Hi all, with GRMD just 2 weeks away, I am doing one mini-meet for people to join and meet each other.
There is a deadline to prepay for GRMD, if cash is the only option for you, this is a chance for you to meet us and prepay in person.
Even if you won't make it to GRMD, this is still a good opportunity to meet other Redditors in meat space.
We will start at 19:00 from Kowloon Taproom
G/F, Ashley Mansion, 10-14 Ashley Rd, Tsim Sha Tsui
At 20:30 we go to Tequila Jack
G/F, Union Mansion, 33-35 Chatham Rd S, Tsim Sha Tsui, Hong Kong
At 22:00 we finish at Enso
Dolford Mansion, Shop D&E G/F, 1-3 Chatham Ct, Tsim Sha Tsui
There are plenty of food options at all the bars.
As per usual I will be wearing Reddit t-shirts, with a Snoo stuff toy so we would be easy to spot.
Strongly suggest everyone to pay for your drink as soon as you order it. The bill often get confusing when we have a large crowd
Finally, please send me your whatsapp number so I can put you into the super secret elite whatsapp group
meetup link

Wow. It’s been 5 years since the last GRMD. Every year we try to get as many people in the /hongkong community to show up and meet each other in person. This year Reddit admin changed things a bit and turn it into GRMW to give some flexibility. We decided on June 15th (Saturday).
I’d toyed with the idea of just doing a big /hongkong meetup like previous years even without any Reddit endorsement like the Xmas party of 2017 and 2018, but venue prices have gone way up since pre-COVID. So we’d managed to arrange something to keep prices as affordable as possible.
Time: 19:00 -00:00
Venue:
This time we will host at DMZ, a gaming venue run by kwuhkc and pyrosas. We will have video games, board games, and karaoke available. If anyone have games they want to play, feel free to bring them along.
Directions:
Map Link
Unit A1, 7/F, Chuan Yuan Factory Building, 342-344 Kwun Tong Rd, Ngau Tau Kok
From Ngau Tau Kok MTR station, exit B5. Cross Lai yYp Street following Kwun Tong Road until you reach Yan Yip Street. Follow the Yan Yip Street to the first building entrance to the right, this will be Chuan Yuan Factory Building. Take any elevator to the 7th floor, and you have arrived!
Games:
Ranging from Card Against Humanity to Hero Quest, 3 TV setups available for karaoke, Nintendo switch and steam deck hookups, bring your consoles people! Jackbox is available as well.
While the games are fun and all, the important part of GRMD is for people to come out and meet each other and make new friends.
The venue will have a lot of space for people to fan out and hang out, so regardless of if you are new to the scene or a long time veteran/lurker, come on by and make some buddies!
Food:
Buffet style, but not unlimited. If we run out of food and there are still hungry people we can call for take out.
Drinks:
There will be non alcoholic drinks available.
Alcoholic drinks will be BYOB, please bring to share. (Also, I like stouts.)
Group photo:
I plan on having the group photo at around 8:30 or so. I will also be leaving my old cameras around the venue so feel free to pick them up and shoot away. I'd appreciate it if other people take some candid pictures of the event.
Costs:
HK$300 per person flat fee if you prepay by the deadline (June 9th 23:59), HK$350 after the deadline or at the door. This will cover drinks and food.
Why prepay?
This is necessary due to logistic and budget reasons, and more importantly we need to know how much food to order from the catering company (the amount of money we collect by the deadline will determine what and how much we order). Please help us out by pre-paying ASAP!
How to pay:
Please do a FPS/PayMe transfer to 96332968 (WONG H** S** S**** ) $300 (for each person). Send a WhatsApp to +852-96332968 with following info:

• Your name (and/or whatever alias you wish to identify yourself by)
• The number of people coming
• Screenshot of the receipt

Once I confirmed received payment we will put you into the Super Secret Elite WhatsApp group for cool Redditors. Again, past the 6/9 deadline the cost goes up to $350.
And before anyone ask I will not be doing any tiered pricing. Please don't ask if you can just come and play and not eat and pay less money, or if you are going to be late, or if you are going to leave early. It just make things more complicated for us and math is hard. Also, no exception for anyone on paying past the deadline.
If for some reason you do not have FPS/Payme, PM me and we will see if we can arrange something. I will try to do a pub crawl the weekend before and you can try to meet me and pay me in person.

[Attaching screenshots and other details below in comments]
I got call with IVR saying "Dear FedEx Customer, Your Package Has Been Returned Due To Being Prohibited From Sending Out. To Know More, Please Press 1. To Contact Our Customer Service, Please Press 0."
I have ordered a lens from Amazon which is in transit from NewYork to my place as I type this. So I thought it's regarding that package, something must have come up in customs. Has happened to me before once when a motherboard was ordered from HongKong via AliExpress and they didn't include the bill copy on outside of the package. I had to contact AliExpress multiple times and a long hassle later I received the motherboard 2 months after ordering it.
