https://preview.redd.it/w3wbxgjzze0d1.png?width=3500&format=png&auto=webp&s=c343619687a11525804d04f755c495d975b2050d
VANCOUVER, British Columbia, May 14, 2024 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) -- MAG Silver Corp. (TSX / NYSE American: MAG) (“MAG”, or the “Company”) announces the Company’s unaudited consolidated financial results for the three months ended March 31, 2024 (“Q1 2024”). For details of the unaudited condensed interim consolidated financial statements of the Company for the three months ended March 31, 2024 (“Q1 2024 Financial Statements”) and management’s discussion and analysis for the three months ended March 31, 2024 (“Q1 2024 MD&A”), please see the Company’s filings on the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval Plus (“SEDAR+”) at ( www.sedarplus.ca ) or on the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (“EDGAR”) at ( www.sec.gov ).
All amounts herein are reported in $000s of United States dollars (“US$”) unless otherwise specified (C$ refers to Canadian dollars).
KEY HIGHLIGHTS (on a 100% basis unless otherwise noted)

• MAG reported net income of $14,895 ($0.14 per share) driven by income from Juanicipio (equity accounted) of $19,244, and adjusted EBITDA 1 of $32,447 for the three months ended March 31, 2024.
• A total of 325,683 tonnes of ore at a silver head grade of 476 grams per tonne (“g/t”) (equivalent silver head grade 2 713 g/t), was processed at Juanicipio during Q1 2024.
• Juanicipio achieved silver production and equivalent silver production 2 of 4.5 and 6.4 million ounces, respectively, during Q1 2024.
• Juanicipio delivered robust cost performance with cash cost 1 of $2.50 per silver ounce sold ($8.66 per equivalent silver ounce sold 3 ), and all-in sustaining cost 1 of $6.11 per silver ounce sold ($11.22 per equivalent silver ounce sold 3 ) in Q1 2024.
• Juanicipio generated strong operating cash flow of $42,521 and free cash flow 1 of $27,820 in the first quarter of 2024 after tax payments of $25,772.
• Juanicipio returned a total of $17,459 in interest and loan principal repayments to MAG during Q1 2024.
• MAG published its updated technical report on Juanicipio on March 27, 2024 outlining robust economics with an after tax NPV of $1.2 billion over an initial 13-year life of mine, generating annual average free cashflow exceeding $130 million. Mineral Resources increased by 33% from the 2017 PEA, with substantial growth in Measured and Indicated categories. Inferred resources also expanded, highlighting significant near-term, high-grade upside potential. An inaugural 15.4 million tonnes Mineral Reserve Estimate at 628 g/t silver equivalent grade was declared enhancing economic confidence. Extensive exploration upside remains, with only 5% of the property explored, indicating high potential for further discoveries.
• MAG announced 2024 production and cost guidance with Juanicipio expected to produce between 14.3 million and 15.8 million silver ounces yielding between 13.2 million and 14.6 million payable silver ounces at all-in sustaining costs of between $9.50 and $10.50 per silver ounce sold. Juanicipio remains on track to achieve 2024 guidance.
• On March 22, 2024 the Company, through its Gatling Exploration Inc. subsidiary, acquired 100% ownership of the Goldstake property (contiguous to its current land holdings) from Goldstake Explorations Inc. and Transpacific Resources Inc., for consideration of C$5,000.

________________________
1 Adjusted EBITDA, total cash costs, cash cost per ounce, all-in sustaining costs, all-in sustaining cost per ounce and free cash flow are non-IFRS measures, please see below ‘ Non-IFRS Measures ’ section and section 12 of the Q1 2024 MD&A for a detailed reconciliation of these measures to the Q1 2024 Financial Statements.
2 Equivalent silver head grade and equivalent silver production have been calculated using the following price assumptions to translate gold, lead and zinc to “equivalent” silver head grade and “equivalent” silver production: $23/oz silver, $1,950/oz gold, $0.95/lb lead and $1.15/lb zinc.
3 Equivalent silver ounces sold have been calculated using realized price assumptions to translate gold, lead and zinc to “equivalent” silver ounces sold (metal quantity, multiplied by metal price, divided by silver price). Q1 2024 realized prices of $23.73/oz silver, $2,112.27/oz gold, $0.92/lb lead and $1.08/lb zinc.
CORPORATE

• The Company is well underway with the preparation of its 2023 sustainability report underscoring its continued commitment to transparency with its stakeholders while providing a comprehensive overview of the Company’s environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) commitments, practices and performance for 2023. A copy of MAG’s 2022 sustainability report and MAG Silver 2022 ESG Data Table are available on the Company’s website at https://magsilver.com/esg/reports/ 4

________________________
4 Information contained in or otherwise accessible through the Company’s website, including the 2022 sustainability report and MAG Silver 2022 ESG Data Table, do not form part of this News Release and are not incorporated into this News Release by reference.
EXPLORATION

• Juanicipio:
  • Infill drilling at Juanicipio continued in Q1 2024 from underground aimed at upgrading mineralization in areas expected to be mined in the near to mid-term. During Q1 2024, 11,271 metres were drilled from underground.
  • Surface drilling focused on expanding and upgrading the deeper zones and broader regional exploration started in April 2024.
  • During 2024, Juanicipio plans to drill a total of 50,000 metres, with 33,000 metres from underground and 17,000 metres from surface.
• Deer Trail Project, Utah:
  • On May 29, 2023 MAG started a Phase 3 drilling program focused on up to three porphyry “hub” target areas thought to be the source of the manto, skarn, epithermal mineralization and extensive alteration throughout the project area including that at the Deer Trail and Carissa zones. In late 2023 an early onset of winter snowfall impacted the commencement of the third porphyry “hub” target, which is now expected to be drilled in 2024. The two completed “hub” holes to date total 2,738 metres. Both holes intercepted alteration and mineralization in line with what is expected on the edges of porphyry systems. Follow-up drill targets are planned for summer 2024.
  • With the early onset of snowfall, Phase 4 drilling focussed on lower elevations commenced in the last quarter of 2023 and continued through Q1 2024, aimed at offsetting the Carissa discovery and testing other high-potential targets in the Deer Trail mine area. During Q1 2024, 1,208 metres were drilled at Carissa with results pending.
• Larder Project, Ontario:
  • Drilling targeting Cheminis and Bear totalled 5,391 metres in Q1 2024. Targets tested include down plunge extension of the high-grade double knuckle at the Bear East zone and extending the Cheminis south mine sequence down plunge.
  • Cheminis Update: Follow-up drilling of the Cheminis South Cadillac-Larder Break (“CLD”) mine sequence down plunge is planned to test below the most recent intercepts. Hole GAT-24-026 intersected a new zone on the north side of the CLB within a fuchsite-silica-albite altered komatiite grading 3.9 g/t gold over 16 metres with 2 higher grade shoots associated with albite dykes (see Table 1 below).
  • Bear Update: Utilizing the updated model and incorporating the updated data from recent drilling, the Bear East zone was successfully extended down plunge by up to 1,100 metres depth. Hole GAT-24-024NB intersected gold mineralization on both sides of the CLB which confirms the presence of either another structural trap at depth or the continuation of the “double knuckle” zone at surface. Gold mineralization intersected on the north zone included 9.4 g/t gold over 2.2 metres within a strongly altered komatiite with syenite intrusions and 1.6 g/t gold over 4.2 metres on the south zone within the south iron-rich volcanics (see Table 1 below). Bear East remains open in all directions.

