaissance.
15) Provide advance relocation to new command posts and OPs. The relocation plan must be approved in advance by a senior commander. The axis of movement of the command post must be known to junior commanders.
You can move to a new point only when communication is established there.
16) Commanders who have personal radio stations should always keep them with them and during the offensive do not move forward without them.
17) The names of the commanders of units and formations are addressed on the radio only by their operational call signs, because some of them were published in the orders of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and mentioning them will enable the enemy to establish from which front these units or formations arrived.
18) Prohibit communications on the radio in the clear. Use only communications tables, reference diagrams and coded maps.
ISSUES OF ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF FIRE
1) All commanders should check their subordinates’ knowledge of the materiel, ability to eliminate delays, and tactically, competently, fire and use each type of weapon.
2) Check all weapons for trouble-free operation and combat accuracy.
3) Require officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel to make full use of infantry fire, especially at the moment when artillery fire will be transferred from the first trench to the second.
Carefully consider infantry fire according to the stages of the battle.
2-3 minutes before launching an attack, heavy machine guns should open fire on the enemy trench under attack. Be sure to take into account which heavy machine guns will go on the attack with the infantry and which ones will support them with fire.
Light machine guns must be completely in the combat formations of the attacking infantry and fire on the move and from short stops.
Fire from machine guns on the move during an attack, taking into account to save ammunition when you need to fight in the second and subsequent trenches.
4) Artillery commanders should not dismiss the organization of fire combat for the infantry itself. Take into account the fire of heavy and light machine guns in planning.
5) The guns will be assigned to companies and platoons; you should always help them move with you, and not abandon them.
6) Commanders of rifle corps and divisions and artillery commanders should give instructions to officers up to the company commander on how and what type of artillery should be assigned tasks.
7) Each commander is obliged to know what assets are operating in his offensive zone in addition to his group. Every leader should inform his subordinates about this so that they can take it into account when making a decision.
8) Division commanders must approve the OP for direct fire guns. Each direct fire weapon must have its own target, the nature and position of this target, the number of shells to hit it, and the time for their consumption.
Rifle corps, divisions and regiments must have general fire plans for direct fire guns.
Direct fire guns should only be placed on the observation posts when the latter are fully prepared and all work is camouflaged. After installing direct fire guns, they should also be carefully camouflaged so that the enemy could not guess their presence even with the help of photographs.
9) In terms of artillery fire for the destruction of trenches, each artillery and mortar battery must have its own area, preventing firing in areas.
Check target numbers with batteries and guns to ensure there are no typos or errors. Also check the trench numbers.
10) Particularly consider the issue of organizing fire to repel counterattacks of small groups of the enemy, with the help of which he seeks to delay our advance. In such cases, the counterattacking infantry must be met with organized fire and, pursuing it, burst into his trenches on the shoulders of the enemy.
11) When moving artillery, first of all move those batteries whose fire has reached the [range] limit.
ISSUES OF USING TANKS AND SELF-PROPELLED GUNS
1) Eliminate the shortcomings in the use of self-propelled artillery that occurred in previous battles: excessive fragmentation of self-propelled units, the use of self-propelled guns as tanks, lack of proper assistance from sappers in clearing mines, building bridges, etc.
Self-propelled guns are used to reinforce regiments as infantry escort weapons.
In regimental battle formations, self-propelled guns should be placed behind the infantry.
2) Provide assigned tanks with fire from the guns of the infantry's anti-tank system. The guns accompanying the tanks must be accurately aimed at the enemy firing points that they need to suppress.
3) Fully use the minesweeper tanks attached to formations. The actions of these tanks will be supported by infantry fire.
To remove and neutralize mines not detonated by minesweeper tanks, assign sapper groups to accompany them.
ENTERING RESERVES INTO BATTLE
(second echelons)
1) Take all necessary measures to eliminate the possibility of delay in bringing reserves (second echelons) into battle.
The commanders of the reserve units must be at the OP together with the commanders of the units advancing in the first echelon.
2) Commanders of reserve units are required to conduct reconnaissance on all possible directions of action of their units.
3) Thoroughly work out on the ground issues of interaction related to the introduction of reserves. Determine the boundaries of deployment, reassignment of reinforcement equipment, establish signals and the procedure for organizing communications.
Avoid delays in switching amplifiers.
INTRODUCTION OF MOBILE GROUPS INTO THE BREAKTHROUGH
Commanders of rifle divisions and regiments can be appointed heads of mobile groups. They need to remember the following:
– more initiative; do not wait for the decision of senior commanders;
– conduct thorough reconnaissance, especially engineering;
– always have a group of sappers ready to clear mine routes, fix roads, and build bridges;
– in case of major damage, use all available human resources to correct it, without waiting for the sapper units to arrive;
– ensure communication both within the group and especially with the highest headquarters of the formation in whose zone it operates;
– before the introduction of a mobile group, check that the issues of interaction, communication and support have been worked out by the commander in whose zone the group operates.
BATTLE MANAGEMENT ISSUES
1) By 12/20/44, check the staffing, composition and preparedness of the headquarters of company and battalion commanders and the availability of communications equipment. Avoid loss of control in this link.
Every officer must once again understand that control during battle is the basis of success; its loss threatens to disrupt the offensive.
2) Rocket signals should be a means of control only by the regiment commander. Other commanders duplicate these signals.
The signals should be common throughout the breakthrough area.
3) Use only white flares to indicate our front line when flying our aircraft. These missiles should only be launched at the very front line. Prohibit the use of white flares for any other signals. Corps commanders should check and report the presence of white flares and signal pistols.
4) Ensure that rifle units (companies) are always combat-ready. It is necessary to maintain a combination of manpower and fire.
After each battle, restore the combat readiness and firepower of the attacking units.
5) Each commander must have two pre-appointed deputies.

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