So naturally, I pressed one, got connected to person from "FedEx", who said a parcel with my name, phone number and Aadhar ID is seized by Narcotics Beureau Mumbai, because it contained illegal items. Which items? 5 expired passports, 3 ICICI Credit Cards, 2 HP laptops, $1000 USD cash and 350gms MDMA.
No lie, I was scared shitless. Why? Because a lot of people from my village have done the 'havaala' thing, aka Money Laundering for people abroad. And a lot of times they've come to me and asked me "Yo bro UPI me 3000 Rs and take cash from me, I need in my account but can't go to bank at this hour". A lot of times I've sent money to them or their "cousins".
On top of that, the village I'm from is basically the one you've seen in Udta Punjab. All my classmates from my village are either dead from overdose, or admitted in rehabilitation centers. When I was graduating and I'd come home for holidays, my parents wouldn't let me meet anyone from my childhood or school. Perhaps if I hadn't gone to study, I would be dealing/using as well. That is the state of my hometown.
So I thought some mf from my village has used my Aadhar Card and my number to mail drugs using my name and now i'm in trouble. I pleaded to them that it's a misuse of my identity and I haven't done any such thing. They said okay, such things happen from time to time. Drug sellers use fake IDs of normal citizens for such tasks and they can help me get out of this. So I got connected to Narcotics Control Beureau Mumbai Branch.
Before I know it, I'm on a Skype call with NCB Mumbai inspector Pradip Sawant who showed me his ID card and some terms and conditions page before starting the conversation and asked me not to share any of this with anyone. I was using my tablet for Skype and my phone was still in my hand, and I was googling their names. Didn't turn much up. I even told them that i'm using my tablet for skype using wifi. They said its okay as long as you're online and don't bring anyone else in the video frame. If we suspect you've involved any other person, we'll cut the call.
They first accused of money laundering for a drug lord called Mohd Islam Malik who has been arrested (which is true - he is a real gangster who is now in jail), then they said they'll help clear my name if I'm truly innocent but they need to verifiy it first.
They contacted some "agent from intelligence" on speakerphone who checked my Aadhar ID and said it's linked with bank accounts and credit cards in Hyderabad, Mumbai, Kolkata, Indore and whatnot.
So, I was told that my name is associated with large number of bank accounts and credit cards all across india, many of which are associated with the drug empire of Mohammed Islam Malik, and I need to verify my bank accounts for them to see which ones I have used to peddle drugs and which ones are safe. He showed me some photos of people and asked if I know any of them.
He was going to connect me to "DCP", who was going to verify my innocence and provide me with a "certificate" so I would be safe in future, but when they went to him (while on call), he wasn't available. So he connected me with their "Finance Officer" instead.
The finance officer asked me a lot of things: Whether this xxxx account of xxx Bank in xxxxx city under your name is currently being operated by you? Is this one you're using? No? Okay here's another one, this is the one you used yeterday to transfer money, right? no?
Okay which ones are you using then?
I was flabbergasted. I asked how can anyone open accounts in my name without my PAN card or my signature or OTP on my phone? Or my Aadhar verification. He said it is possible when bankers themselves are working for the drug dealers and they can allow it to happen. They do such things, open accounts in name of innocent people and use that to transfer drug money. In return, they are given some incentive in their personal accounts for such tasks. We are looking for such incentive money in your accounts.
So he asked me which accounts I actually use. I was about to say account number but he stopped he. He said "only tell me which bank and branch you're using and we'll filter those here. No need to give any details. We already have everything associated with your name here." I told them the banks and branches I use, when I asked how often I go to those banks, I said I don't. I either use UPIs or Netbanking and I have statements to show for it.
I tried showing them my PAN and ask them if this is the one associated with those accounts, if not then it's obviously not me. He said "Dont do that. This call is being recorded. Do not show you PAN Card or your Bank Account Number or your UPI or your Passwords or anything like that here. It is against department rules, infact never share such information with anyone ever again. Sharing such things with strangers is what got you involved in this in the first place. Just answer what is being asked. Nothing more, nothing less."
Then they asked me to transfer some money from one of my accounts to another one of my accounts and tell them how much was transferred, and the balance after the transfer so they can verify that I own both those accounts. I did that and they said okay, these two accounts are yours as we have detected the transaction your just did, but one of the accounts is also listed suspicious so you need to verify that all money in that account is yours and not given to you by the drug empire.
I transferred the money using netbanking on phone, while call was going on in tablet's skype. When I tried to show them my phone that look transaction has gone through from one account to another they said, "Dont share your netbanking screen on the video. We're already tracking everything you do."
I mean, that was so convincing.
And they said that the suspicious account needs to be verified by your bank's home branch so you need to go there and verify it so we can be sure that those suspicious activies are not done by you in person but some other party was using your indentity to do so.