Table 1: 2024 Larder Drillholes Highlights
https://preview.redd.it/qdr6asmzze0d1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=aaedd0020755eaf3404201557cc9623acc995125
JUANICIPIO RESULTS
All results of Juanicipio in this section are on a 100% basis, unless otherwise noted.
Operating Performance
The following table and subsequent discussion provide a summary of the operating performance of Juanicipio for the three months ended March 31, 2024 and 2023, unless otherwise noted.
https://preview.redd.it/9txq8snzze0d1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=0089cf57573e8834bdb641cf9e055619e6f6c5b2
(1) Equivalent silver head grades have been calculated using the following price assumptions to translate gold, lead and zinc to “equivalent” silver head grade: $23/oz silver, $1,950/oz gold, $0.95/lb lead and $1.15/lb zinc (Q1 2023: $21.85/oz silver, $1,775/oz gold, $0.915/lb lead and $1.30/lb zinc).
(2) Equivalent silver payable ounces have been calculated using realized price assumptions to translate gold, lead and zinc to “equivalent” silver payable ounces (metal quantity, multiplied by metal price, divided by silver price). Q1 2024 realized prices of $23.73/oz silver, $2,112.27/oz gold, $0.92/lb lead and $1.08/lb zinc (Q1 2023 realized prices of $22.93/oz silver, $1,959.50/oz gold, $0.94/lb lead and $1.43/lb zinc).
During the three months ended March 31, 2024 a total of 325,081 tonnes of ore were mined. This represents an increase of 45% over Q1 2023. Increases in mined tonnages at Juanicipio have been driven by the operational ramp up of the mine towards steady state targets.
During the three months ended March 31, 2024 a total of 325,683 tonnes of ore were processed through the Juanicipio plant; no ore was processed at the nearby Fresnillo and Saucito processing plants (100% owned by Fresnillo). This represents an increase of 47% over Q1 2023. The increase in milled tonnage has been driven by the Juanicipio mill commissioning and operational ramp up to nameplate capacity over the course of 2023.
The silver head grade and equivalent silver head grade for the ore processed in the three months ended March 31, 2024 was 476 g/t and 713 g/t, respectively (three months ended March 31, 2023: 363 g/t and 530 g/t, respectively). Head grades in Q1 2023 were lower as low-grade commissioning stockpiles were processed through the Juanicipio plant. Silver metallurgical recovery during Q1 2024 was 89.1% (Q1 2023: 87.0%) reflecting ongoing optimizations in the processing plant.
The following table provides a summary of the total cash costs 5 and all-in sustaining costs 5 (“AISC”) of Juanicipio for the three months ended March 31, 2024, and 2023.
https://preview.redd.it/riqz1yozze0d1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=c5f2edde6bc789d2d379ca3a910beaa1cb262bde
________________________
5 Total cash costs, cash cost per ounce, cash cost per equivalent ounce, all-in sustaining costs, all-in sustaining cost per ounce, and all-in sustaining cost per equivalent ounce are non-IFRS measures, please see the “ Non-IFRS Measures ” section below and section 12 of the Q1 2024 MD&A for a detailed reconciliation of these measures to the Q1 2024 Financial Statements. Equivalent silver ounces sold have been calculated using realized price assumptions to translate gold, lead and zinc to “equivalent” silver ounces sold (metal quantity, multiplied by metal price, divided by silver price). Q1 2024 realized prices of $23.73/oz silver, $2,112.27/oz gold, $0.92/lb lead and $1.08/lb zinc (Q1 2023: $22.93/oz silver, $1,959.50/oz gold, $0.94/lb lead and $1.43/lb zinc).
Financial Results
The following table presents excerpts of the financial results of Juanicipio for the three months ended March 31, 2024 and 2023.
https://preview.redd.it/4zym5dqzze0d1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=d25c91cabc7f6c6b35ff61acacc0160f3dfac2e7
Sales increased by $72,207 during the three months ended March 31, 2024, mainly due to 179% higher metal volumes and 2% higher realized metal prices.
Offsetting higher sales was higher production cost ($9,409) which was driven by higher sales and operational ramp-up in mining and processing, including $3,545 in inventory movements, and higher depreciation ($14,083) as the Juanicipio mill achieved commercial production and commenced depreciating the processing facility and associated equipment in June 2023. Operating margin increased by 21% to 52%, mainly due to operational leverage and the lower reliance on the nearby Fresnillo and Saucito processing facilities.
Other expenses increased by $2,159 mainly as a result of higher extraordinary mining and other duties ($872) in relation to higher precious metal revenues from the sale of concentrates and higher consulting and administrative expenses ($2,690) as an operator services agreement became effective upon initiation of commercial production (the “Operator Services Agreement”), offset by lower exchange losses and other costs ($1,566).
Taxes increased by $20,980 impacted by higher taxable profits generated during Q1 2024, and non-cash deferred tax credits related to the commencement of use of plant and equipment in Q1 2023.
Ore Processed at Juanicipio Plant (100% basis)
https://preview.redd.it/koajybrzze0d1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=caf1b70c53c47d371b9cebd743877fcd4ae59ba3
(1) The underground mine was considered readied for its intended use on January 1, 2022, whereas the Juanicipio processing facility started commissioning and ramp-up activities in January 2023, achieving commercial production status on June 1, 2023.
(2) Includes toll milling costs from processing mineralized material at the Saucito and Fresnillo plants for Q1 2023.
Sales and treatment charges are recorded on a provisional basis and are adjusted based on final assay and pricing adjustments in accordance with the offtake contracts.
MAG FINANCIAL RESULTS – THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2024
As at March 31, 2024, MAG had working capital of $72,833 (December 31, 2023: $67,262) including cash of $74,683 (December 31, 2023: $68,707) and no long-term debt. As well, as at March 31, 2024, Juanicipio had working capital of $107,088 including cash of $30,991 (MAG’s attributable share is 44%).