But.... They didn't allow me to contact anyone and told me keep the video call on, or I'll suffer the consequences of charges. They told me to go to my bank to verify my accounts and said local police is following me in civil dress, and since bankers are suspects too, i shouldn't disclose anything to anyone. I told them I'm at work and I need to pick up my wife cause she'll be alone after work hours but they said it's very crucial. "Do you realise the seriousness of the case you're in?" they said.
"If you tell anyone, or we find even a single point of mischief, we will disconnect the call and all your accounts will be frozen. We won't help you. You will never be able to contact us again and will be treated as dangerous suspect."
That's when I kinda suspected that this might be a scam. I was all three things in that moment - scared, curious and cautious. If this is scam, why haven't they asked for money or tried to hack my account or anything? Why haven't they shown their own face in the video? How has FedEx a direct line to NCB? and if I am to prove this happened, I need something concrete, something more than a skype address or photographs of their IDs they've sent me so far, which is just as easy as changing your name on your Aadhar ID in photoshop and printing it out and laminating it to look like the real thing.
I played along, because up until that point I only had a skype ID and some calls from few (possibly spoofed or burner) phones, nothing concrete. But now I started to act scared for them. Every now and then I'll turn the tablet to flight mode, turn it back on and when they called back i'd tell them I'm sorry the mobile data connection dropped on my phone. They didn't ask why I was saying mobile data when I had clearly told them i'm using Wifi and Skype on a tablet? They were clearly desperate to corner me into something, but what? In between talks and disconnections, I logged into mobile phone skype and started using that, and they didn't notice any difference.
Until that point, it was hard to 100% call it a money scam. Wasting my time? maybe. They didn't ask my personal details. They didn't ask my account numbers or credit card details, they didn't even ask for my PAN card, infact they advised against doing so. And at no point they ever asked me to transfer any money to them. I was only transfering money between my own accounts. And for "verification", they're asking me to visit the home branch of my bank? So What? I'll go to the bank. So what's the endgame of all of this? When I reach the bank they'll ask me to, what, verify my identity? Show my passbook and tell them its me? What are they thinking?
After 3-4 hours of calls and skype video call (where they didn't show face, only sent their IDs and documents), and routing calls through various people (inspectors, DSPs etc), at final step, when I showed them that I'm outside the "Home Branch" of my bank and showed them the logo and the main doors, they asked me go inside, get an RTGS form and asked me fill the details as written in the Skype chat. They said they had created a temporary account for security purposes so the bankers will not suspect anything.
Bingo. Money demanded.
They practially asked me to transfer Rs 10 lakh via RTGS in account number 42630940831 (Name: AMILALI SOFTWARE PVT LTD); Bank: State Bank of India, Branch: Shastri Nagar Meerut; Account type: Current; IFSC SBIN0008696 to verify that my money was legal. Once its verified as legal, it will be transferred back to my account and they will issue me a certificate.
Moreover, there was the thing from their end: A current bank account. That cannot be created overnight for a scam. It had to be verified by the bank from an actual person which can be traced! And now it was my turn. Since they had already wasted like 4 hours of my time, and I knew the moment I tell them I know this is a scam they'll just cut the call and i'll be left thinking i'm stupid to fall for it (I still do), But I wanted to give them a little taste of their own medicine. It was kinda dangerous but here's the thing - I was not at the home branch. I was at the local HDFC Bank branch that was just near to where I was doing the whole skype thing. So even if I wanted to do a transaction or signature verification or whatever, it could either be done at the branch where my account was, or the "home branch" which is basically the head office of every other HDFC bank in the area. So whatever I do there (signature change/phone number change/NEFT etc.), they would just ask me to visit the my own account branch or the head office, or wait till 4pm when bank's last courier will leave with all the forms and submit it to main office, where they will be processed by 5pm. That's normal procedure for HDFC banks as far as I knew. It has happened many times before when I needed something done but couldn't do it at local branch. Still, those bank rules could have been changed and what I did next could have costed me a lot.
Now comes the thin tread:
On the videocall, in the bank, while showing them on camera, I got the RTGS form. I filled the details as asked and submitted it to the reception counter to the receptionist sitting at RTGS desk. She accepted it, stamped it and gave me an RTGS reference number in return, and told me she will submit it to manager in 15 minutes where the manager will send it onwards. I showed the reference number to the scammers and told them receptionist asked to wait for 15 mins till the transaction goes through from my account to their account. They saw and heard the whole thing happen.
Then they got kinda relaxed. The "DCP" said wait till it goes through, and when I get a message regarding amount debited from my account, tell him and he will send it back withing 15 minutes. No need to worry. He started talking to me about how they are going to help me out of this, that once they issue me the "certificate", my name will be cleared and if any police or CBI asks me again regarding my involvement in Mohd Islam case, just show them the certificate. Then he started talking about how is my family, how the area around me, what's the politics in the area, what are my future plans, and how did my aadhar card got leaked that landed me in such trouble. He even told me, kinda gave me step by step guide, to create a digilocker so from next time someone asks my aadhar they'll only get last 4 digits and my IDs will be secured from any illegal activity. They even said that I can now go and pick up my wife because she'll want to know about the situation you were into.
I took a long rolling screenshot of the skype conversation at the moment because I knew they'll delete it from their end and maybe it gets deleted from my end too. I kept waiting till the receptionist was done attending the other people in the queue.
Just when the receptionist got up with the form to go into the manager's room to approve the RTGS, i just put the phone on flight mode without notice, and stopped her. Told her to cancel the RTGS and told the manager as well about the scam I was into. They said the RTGS was never going to go through from this branch anyway. They were going to send this to their head office where it would be verified for signature, and then they would have also called me again to confirm the transaction since 10 lakh is a large amount. They said that to keep a proper record, I must also write a letter to branch manager regarding cancellation of a submitted RTGS form. I did that too.
Phew.
But now I could only imagine the situation of the scammers. I had submitted the form, even showed them the reference number for that transaction that was about to happen in just 5 more minutes. Within 5 minutes I started getting phone calls, skype calls, skype messages. Like for next one hour my phone kept ringing but I didn't pick up. Didn't cut. I just let it ring.

Hello everyone. I'm conducting a Masters study on the Impacts of Cloud Computing on Hongkong Business Entities and I am in urgent need of at least 500responses in this survey for my study.
I am kindly requesting you to take part in this short survey (5minutes) so that I get the required data (500responses) so that I complete my study in time, I will really appreciate your help a lot. Anyone can fill it, not a must you be from Hongkong, but if you're from China or Asia at large, the better. Thanks for your help.
Below is the link:
https://forms.gle/Bvh5Ww89hNaYMZgN7

My channel does have a lot of content, mainly figurines from games developed by Mihoyo, such as Honkai Star Rail and Genshin Impact. So this offer actually perfectly aligns with my channel's content. They addressed me by my channel name, and email ends with @perkinggroup.com. For now, my plan is to reply and show interest, and see how they respond to me. Here is a direct copy of of the email i received:
Dear EXkurogane,
I hope this email finds you well. I'm alberta from Perking company, a professional influencer agency. Our client has entrusted us to search globally for promising creators to participate in the promotion of Honkai Star Rail. Collaboration Details:Compensation: start from $50, and up to $500 per video (based on your channel data) Content: the game is about to release a new strong character. We need creators to make engaging videos featuring gaming products. The cooperation is straightforward: create game videos and publish them.
We won't interfere too much with your creativity. If you are willing to anticipate, we will send you the brief of the video later.
Moreover, it's not just about Star Rail; we have many other games with the same cooperation structure. If you are interested in this collaboration opportunity or would like to discuss pricing further, please apply and provide your contact information. This will help us facilitate faster communication. We believe that your unique style and content would resonate well with our audience, and we are excited about the possibility of working together.
About Honkai: Star Rail: Honkai: Star Rail is an mobile game set in the popular Honkai Impact universe. It's developed by miHoYo. https://hsr.hoyoverse.com/en-us/home
Regards,
Alberta Influencer Media of Perking
Shenzhen Office: 10F, Han's Laser Building, NO.9988 Shennan Avenue, Nanshan District, Shenzhen,PRC Hongkong Office: Unit A3, 2/F., Hing Yip Center, NO.31 Hing Yip Str, Kwun Tong, Kowloon HongKong
Perking Communication Group https://www.linkedin.com/company/perkinggroup/

Hello, I just installed pinta because I wanted a simple paint program, but during the install process it said 137 new certificates were added to my trust store (!)
​
I'm not okay with this at all, any idea how or why this happened, and how to remove them?
I uninstalled pinta but didn't get any messages about these being removed
log:
```
Setting up pinta (1.6-2.1) ... Processing triggers for mailcap (3.70+nmu1ubuntu1) ... Processing triggers for desktop-file-utils (0.26-1ubuntu5) ... Processing triggers for hicolor-icon-theme (0.17-2) ... Processing triggers for libc-bin (2.38-1ubuntu6.2) ... Processing triggers for man-db (2.11.2-3) ... Processing triggers for ca-certificates (20230311ubuntu1) ... Updating certificates in /etc/ssl/certs... 0 added, 0 removed; done. Running hooks in /etc/ca-certificates/update.d... Updating Mono key store Mono Certificate Store Sync - version 6.8.0.105 Populate Mono certificate store from a concatenated list of certificates. Copyright 2002, 2003 Motus Technologies. Copyright 2004-2008 Novell. BSD licensed.