The Company’s net income for the three months ended March 31, 2024 amounted to $14,895 (March 31, 2023: $4,713) or $0.14/share (March 31, 2023: $0.05/share). MAG recorded its 44% income from equity accounted investment in Juanicipio of $19,244 (March 31, 2023: $7,919) which included MAG’s 44% share of net income from operations as well as loan interest earned on loans advanced to Juanicipio (see above for MAG’s share of income from its equity accounted investment in Juanicipio).
https://preview.redd.it/5bneimszze0d1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=323d988dbd92cf6ca4e815fff071c8ec7f45ee00
NON-IFRS MEASURES
The following table provides a reconciliation of cash cost per silver ounce of Juanicipio to production cost of Juanicipio on a 100% basis (the nearest IFRS measure) as presented in the notes to the Q1 2024 Financial Statements.
https://preview.redd.it/0jhh2stzze0d1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=c97634763bd00967ddd878bc09b8e069687fae68
(1) As Q3 2023 represented the first full quarter of commercial production, information presented for total cash costs together with their associated per unit values are not directly comparable.
(2) By-product revenues relates to the sale of other metals namely gold, lead, and zinc.
(3) Equivalent silver payable ounces have been calculated using realized prices to translate gold, lead and zinc to “equivalent” silver payable ounces (metal quantity, multiplied by metal price, divided by silver price). Q1 2024 realized prices: $23.73/oz silver, $2,112.27/oz gold, $0.92/lb lead and $1.08/lb zinc (Q1 2023: $22.93/oz silver, $1,959.50/oz gold, $0.94/lb lead and $1.43/lb zinc).
The following table provides a reconciliation of AISC of Juanicipio to production cost and various operating expenses of Juanicipio on a 100% basis (the nearest IFRS measure), as presented in the notes to the Q1 2024 Financial Statements.
https://preview.redd.it/qkx2r5vzze0d1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=0c9cb89471512649ac77b5cbe3177b0621d64835
(1) As Q3 2023 represented the first full quarter of commercial production, information presented for all-in sustaining costs and all-in sustaining margin together with their associated per unit values are not directly comparable.
(2) Equivalent silver payable ounces have been calculated using realized prices to translate gold, lead and zinc to “equivalent” silver payable ounces (metal quantity, multiplied by metal price, divided by silver price). Q1 2024 realized prices: $23.73/oz silver, $2,112.27/oz gold, $0.92/lb lead and $1.08/lb zinc, (Q1 2023 realized prices: $22.93/oz silver, $1,959.50/oz gold, $0.94/lb lead and $1.43/lb zinc).
For the three months ended March 31, 2024 the Company incurred corporate G&A expenses of $3,964 (three months ended March 31, 2023: $3,262), which exclude depreciation expense.
The Company’s attributable silver ounces sold and equivalent silver ounces sold for the three months ended March 31, 2024 were 1,757,630 and 2,475,862 respectively (three months ended March 31, 2023: 880,429 and 1,230,412 respectively), resulting in additional all‐in sustaining cost for the Company of $2.26/oz and $1.60/oz respectively (three months ended March 31, 2023: $3.71/oz and $2.65/oz respectively), in addition to Juanicipio’s all-in-sustaining costs presented in the above table.
The following table provides a reconciliation of EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA attributable to the Company based on its economic interest in Juanicipio to net income (the nearest IFRS measure) of the Company per the Q1 2024 Financial Statements. All adjustments are shown net of estimated income tax.
https://preview.redd.it/sx6jo7wzze0d1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=1fea9df2b8195ce579b570935ab24b9939da5988
(1) As Q3 2023 represents the first full quarter of commercial production, information presented for EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA is not directly comparable.
The following table provides a reconciliation of free cash flow of Juanicipio to its cash flow from operating activities on a 100% basis (the nearest IFRS measure), as presented in the notes to the Q1 2024 Financial Statements.
https://preview.redd.it/aqnp2dxzze0d1.png?width=720&format=png&auto=webp&s=56db2245eb87ec1f718edc1890b48b9b5d3ad762
(1) As Q3 2023 represents the first full quarter of commercial production, comparative information presented for free cash flow of Juanicipio is not directly comparable.
Qualified Persons: All scientific or technical information in this press release including assay results referred to, and mineral resource estimates, if applicable, is based upon information prepared by or under the supervision of, or has been approved by Gary Methven, P.Eng., Vice President, Technical Services and Lyle Hansen, P.Geo, Geotechnical Director; both are “Qualified Persons” for purposes of National Instrument 43-101, Standards of Disclosure for Mineral Projects
About MAG Silver Corp.
MAG Silver Corp. is a growth-oriented Canadian exploration company focused on advancing high-grade, district scale precious metals projects in the Americas. MAG is emerging as a top-tier primary silver mining company through its (44%) joint venture interest in the 4,000 tonnes per day Juanicipio Mine, operated by Fresnillo plc (56%). The mine is located in the Fresnillo Silver Trend in Mexico, the world's premier silver mining camp, where in addition to underground mine production and processing of high-grade mineralised material, an expanded exploration program is in place targeting multiple highly prospective targets. MAG is also executing multi-phase exploration programs at the 100% earn-in Deer Trail Project in Utah and the 100% owned Larder Project, located in the historically prolific Abitibi region of Canada.
Neither the Toronto Stock Exchange nor the NYSE American has reviewed or accepted responsibility for the accuracy or adequacy of this press release, which has been prepared by management.
Certain information contained in this release, including any information relating to MAG’s future oriented financial information, are “forward-looking information” and “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of applicable Canadian and United States securities legislation (collectively herein referred as “forward-looking statements”), including the “safe harbour” provisions of provincial securities legislation, the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Section 21E of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended and Section 27A of the U.S. Securities Act. Such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to:

• statements that address maintaining the nameplate 4,000 tpd milling rate at Juanicipio;
• statements that address our expectations regarding exploration and drilling;
• statements regarding production expectations and nameplate;
• statements regarding the additional information from future drill programs;
• estimated future exploration and development operations and corresponding expenditures and other expenses for specific operations;
• the expected capital, sustaining capital and working capital requirements at Juanicipio, including the potential for additional cash calls;
• expected upside from additional exploration;
• expected results from Deer Trail Project drilling;
• expected results from the Larder Project at the Fernland, Cheminis, and Bear zones;
• expected capital requirements and sources of funding; and
• other future events or developments.

When used in this release, any statements that express or involve discussions with respect to predictions, beliefs, plans, projections, objectives, assumptions or future events of performance (often but not always using words or phrases such as “anticipate”, “believe”, “estimate”, “expect”, “intend”, “plan”, “strategy”, “goals”, “objectives”, “project”, “potential” or variations thereof or stating that certain actions, events, or results “may”, “could”, “would”, “might” or “will” be taken, occur or be achieved, or the negative of any of these terms and similar expressions), as they relate to the Company or management, are intended to identify forward-looking statements. Such statements reflect the Company’s current views with respect to future events and are subject to certain known and unknown risks, uncertainties and assumptions.
Forward-looking statements are necessarily based upon estimates and assumptions, which are inherently subject to significant business, economic and competitive uncertainties and contingencies, many of which are beyond the Company’s control and many of which, regarding future business decisions, are subject to change. Assumptions underlying the Company’s expectations regarding forward-looking statements contained in this release include, among others: MAG’s ability to carry on its various exploration and development activities including project development timelines, the timely receipt of required approvals and permits, the price of the minerals produced, the costs of operating, exploration and development expenditures, the impact on operations of the Mexican tax and legal regimes, MAG’s ability to obtain adequate financing, outbreaks or threat of an outbreak of a virus or other contagions or epidemic disease will be adequately responded to locally, nationally, regionally and internationally.
Although MAG believes the expectations expressed in such forward-looking statements are based on reasonable assumptions, such statements are not guarantees of future performance and actual results or developments may differ materially from those in the forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and many factors could cause actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements that may be expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements including amongst others: commodities prices; changes in expected mineral production performance; unexpected increases in capital costs or cost overruns; exploitation and exploration results; continued availability of capital and financing; general economic, market or business conditions; risks relating to the Company’s business operations; risks relating to the financing of the Company’s business operations; risks related to the Company’s ability to comply with restrictive covenants and maintain financial covenants pursuant to the terms of the Credit Facility; the expected use of the Credit Facility; risks relating to the development of Juanicipio and the minority interest investment in the same; risks relating to the Company’s property titles; risks related to receipt of required regulatory approvals; pandemic risks; supply chain constraints and general costs escalation in the current inflationary environment heightened by the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the events relating to the Israel-Hamas war; risks relating to the Company’s financial and other instruments; operational risk; environmental risk; political risk; currency risk; market risk; capital cost inflation risk; risk relating to construction delays; the risk that data is incomplete or inaccurate; the risks relating to the limitations and assumptions within drilling, engineering and socio-economic studies relied upon in preparing economic assessments and estimates, including the 2017 PEA; as well as those risks more particularly described under the heading “Risk Factors” in the Company’s Annual Information Form dated March 27, 2023 available under the Company’s profile on SEDAR+ at www.sedarplus.ca .
Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialize, or should underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual results may vary materially from those described herein. This list is not exhaustive of the factors that may affect any of the Company’s forward-looking statements. The Company’s forward-looking statements are based on the beliefs, expectations and opinions of management on the date the statements are made and, other than as required by applicable securities laws, the Company does not assume any obligation to update forward-looking statements if circumstances or management’s beliefs, expectations or opinions should change. For the reasons set forth above, investors should not attribute undue certainty to or place undue reliance on forward-looking statements.
Please Note: Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosures in MAG's annual and quarterly reports and other public filings, accessible through the Internet at www.sedarplus.ca and www.sec.gov
LEI: 254900LGL904N7F3EL14
​

For further information on behalf of MAG Silver Corp. Contact Michael J. Curlook, Vice President, Investor Relations and Communications Phone: (604) 630-1399 Toll Free: (866) 630-1399 Email:info@magsilver.com 

https://preview.redd.it/d8wzg8yzze0d1.jpg?width=66&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=a39ec6a39761447bbd4dbd77e92aef49e95e583e
https://preview.redd.it/qr1wv0zzze0d1.png?width=4000&format=png&auto=webp&s=fadeb32c9245f8b70d903b1c70321decddf77985

Universal Site Links
MAG SILVER CORP.
STOCK METAL DATABASE
ADD TICKER TO THE DATABASE
www.reddit.com/Treaty_Creek
REPORT AN ERROR

U.S. credit card balances climbed $50 billion to $1.13 trillion last quarter. This deep analysis explores state-by-state credit card delinquency rate trends. It offers insights into regional economic health and consumer finances.

Key Takeaways

• Credit card balances rose $50 billion to $1.13 trillion in late 2023.
• State-by-state delinquency rates analyzed, showing economic and financial variations.
• Regional differences in delinquency highlight need for targeted solutions.
• Data sourced from Federal Reserve Bank of New York.

https://preview.redd.it/ihrr2nbeze0d1.png?width=1344&format=png&auto=webp&s=36b8875e53909aca93724f478f050b3ca1daaedc

States with the Highest Credit Card Delinquency Rates

Credit card debt continues rising nationwide. Three states face acute financial struggles: Florida, Texas, and Nevada. These regions show concerning economic conditions and consumer financial well-being issues.

Florida: The Sunshine State's Credit Card Debt Crisis

Florida has the highest credit card debt challenges. From 2022 to 2023, card debt increased 13.22%. Delinquencies rose 24.65% during that time. Florida's average credit card debt was $4,540, ranking sixth-highest nationally. Its delinquency rate of 11.68% ranked second-highest.

Texas: Lone Star State Struggles with Rising Card Balances

Texas had the fourth-highest delinquency rate at 11.19% in Q4 2023. Average credit card debt rose 13.10% from $3,650 to $4,200. Texas ranked 11th for credit card debt as a percentage of income at 5.63%.

Nevada: Gambling Mecca Tops the List for Delinquencies

Nevada had the nation's highest credit card delinquency rate at 12.95%. Delinquencies grew 23.10% from 2022 to 2023. Average credit card debt increased from $3,860 to $4,490 during that period. Card debt as a percentage of income reached 6.21%, likely impacted by the gambling industry.

Mapping Credit Card Delinquency Rates in the U.S. by State

https://preview.redd.it/xkpgdjgjze0d1.png?width=1200&format=png&auto=webp&s=3272081cb19a4ed043b552a0e6453b40678bdd3a
The analysis examined credit card debt and delinquency rates. It defined delinquency as balances 90 days late. Data came from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It covered all 50 states and Washington D.C.
Four of the top 10 states with high delinquency were in the Southeast. Three were in the Northeast. Between Q4 2022 and Q4 2023, debt and delinquency increased nationwide.
Credit card debt rose 13.50% across the U.S. The delinquency rate climbed 28.2%. This data reveals regional financial trends and credit card debt analysis.

State	Credit Card Delinquency Rate (Q4 2023)	Increase from Q4 2022	Average Credit Card Debt (Q4 2023)	Increase from Q4 2022
Florida	11.68%	24.65%	$4,540	13.22%
Texas	11.19%	21.34%	$4,200	13.10%
Nevada	12.95%	23.10%	$4,490	16.32%

Dolly Varden Silver Corp

Strategies for Managing and Reducing Credit Card Debt

Credit card debt shouldn't be ignored. One strategy is consolidating debt into a single loan with lower interest. This simplifies repayment and reduces overall debt cost.
Refinancing through balance transfers is effective. Take advantage of interest-free promotional periods to pay down principal balances. Start paying balances as soon as possible to avoid more interest.
For those with low credit scores, secured cards and cards for rebuilding credit help. These report to major credit bureaus, improving scores over time. This provides access to more favorable financing options.

• Fast Approval: Discover the joy of quick loan approvals and get your funds within hours!
• Competitive Rates: Enjoy cash loans with competitive interest rates tailored just for you.
• Flexible Terms: Choose from a variety of repayment options to suit your budget.