Importing into legacy system store: I already trust 0, your new list has 137 Certificate added: CN=ACCVRAIZ1, OU=PKIACCV, O=ACCV, C=ES Certificate added: C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM Certificate added: C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, OID.2.5.4.97=VATES-Q2826004J, CN=AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM SERVIDORES SEGUROS Certificate added: SERIALNUMBER=G63287510, C=ES, O=ANF Autoridad de Certificacion, OU=ANF CA Raiz, CN=ANF Secure Server Root CA Certificate added: C=IT, L=Milan, O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967, CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA Certificate added: C=US, O=AffirmTrust, CN=AffirmTrust Commercial Certificate added: C=US, O=AffirmTrust, CN=AffirmTrust Networking Certificate added: C=US, O=AffirmTrust, CN=AffirmTrust Premium Certificate added: C=US, O=AffirmTrust, CN=AffirmTrust Premium ECC Certificate added: C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 1 Certificate added: C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 2 Certificate added: C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 3 Certificate added: C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 4 Certificate added: CN=Atos TrustedRoot 2011, O=Atos, C=DE Certificate added: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068 Certificate added: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068 Certificate added: C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root Certificate added: C=NO, O=Buypass AS-983163327, CN=Buypass Class 2 Root CA Certificate added: C=NO, O=Buypass AS-983163327, CN=Buypass Class 3 Root CA Certificate added: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2 Certificate added: C=CN, O=China Financial Certification Authority, CN=CFCA EV ROOT Certificate added: C=GB, S=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO Certification Authority Certificate added: C=GB, S=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO ECC Certification Authority Certificate added: C=GB, S=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO RSA Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, O=Certainly, CN=Certainly Root E1 Certificate added: C=US, O=Certainly, CN=Certainly Root R1 Certificate added: C=FR, O=Dhimyotis, CN=Certigna Certificate added: C=FR, O=Dhimyotis, OU=0002 48146308100036, CN=Certigna Root CA Certificate added: C=PL, O=Asseco Data Systems S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum EC-384 CA Certificate added: C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA Certificate added: C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA 2 Certificate added: C=PL, O=Asseco Data Systems S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Root CA Certificate added: C=GB, S=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=Comodo CA Limited, CN=AAA Certificate Services Certificate added: C=DE, O=D-Trust GmbH, CN=D-TRUST BR Root CA 1 2020 Certificate added: C=DE, O=D-Trust GmbH, CN=D-TRUST EV Root CA 1 2020 Certificate added: C=DE, O=D-Trust GmbH, CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009 Certificate added: C=DE, O=D-Trust GmbH, CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 EV 2009 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root G3 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G3 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA Certificate added: C=US, O="DigiCert, Inc.", CN=DigiCert TLS ECC P384 Root G5 Certificate added: C=US, O="DigiCert, Inc.", CN=DigiCert TLS RSA4096 Root G5 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Trusted Root G4 Certificate added: C=TR, L=Ankara, O=E-Tuğra EBG Bilişim Teknolojileri ve Hizmetleri A.Ş., OU=E-Tugra Sertifikasyon Merkezi, CN=E-Tugra Certification Authority Certificate added: C=TR, L=Ankara, O=E-Tugra EBG A.S., OU=E-Tugra Trust Center, CN=E-Tugra Global Root CA ECC v3 Certificate added: C=TR, L=Ankara, O=E-Tugra EBG A.S., OU=E-Tugra Trust Center, CN=E-Tugra Global Root CA RSA v3 Certificate added: O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS\_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) Certificate added: C=US, O="Entrust, Inc.", OU=www.entrust.net/CPS is incorporated by reference, OU="(c) 2006 Entrust, Inc.", CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, O="Entrust, Inc.", OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms, OU="(c) 2012 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only", CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - EC1 Certificate added: C=US, O="Entrust, Inc.", OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms, OU="(c) 2009 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only", CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2 Certificate added: C=US, O="Entrust, Inc.", OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms, OU="(c) 2015 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only", CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Certificate added: C=CN, O="GUANG DONG CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY CO.,LTD.", CN=GDCA TrustAUTH R5 ROOT Certificate added: C=AT, O=e-commerce monitoring GmbH, CN=GLOBALTRUST 2020 Certificate added: C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R1 Certificate added: C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R2 Certificate added: C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R3 Certificate added: C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R4 Certificate added: OU=GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R4, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign Certificate added: OU=GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R5, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign Certificate added: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA Certificate added: OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R3, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign Certificate added: OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R6, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign Certificate added: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, CN=GlobalSign Root E46 Certificate added: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, CN=GlobalSign Root R46 Certificate added: C=US, O="The Go Daddy Group, Inc.", OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, S=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O="GoDaddy.com, Inc.", CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 Certificate added: C=GR, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA, CN=HARICA TLS ECC Root CA 2021 Certificate added: C=GR, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA, CN=HARICA TLS RSA Root CA 2021 