💡 Why Choose Mr. Cash Loans?

https://preview.redd.it/hx2ox5ri9e0d1.png?width=1200&format=png&auto=webp&s=8366f60328172da117c4dd951e3c733492690a1b
Personalized Service: We understand that everyone’s financial journey is unique.
All Credit Types Welcome: Don’t let your credit score hold you back. We consider all applications.
Consolidate and Save: Say goodbye to high-interest debts with our consolidation options.

🌐 Apply Online Anytime, Anywhere!

• Convenience at Your Fingertips: Apply from the comfort of your home through our easy online process.
• Transparent Process: No hidden fees, no surprises. Just straightforward cash loans paid into your bank account.
• 🔒 Safe and Secure
• Trusted Provider: Join the thousands of satisfied customers who trust Mr. Cash Loans.

The kitchen is on fire. Welcome to the final part of the Vapiano story where the tables are turning. In the first two episodes we followed Mark Korzilius' journey from setbacks to founding Vapiano, a groundbreaking restaurant concept, highlighting its fresh ingredients, dynamic atmosphere, and data-driven operations that drove rapid success. While achieving initial profitability and garnering attention from industry giants like McDonald's, Vapiano's global expansion has led to stellar revenue growth. However, it has also resulted in the emergence of numerous side projects (or distractions), operational challenges, increased costs, significant investments, and a notable accumulation of debt. This underscores the prioritization of top-line growth over profitable growth. We will continue on this thread and see how the story ends, but I would encourage you to read part one and two for better context. Vapiano P1: Italian Food Made in Germany (substack.com). Let's dig in.
Before Going Public
We are now in 2015 and the year is a disaster for Vapiano's PR department. Employee time stamps are being manipulated, endless overtime for employees and high turnover in managerial roles are reported; mice in the kitchen and even rotten food allegedly found.
The company is confronted with allegations of exceeding working hours among trainees in an article published by Welt am Sonntag, while the same outlet accuses Vapiano of manipulating punch times. The auditing firm PwC is commissioned to investigate the allegations and finds that there is no systematic approach but rather misconduct by individual employees, a mistake that’s being corrected. Internal however, investigations into stamp times are carried out regularly now and beyond its obvious reputational impact, this sucks up valuable management time and attention.
In the summer of 2015 CEO, co-founder and investor Gregor Gerlach, who has been running the group since 2011 is stepping down and Jochen Halfmann is taking over. A new Vapiano People Program with an App is being developed with the aim to better interact with customers that will incorporate innovate features such as mobile pay. The German website sees a launch of new magazine to further promote the brand and there is now a full inhouse blogger and Instagram team being installed. In October the company buys seven restaurants from original co-founder, former co-investor and ex-president previously responsible for internation expansion Kent Hahne (2x Bonn, 3x Cologne, 1x Koblenz and one in Cologne that’s under construction). This package of Vapiano restaurants is very successful and generates net sales of more than 20 million euros in 2014. Hahne opened his first Vapiano restaurant in Cologne in August 2006 and in 2015 with his company apeiron AG, Hahne operates six L'Osteria franchise restaurants, a direct Vapiano competitor, and two self-owned restaurants GinYuu.
Then in November of 2015, the next public relations bomb goes off with allegations regarding the company's quality standards. The company immediately investigates the issue through internal and external specialists but finds no evidence of any quality issues. Nevertheless, knowing that the group is now being closely watched, the company’s already in place hygiene standards are being reinforced. Additional audits and inspections are performed nationally. Further, all Vapianos worldwide are being audited twice by the partners SGS Institut Fresenius and SAI Global. Auditing software is purchased to simplify the implementation of the audits and the resulting measures. Apart from the external examinations, there is a food sampling plan in place being performed continuously. Again, all of this sucks up costs, management time and attention. With all these tumultuous developments the company’s growth engine is undeterred. Revenue grows by a whopping 50 million euros to 202 million euros, an increase of 33%. Impressive. While average spent per customer increases in all countries, the number of customers per day in Germany decreases by 3.3% partially due to the negative press towards the end of the year. Five own, four JV and 19 new franchise restaurants are added that year to the group, the total number of own managed restaurants grows to 51, there are 31 JVs and 84 franchises which bringing the total to 166 Vapiano restaurants. Global restaurant sales are now above 400 million euros.
But while revenue grows by an astronomical 50 million euros, operating profits, alarmingly, shrink again. Gross margins are staying perfectly healthy above 75% but operating costs keep growing disproportionately fast. The Company’s outstanding debt jumps by almost 30 million, close to 85 million euros by the end of the year. With operating profits at 9.5 million euros, alarm bells should be going off right now.
In Q4 of 2015, new CEO Jochen Halfmann introduces Strategy 2020. The new strategy includes five essential points. One, profitable growth in the newly defined core markets of Germany and Austria as well as in the UK, Netherlands, France and USA. Two, operational excellence through strict “best practice” management. Three, further development and digitalization of the concept considering guest feedback. Four, greater focus on long-term employee retention and five, building a modern and sustainable IT landscape. Sound’s good on paper but let’s see how things pan out.
Vapiano's investments (capital expenditures) that year are primarily directed towards new restaurant openings, renovations of existing establishments, and share acquisitions in other Vapiano restaurants from franchisees or JV partners. A significant portion of funds is allocated to the digitalization of the guest experience, including the development of a new app scheduled for market release in 2016 and the implementation of a time recording system across all group restaurants. The world's first standalone Vapiano restaurant with a delivery service that year is built in Fürth, Germany. The company keeps expanding its presence in both inner-city locations and international markets, such as Shanghai, China.
To finance all of this, the group has its own operating cash flow which comes in at 18 million while capital expenditures are 26 million euros plus 14 million for acquisitions. The funding gab is filled with 26 million euros of new debt and a seven-million-euro equity raise. At that end of the year and after the equity raise Gregor Gerlach (through his AP Leipzig GmbH & Co. KG entity) holds 30.1%, Hans-Joachim and Gisa Sander through their Exchange Bio GmbH hold 25.5% and the Tchibo heirs, Herz through their Mayfair Beteiligungsfonds II GmbH & Co. KG hold 44,4%.
But for the first time the restaurant’s concept that was so successful to date is being questioned. Some customers are starting to mislike the operational flow of the concept itself. If you want pasta, you must queue for pasta. If you want pizza you stand in a different queue. A small side salad, yet another queue. "You spend more time carrying trays than an actress in Berlin-Mitte. The audience in the pasta limbo can only consist of people who have worked for an insurance company for a long time and, like Stockholm syndrome, they can no longer get away from the industrial canteen feeling," writes TV host Beisenherz provocatively. While overly harsh in his assessment he's not entirely wrong judging by customers venting their frustrations in forums and social media channels. It isn’t uncommon for those who ordered pizza to have already finished eating while there is little movement in the pasta queue. Long term that doesn't go down well, QSRs competitors like L’Osteria are handling this process differently, with much success.
https://preview.redd.it/6cas01oked0d1.png?width=1200&format=png&auto=webp&s=2da6e0b4bc0e07dbee558de412feb414cd598d4a

Tipping Point

Where are now in the year 2016 and things start to deteriorate visibility. Perhaps not for the leman’s eye but any business minded observer can see that there are problems under the hood. Yes, revenue grows yet another whopping 50 million to almost 250 million euros but half of that growth, comes from acquisitions of restaurants that the group didn’t already own 100%, which is now being fully consolidated within the group’s accounts. Here is a concrete example. In the past, Vapiano SE, the group’s top holding company held an indirect 50% stake in a French subgroup via the subsidiary VAP Restaurants SA, based in Luxembourg, and included this as an associated company in the Vapiano SE consolidated financial statements using the equity method. Due to the acquisition of additional shares in September of 2016, Vapiano SE's indirect share in the French subgroup increased to 75%. This means that Vapiano SE takes control of the French subgroup, which is therefore included in the group’s financial statements as part of the full consolidation. The revenue from the acquired subsidiary now recorded in the consolidated income statement amounts to 12.8 million euros. While that’s great for the top line, the loss of the fully consolidated entity equates to 0.2 million euros. Yes, you are buying revenue, but there are losses attached to them, not profits. A similar case is the Swedish entity that runs eight restaurants with revenue of 11.5 million euros but has losses of 235 thousand euros. So much for Strategy 2020 and “profitable” growth.
That year the group’s operating profits are absolutely tanking, halving to 3.5 million euros. Operating profits are now a mere 1,4% of revenue. Remember original founder Mark Korzilius who talked about operating margins of 25% to 28% at the restaurant level? Yes, there are overhead costs for the organization that sits above the chain of restaurants, but operating margins that low indicates a course correction is needed. What’s telling is that in the annual report, in the management discussion section, the company starts talking about EBITDA as a proxy measure of profitability, rather than operating profit or net income. This wasn’t the case in the years before. Is this window dressing for an upcoming IPO? EBITDA is short for earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. How can you measure profitability of a restaurant chain that absolutely and unequivocally needs capital investment to maintain its restaurant operations, the very source of cash generation, by simply excluding this maintenance charge (depreciation in the income statement)? Vapiano’s own annual report talks about the fact that existing restaurants must be rejuvenated from time to time and that new interior designs have to be implemented every few years. These things wear and tear, they go out of style, kitchen equipment breaks and needs replacement. This business absolutely needs maintenance capital expenditure, why anyone talks of profits before these maintenance costs is beyond me. Fun fact: in the previous annual report EBITDA is mentioned seven times, mostly around restaurant acquisitions and financing, not however as a profit indication for the group. In the new annual report, EBITDA is mentioned 28 times. Maybe it’s just me but belated Charlie Munger liked to call EBITDA: bullsh*t earnings. When in doubt I stick with Charlie. Interestingly, EBITDA for Vapiano keeps growing while operating and net profits keep falling.
Operating cashflow for the group that year is about 21 million euros, but capital expenditure is 30 million and acquisitions for subsidiaries another 20 million. To finance these expenditures another 28 million euros of debt and 16 million of equity is raised. Net debt rises above 130 million euro. The operating cashflow of the group before any capital expenditures is 21 million euros. I am not sure free cash flow would be significantly positive after maintenance capex is paid out; it’s not broken out so we can’t be sure. Granted, I am not on the ground during this time, and I am not in the board room, I am simply reading what’s in front of me, but to me this is starting to look like a distressed situation. Regardless, the following year the company goes public.