Certificate added: C=GR, L=Athens, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority, CN=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC RootCA 2015 Certificate added: C=GR, L=Athens, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority, CN=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2015 Certificate added: C=TW, O="Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.", CN=HiPKI Root CA - G1 Certificate added: C=HK, O=Hongkong Post, CN=Hongkong Post Root CA 1 Certificate added: C=HK, S=Hong Kong, L=Hong Kong, O=Hongkong Post, CN=Hongkong Post Root CA 3 Certificate added: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Certificate added: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X2 Certificate added: C=US, O=IdenTrust, CN=IdenTrust Commercial Root CA 1 Certificate added: C=US, O=IdenTrust, CN=IdenTrust Public Sector Root CA 1 Certificate added: C=ES, O=IZENPE S.A., CN=Izenpe.com Certificate added: C=HU, L=Budapest, O=Microsec Ltd., CN=Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009, E=info@e-szigno.hu Certificate added: C=US, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 Certificate added: C=US, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft RSA Root Certificate Authority 2017 Certificate added: C=KR, O=NAVER BUSINESS PLATFORM Corp., CN=NAVER Global Root Certification Authority Certificate added: C=HU, L=Budapest, O=NetLock Kft., OU=Tanúsítványkiadók (Certification Services), CN=NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főtanúsítvány Certificate added: C=CH, O=WISeKey, OU=OISTE Foundation Endorsed, CN=OISTE WISeKey Global Root GB CA Certificate added: C=CH, O=WISeKey, OU=OISTE Foundation Endorsed, CN=OISTE WISeKey Global Root GC CA Certificate added: C=BM, O=QuoVadis Limited, CN=QuoVadis Root CA 1 G3 Certificate added: C=BM, O=QuoVadis Limited, CN=QuoVadis Root CA 2 Certificate added: C=BM, O=QuoVadis Limited, CN=QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3 Certificate added: C=BM, O=QuoVadis Limited, CN=QuoVadis Root CA 3 Certificate added: C=BM, O=QuoVadis Limited, CN=QuoVadis Root CA 3 G3 Certificate added: C=US, S=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority ECC Certificate added: C=US, S=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority RSA R2 Certificate added: C=US, S=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com Root Certification Authority ECC Certificate added: C=US, S=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com Root Certification Authority RSA Certificate added: C=PL, O=Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A., CN=SZAFIR ROOT CA2 Certificate added: C=JP, O="Japan Certification Services, Inc.", CN=SecureSign RootCA11 Certificate added: C=US, O=SecureTrust Corporation, CN=SecureTrust CA Certificate added: C=US, O=SecureTrust Corporation, CN=Secure Global CA Certificate added: C=JP, O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.", CN=Security Communication ECC RootCA1 Certificate added: C=JP, O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.", OU=Security Communication RootCA2 Certificate added: C=JP, O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.", CN=Security Communication RootCA3 Certificate added: C=JP, O=SECOM Trust.net, OU=Security Communication RootCA1 Certificate added: C=US, O="Starfield Technologies, Inc.", OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, S=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O="Starfield Technologies, Inc.", CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2 Certificate added: C=US, S=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O="Starfield Technologies, Inc.", CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 Certificate added: C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign Gold CA - G2 Certificate added: C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign Silver CA - G2 Certificate added: C=DE, O=T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH, OU=T-Systems Trust Center, CN=T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 Certificate added: C=DE, O=T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH, OU=T-Systems Trust Center, CN=T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3 Certificate added: C=TR, L=Gebze - Kocaeli, O=Turkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Arastirma Kurumu - TUBITAK, OU=Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi - Kamu SM, CN=TUBITAK Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifik asi - Surum 1 Certificate added: C=TW, O=TAIWAN-CA, OU=Root CA, CN=TWCA Global Root CA Certificate added: C=TW, O=TAIWAN-CA, OU=Root CA, CN=TWCA Root Certification Authority Certificate added: O=TeliaSonera, CN=TeliaSonera Root CA v1 Certificate added: C=FI, O=Telia Finland Oyj, CN=Telia Root CA v2 Certificate added: C=US, S=Illinois, L=Chicago, O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.", CN=Trustwave Global Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, S=Illinois, L=Chicago, O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.", CN=Trustwave Global ECC P256 Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, S=Illinois, L=Chicago, O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.", CN=Trustwave Global ECC P384 Certification Authority Certificate added: C=TN, O=Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique, CN=TunTrust Root CA Certificate added: C=CN, O=UniTrust, CN=UCA Extended Validation Root Certificate added: C=CN, O=UniTrust, CN=UCA Global G2 Root Certificate added: C=US, S=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust ECC Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, S=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, OU=www.xrampsecurity.com, O=XRamp Security Services Inc, CN=XRamp Global Certification Authority Certificate added: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA Certificate added: C=RO, O=CERTSIGN SA, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA G2 Certificate added: C=HU, L=Budapest, O=Microsec Ltd., OID.2.5.4.97=VATHU-23584497, CN=e-Szigno Root CA 2017 Certificate added: C=TW, O="Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.", OU=ePKI Root Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, OU=emSign PKI, O=eMudhra Inc, CN=emSign ECC Root CA - C3 Certificate added: C=IN, OU=emSign PKI, O=eMudhra Technologies Limited, CN=emSign ECC Root CA - G3 Certificate added: C=US, OU=emSign PKI, O=eMudhra Inc, CN=emSign Root CA - C1 Certificate added: C=IN, OU=emSign PKI, O=eMudhra Technologies Limited, CN=emSign Root CA - G1 Certificate added: C=CN, O="iTrusChina Co.,Ltd.", CN=vTrus ECC Root CA Certificate added: C=CN, O="iTrusChina Co.,Ltd.", CN=vTrus Root CA 137 new root certificates were added to your trust store. Import process completed.