IPO

Where are now in the year 2017 and its Vapiano’s first year as public company. The company’s annual report reads the following “Sales revenue, like-for-like growth (LfL) and the earnings figures EBITDA and adjusted EBITDA are used as the most important financial performance indicators for controlling operational business activities.” The very same report however also says: “The majority of the group's investments regularly go towards opening new restaurant locations and modernizing existing restaurants. The latter are differentiated into regular replacement investments that occur during ongoing operations (Maintenance CAPEX) and fundamental investments in the renovation of a restaurant (Remodeling CAPEX). On average, a restaurant remodeling takes place nine years after opening.” It says it right there in their own report; every nine years a remodeling is taking place. Remodeling and updating is not cost free, so why exclude depreciation charges which reflect capital expenditures? I understand that perhaps you would want to strip out one-off opening costs, that’s fine and fair, but don’t go overboard.
The number of restaurants increases by 26 (previous year: 13) to a total of 205. The increase consists of 27 new openings and one closure. Group revenue grows to an astonishing 325 million euros but here comes the shocker, operating profits turn negative to 25 million. Fine, strip out foreign exchange losses of 3 million, IPO costs of 5.8 million and new opening costs of 6.1 million and you still have 10 million euros of operational losses. All the while the debt load of almost 130 million hasn’t materially changed, so those operating losses are before a six-million-euro interest payment. 184 million euros are raised through the IPO of which 85 million go to the company. This money is earmarked for further expansion as the group has ambitions to almost double the footprint to 330 restaurants by the end of 2020. The company is currently not profitable on an operating basis, and still wants to expand aggressively? I don’t get it. The remaining 100 million euros of the IPO money raised is distributed to co-founder Gregor Gerlach and Wella heirs Hans-Joachim and Gisa Sander. The family office of the former Tchibo owners Günter and Daniela Herz with a 44% stake, don’t sell a single share. After the IPO, 32% of all the company’s shares are now in free float.
One year later, in 2018, things get even worse. Revenue grows to 371 million, but operating losses mount to 85 million euros, that’s before interest expenses of 9 million. Even the beloved EBITDA figure turns negative, meaning the operating business before any expansionary or even maintenance capital expenditures is loss making. All regions are experiencing significant deterioration in their earnings profiles. Like for like sales are down 1% across the board. That’s revenue, not profitability. The question naturally arises: is the Group approaching its natural saturation point here or this operational by nature? The operating cash flow is now 9 million while financing cost are close to 7 million. That leaves 2 million for maintenance capital for 74 own restaurants and 76 joint ventures ones. Describing this as financially tight, would be an understatement.
Things are not looking good at this point. Yet the company still grows restaurants by 26 new sites. 64 million euros are spent on acquisitions, new openings, and maintenance costs, financed through a 20 million-euro equity raise and 72 million of new debt. The Company now has net debt outstanding of over 160 million euros. After the equity raise and by the end of the year 2018, Mayfair owns 47.4%, VAP Leipzig, Gregor Gerlach’s entity owns 18.9% and the Sander couple own 15.5% of the company. Yes, the Sanders and Gerlach may have taken 100 million euros off the table, but they still have substantial skin in the game. Plus, Mayfair hasn’t sold a single share and instead injects more money into the company through the equity round. The stock has now fallen from its IPO price of 23 euros per share to under 6 euros by the end of 2018. Something must be done here. And indeed, there is pivot in strategy and a hard push for change. At last, the management team abandons its aggressive growth plan and curtails new openings significantly. Additionally, the team wants to run a thorough analysis of weak locations to then either discontinue or sell sites. In Europe, the operating focus will be put on corporate restaurants and joint ventures in major cities to ensure the ideal size and location to match the respective demographic target group. Outside of Europe, the franchising business is being expanded and at the same time a consolidation of the existing corporate and joint venture markets is being sought. All future investments will be reviewed to achieve higher rates of returns on new openings. Investments are also being made in the renovation of older restaurants. The goal in the future is to also open smaller formats, like Mini-Vapianos (less than 400 square meters) or Freestander at prominent transportation hubs outside city centers (currently in Fürth and Toulouse) to cater to individual location requirements, and to enter new partnerships. I am not sure why management hasn’t stopped all expansion altogether, bringing the ship in order first, getting profitable, clean up, all hands-on deck before considering any further expansions whatsoever. But again, it’s easy to comment from the sidelines; maybe they saw white spaces that would be covered by competing concepts if they weren’t moving fast and aggressively enough. Although pushing internationally means competing with local players such as Jamie's Italian, Prezzo, Pizza Express, Wagamama, Nando's and many more which brings in its own dynamic.
Management also aims to enhance guest satisfaction. This involves refining operational processes, reorganizing the support center, and refocusing on the core offering: providing fresh and high-quality Italian food at affordable prices for a broad audience. The group also aims to reduce waiting times, especially during lunch, while also improving the evening atmosphere. There is even what I would call an evolution, away from Vapiano’s original concept, reorientating the customer journey. The ordering flow is being changed, offering guests synchronized preparations of all dishes while eliminating wait times at the cooking stations. The open show kitchen remains, staying true to original mantra of freshness and transparency but now guests can choose their preferred method of ordering through a mobile app, using a digital order point (kiosk), or by personally placing an order with a waiter. Guests can still freely choose their table and are then informed about the complete preparation of their order through a pager or their smartphone. This is a substantial deviation from the original concept, but a needed one. The group is also exploring and implementing the expansion of take-away and home delivery services but only at suitable locations, not universally across new openings. I am not sure why home delivery is even a priority here; it adds operational complexity. It’s better to clean up shop first and get back to the basics before adding new complexities. To be fair management does try to simplify. There are 49 different permanent dishes on the menu and additional 10 seasonal ones. Customers can choose from eleven different types of pasta. There is simply too much choice, and it makes orders complicated. The company announced to slim the menu down to its most popular and typical Vapiano dishes. There’s no need for an Asian salad at an Italian restaurant. "We have to go back to the roots, i.e. classic, honest Italian cuisine" says COO Everke. Regardless, in November of 2018, the supervisory board pulls the plug on CEO Jochen Halfmann and replaces him with Cornelius Everke. Everke himself has just become COO five months ago. Since 2017 he was responsible for international expansion. From 2011 to 2017 that role was filled by Mario Bauer – put a pin in that name, he’ll play a key role in the groups fate later. Then nine months later, in the middle of 2019, Cornelius Everke quits. He essentially concludes that his skillset and experience in the areas of internation expansion is no longer needed in the foreseeable future. To put it differently: Vapiano has moved from a growth story and has become a restructuring case, and other skills are required for that job. In June of 2019 Everke says the following “(we’ve) made a bit of a mistake when it came to foreign expansion”. No sh#t. Vapiano postpones the presentation of the 2018 annual financial statements three times in the spring of 2019, citing negotiations over an urgently needed loan of 30 million euros. It’s not until the end of May that a binding loan commitment comes through from the financing banks and major shareholders.
We are now in August of 2019 and the corona pandemic is just around the corner. Supervisory board chief Vanessa Hall takes over as interim-CEO and things are unravelling. Visitor numbers are declining; originally, it was planned to sell the US business but halfway through the year the buyer cannot come up with the money. But not all restaurants are performing poorly. The group's poor figures contrast starkly as an example with the experiences of the Swiss-German franchisee, who runs six restaurants. The Sodano family in Switzerland pays Vapiano a royalty of 6% of sales for the use of the brand. Enrico Sodano explains in an interview that they operate largely autonomously from the licensor. If an “accident” were to occur, he could immediately replace the Vapiano sign with Sodano, he says. The family concluded the rents and contracts with employees and suppliers independently. The Sodano family have six locations in Bern, Basel and Zurich, around one million guests every year and 350 employees. Things are going well on the ground. The delivery service they’ve built is offering them a second income stream. Expansion into Winterthur, St. Gallen and Lucerne are being planned; small locations with 150 to 250 square meters and an attached delivery service. Originally, Vapiano restaurants used to be huge but for such a large restaurant to be profitable, 800 to 1,000 guests per day are needed. That’s possible in medium-sized cities, but not in smaller towns which is why the Vapiano group now also supports smaller formats. Back to our corporate drama. The 2019 annual report would be the last report the group files. By the end 2019 the outstanding debt of the company is at an astronomical 450 million euros. Revenue has grown by another 7%, produced by four net new openings through two JVs and two franchise restaurants but operating losses come in at 317 million euros. That sound like an absolute shocker at first but depreciation and amortization charges are 345 million, so that operating cash flow is actually positive but unfortunately capital expenditures and interest payments are so large that they are eating up all of the company’s operating cash flow. Then in the beginning of 2020 Corona hits with full force and the world shuts down. As a result of the measures to prevent further spreading of the virus, the group is forced to cease all global business operations (except in Sweden). While all these shutdowns are happening, the group is the middle of negotiating with its lending banks and main shareholders. There are additional financing needs for restructuring measures, even without a pandemic happening in the background. The situation is so dire that the company starts pleading to the German government to roll out the package of financial help more quickly. Unfortunately, it’s to no end. The rapid closure of restaurants and the resulting lack of operating cash inflows in conjunction with the additional financing requirements, lead to the company’s final knockout punch. In April of 2020, the Vapiano group officially files for insolvency proceedings. The end of an era.

New Beginnings

Because of the pandemic, the majority of the group's subsidiaries in Austria, the Netherlands, Denmark, the United States, Sweden, and China also file for insolvency or seek liquidation. The US business never gets sold in the end and is wound down. In the summer of 2020, significant group divestments occur, including the sale of 75% shares in the group's French subsidiaries, shares in franchisor companies, Australian subsidiaries, German subsidiaries, associated companies, self-managed restaurants in Germany, and insolvency-related sales in the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Sweden. The buyer of the Vapiano brand and one of these bundles of Vapiano restaurants is company named Love & Food Restaurant Holding, a consortium led by Mario C. Bauer – a name I told you to remember. Bauer was a former Vapiano board member and led the national and international expansion, opening 200 sites in 33 countries from 2011 to 2017 until he was succeeded by Cornelius Everke. Bauer didn’t feel comfortable with the IPO at the time but clearly has a lot of managerial and entrepreneurial talent.
The buyer consortium is an absolute A-Team comprised of European QSR top league hitters, including the founder of the Pret A Manger chain Sinclair Beecham; Henry McGovern, the founder and Ex-CEO of the giant international restaurant and foodservice operator AmRest; the Van der Valk Family that runs hotels and Vapiano restaurants in the Netherlands, and co-founder and ex-CEO Gregor Gerlach. The acquisition value is 15 million euros and entails 30 Vapiano restaurants in Germany, albeit that’s just the purchase price which comes on top of any capital investment needed to refresh and return the sites to its former glory. Nevertheless, just as a thought experiment, if you can get each site to 2 million euros of revenue and 400,000 euros in operating profit on average, which wouldn’t be an overly aggressively assumption given the company’s history, you’ve got yourself a package that can deliver restaurant-level operating profits of 12 million euros or more. It’s not disclosed how much capex was needed to refresh the operations, just that fact that the overall investment plus purchase price was a middle double-digit million-euro figure. Stil, it probably was a decent purchase. The same consortium buys Vapiano’s French business for 25 million euros just two weeks prior. After the transaction concludes, the master franchise is given to Delf Neumann and his Gastro & Soul GmbH. Neumann is an experienced operator, and he is ambitious to revitalise the brand with new services and products. For example, instead of pizza, the restaurants will be serving pinsa - a flatbread made from sourdough, wheat and rice flour, topped similarly to a pizza. It targets a more health-oriented customer base looking for a less calory heavy option. The menu overall is expanded by including a variety of vegan and vegetarian dishes.
https://preview.redd.it/kpt7ea6red0d1.png?width=1242&format=png&auto=webp&s=c9930ced85ee364e9df414547cae06b47a03fc19
Today Neumann’s Gastro & Soul GmbH operates 18 Vapianos on its own account and has 29 franchise sites, amongst other brands. By the year 2021, Vapiano operates 191 restaurants in 34 countries. This is around 50 fewer sites than before the bankruptcy. The number of branches is particularly thinned out in Germany – from 80 to 55. Nevertheless, Vapiano's home country remains by far the largest market, followed by France with 35 restaurants and Austria with 15 locations. “We have shrunk ourselves to health,” says Bauer in the aftermath and there is no further shrinking planned. Quite the opposite, the smell of expansion is in the air again – pun intended. Not as aggressively as before and with a new menu and ordering process.
Overall, the team around Bauer is filled with industry experts with knowledge and networks gained over decades who have a great track record, a long-term view, and the staying power to let Vapiano breath and finds its way back to success. The pressure of being a public company with all the associated quarterly, half-year and yearly disincentives have been removed. The menu is changed and extended with new types of pasta and sauces with significantly more vegetarian and vegan dishes available. Guests can order with restaurant staff, at terminals or on their phones and there are barcodes attached to the tables identify the respective seat. The food is brought to your table, all at the same time if you are in a group, no more annoyances with waiting in line. There is a plan for smaller, 350 square meter locations, with half the number of guests and significantly fewer staff and less set-up costs required to make the economics work. Locations that capitalize on remote work and increased demand for local lunch options, higher population density with shorter delivery routes and therefore cost-effective in house delivery services are targeted. And Bauer is testing the concept of ghost kitchens, which operate without a dining room or service staff, focusing solely on preparing food for delivery services, which for obvious reasons have a very different operational set up and footprint. Original founder Mark Korzilius however is not entirely convinced. He is not a fan of the pinsa for instance and he considers Vapiano's pizza as its cash cow, flagship product and believes that the core Vapiano proposition of Pizza, Pasta, Bar that has given the company its original success is being diluted. He instead admires the competitor L'Osteria, saying they’ve done a better job by focusing on Italian classics, especially the impressively large pizzas that sticks out beyond the plate is leaving every customer in awe. The guys who run L’Osteria are the same guys who have built Vapiano with him in the first place. Bauer on the other hand, like a true business leader, remains undeterred, stating that he is frequently asked whether Vapiano's restart was bold or foolish. He believes in entrepreneurship, franchising, in his experienced fellow partners and importantly the Vapiano concept. By the year 2024 you can find over 140 Vapiano branded restaurant in 27 countries across the globe, including locations far away from its birthplace like Australia, USA, Columbia, Chile, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. And why not? Italian food is, and will remain to be, incredibly popular. Vapiano offers fresh and tasty food at affordable prices in a good atmosphere. This combination of attributes should attract a lot of customers. It certainly has in the past.
For more stories: WIP Thomas Weitzendoerfer Substack

Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has recently highlighted the robust and secure nature of India’s government debt, describing it as “safe and prudent.” In a series of posts on social media platform X (formerly Twitter), Sitharaman emphasized that debt assessments should consider GDP growth, often overlooked in straightforward comparisons of absolute numbers.
Union Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman
Sitharaman contrasted the current government’s fiscal management under Prime Minister Narendra Modi with that of the previous Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA). She noted that despite facing the economic challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Modi administration has demonstrated superior fiscal discipline.
Addressing the promises made by Congress in its manifesto, Sitharaman questioned the fiscal feasibility of schemes proposed by Congress leader Rahul Gandhi, such as the ‘Khata Khat’ initiatives. Gandhi had promised to transfer ₹1 lakh to one woman in every poor household if Congress wins the elections. Sitharaman challenged this by asking how Congress plans to finance such schemes, whether through substantial borrowing or increased taxes.
She highlighted that India’s debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 81% in 2022, which is significantly lower than that of several major economies. For comparison, Japan’s debt-to-GDP ratio was 260.1%, Italy’s was 140.5%, the USA’s was 121.3%, France’s was 111.8%, and the UK’s was 101.9%. This comparison underscores India’s relative fiscal stability.
Additionally, Sitharaman pointed out that India’s central government debt is predominantly rupee-denominated, with external borrowings accounting for less than 5% of total debt. This structure minimizes India’s exposure to exchange rate volatility. She recalled that the central government’s debt as a percentage of GDP was reduced from 52.2% in 2013–14 to around 48.9% in 2018–19 through fiscal consolidation efforts. During this period, the fiscal deficit was also reduced from 4.5% in FY14 to 3.4% in FY19.
However, the fiscal deficit surged to 9.2% of GDP in 2020–21 due to the pandemic and necessary government interventions to protect lives and livelihoods, increasing the central government’s debt to 61.4% of GDP. Post-pandemic, the Modi government has adopted a balanced approach to fiscal consolidation while maintaining economic growth, reducing the fiscal deficit to 5.8% in the Revised Estimates for FY24.
In conclusion, Sitharaman’s detailed breakdown underscores the prudent management of India’s government debt, emphasizing the country’s strong fiscal position relative to other major economies. The current administration’s focus on fiscal consolidation and economic growth post-pandemic showcases a commitment to maintaining financial stability while fostering development.