Importing into BTLS system store: I already trust 0, your new list has 137 Certificate added: CN=ACCVRAIZ1, OU=PKIACCV, O=ACCV, C=ES Certificate added: C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM Certificate added: C=ES, O=FNMT-RCM, OU=Ceres, OID.2.5.4.97=VATES-Q2826004J, CN=AC RAIZ FNMT-RCM SERVIDORES SEGUROS Certificate added: SERIALNUMBER=G63287510, C=ES, O=ANF Autoridad de Certificacion, OU=ANF CA Raiz, CN=ANF Secure Server Root CA Certificate added: C=IT, L=Milan, O=Actalis S.p.A./03358520967, CN=Actalis Authentication Root CA Certificate added: C=US, O=AffirmTrust, CN=AffirmTrust Commercial Certificate added: C=US, O=AffirmTrust, CN=AffirmTrust Networking Certificate added: C=US, O=AffirmTrust, CN=AffirmTrust Premium Certificate added: C=US, O=AffirmTrust, CN=AffirmTrust Premium ECC Certificate added: C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 1 Certificate added: C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 2 Certificate added: C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 3 Certificate added: C=US, O=Amazon, CN=Amazon Root CA 4 Certificate added: CN=Atos TrustedRoot 2011, O=Atos, C=DE Certificate added: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068 Certificate added: C=ES, CN=Autoridad de Certificacion Firmaprofesional CIF A62634068 Certificate added: C=IE, O=Baltimore, OU=CyberTrust, CN=Baltimore CyberTrust Root Certificate added: C=NO, O=Buypass AS-983163327, CN=Buypass Class 2 Root CA Certificate added: C=NO, O=Buypass AS-983163327, CN=Buypass Class 3 Root CA Certificate added: C=SK, L=Bratislava, O=Disig a.s., CN=CA Disig Root R2 Certificate added: C=CN, O=China Financial Certification Authority, CN=CFCA EV ROOT Certificate added: C=GB, S=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO Certification Authority Certificate added: C=GB, S=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO ECC Certification Authority Certificate added: C=GB, S=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=COMODO CA Limited, CN=COMODO RSA Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, O=Certainly, CN=Certainly Root E1 Certificate added: C=US, O=Certainly, CN=Certainly Root R1 Certificate added: C=FR, O=Dhimyotis, CN=Certigna Certificate added: C=FR, O=Dhimyotis, OU=0002 48146308100036, CN=Certigna Root CA Certificate added: C=PL, O=Asseco Data Systems S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum EC-384 CA Certificate added: C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA Certificate added: C=PL, O=Unizeto Technologies S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Network CA 2 Certificate added: C=PL, O=Asseco Data Systems S.A., OU=Certum Certification Authority, CN=Certum Trusted Root CA Certificate added: C=GB, S=Greater Manchester, L=Salford, O=Comodo CA Limited, CN=AAA Certificate Services Certificate added: C=DE, O=D-Trust GmbH, CN=D-TRUST BR Root CA 1 2020 Certificate added: C=DE, O=D-Trust GmbH, CN=D-TRUST EV Root CA 1 2020 Certificate added: C=DE, O=D-Trust GmbH, CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 2009 Certificate added: C=DE, O=D-Trust GmbH, CN=D-TRUST Root Class 3 CA 2 EV 2009 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root CA Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root G2 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Assured ID Root G3 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root CA Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G2 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Global Root G3 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance EV Root CA Certificate added: C=US, O="DigiCert, Inc.", CN=DigiCert TLS ECC P384 Root G5 Certificate added: C=US, O="DigiCert, Inc.", CN=DigiCert TLS RSA4096 Root G5 Certificate added: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert Trusted Root G4 Certificate added: C=TR, L=Ankara, O=E-Tuğra EBG Bilişim Teknolojileri ve Hizmetleri A.Ş., OU=E-Tugra Sertifikasyon Merkezi, CN=E-Tugra Certification Authority Certificate added: C=TR, L=Ankara, O=E-Tugra EBG A.S., OU=E-Tugra Trust Center, CN=E-Tugra Global Root CA ECC v3 Certificate added: C=TR, L=Ankara, O=E-Tugra EBG A.S., OU=E-Tugra Trust Center, CN=E-Tugra Global Root CA RSA v3 Certificate added: O=Entrust.net, OU=www.entrust.net/CPS\_2048 incorp. by ref. (limits liab.), OU=(c) 1999 Entrust.net Limited, CN=Entrust.net Certification Authority (2048) Certificate added: C=US, O="Entrust, Inc.", OU=www.entrust.net/CPS is incorporated by reference, OU="(c) 2006 Entrust, Inc.", CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, O="Entrust, Inc.", OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms, OU="(c) 2012 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only", CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - EC1 Certificate added: C=US, O="Entrust, Inc.", OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms, OU="(c) 2009 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only", CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G2 Certificate added: C=US, O="Entrust, Inc.", OU=See www.entrust.net/legal-terms, OU="(c) 2015 Entrust, Inc. - for authorized use only", CN=Entrust Root Certification Authority - G4 Certificate added: C=CN, O="GUANG DONG CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY CO.,LTD.", CN=GDCA TrustAUTH R5 ROOT Certificate added: C=AT, O=e-commerce monitoring GmbH, CN=GLOBALTRUST 2020 Certificate added: C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R1 Certificate added: C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R2 Certificate added: C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R3 Certificate added: C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R4 Certificate added: OU=GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R4, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign Certificate added: OU=GlobalSign ECC Root CA - R5, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign Certificate added: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, OU=Root CA, CN=GlobalSign Root CA Certificate added: OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R3, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign Certificate added: OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R6, O=GlobalSign, CN=GlobalSign Certificate added: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, CN=GlobalSign Root E46 Certificate added: C=BE, O=GlobalSign nv-sa, CN=GlobalSign Root R46 Certificate added: C=US, O="The Go Daddy Group, Inc.", OU=Go Daddy Class 2 Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, S=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O="GoDaddy.com, Inc.", CN=Go Daddy Root Certificate Authority - G2 Certificate added: C=GR, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA, CN=HARICA TLS ECC Root CA 2021 Certificate added: C=GR, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions CA, CN=HARICA TLS RSA Root CA 2021 Certificate added: C=GR, L=Athens, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority, CN=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions ECC RootCA 2015 Certificate added: C=GR, L=Athens, O=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions Cert. Authority, CN=Hellenic Academic and Research Institutions RootCA 2015 Certificate added: C=TW, O="Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.", CN=HiPKI Root CA - G1 Certificate added: C=HK, O=Hongkong Post, CN=Hongkong Post Root CA 1 Certificate added: C=HK, S=Hong Kong, L=Hong Kong, O=Hongkong Post, CN=Hongkong Post Root CA 3 Certificate added: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X1 Certificate added: C=US, O=Internet Security Research Group, CN=ISRG Root X2 Certificate added: C=US, O=IdenTrust, CN=IdenTrust Commercial Root CA 1 Certificate added: C=US, O=IdenTrust, CN=IdenTrust Public Sector Root CA 1 Certificate added: C=ES, O=IZENPE S.A., CN=Izenpe.com Certificate added: C=HU, L=Budapest, O=Microsec Ltd., CN=Microsec e-Szigno Root CA 2009, E=info@e-szigno.hu Certificate added: C=US, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft ECC Root Certificate Authority 2017 Certificate added: C=US, O=Microsoft Corporation, CN=Microsoft RSA Root Certificate Authority 2017 Certificate added: C=KR, O=NAVER BUSINESS PLATFORM Corp., CN=NAVER Global Root Certification Authority Certificate added: C=HU, L=Budapest, O=NetLock Kft., OU=Tanúsítványkiadók (Certification Services), CN=NetLock Arany (Class Gold) Főtanúsítvány Certificate added: C=CH, O=WISeKey, OU=OISTE Foundation Endorsed, CN=OISTE WISeKey Global Root GB CA Certificate added: C=CH, O=WISeKey, OU=OISTE Foundation Endorsed, CN=OISTE WISeKey Global Root GC CA Certificate added: C=BM, O=QuoVadis Limited, CN=QuoVadis Root CA 1 G3 Certificate added: C=BM, O=QuoVadis Limited, CN=QuoVadis Root CA 2 Certificate added: C=BM, O=QuoVadis Limited, CN=QuoVadis Root CA 2 G3 Certificate added: C=BM, O=QuoVadis Limited, CN=QuoVadis Root CA 3 Certificate added: C=BM, O=QuoVadis Limited, CN=QuoVadis Root CA 3 G3 Certificate added: C=US, S=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority ECC Certificate added: C=US, S=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com EV Root Certification Authority RSA R2 Certificate added: C=US, S=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com Root Certification Authority ECC Certificate added: C=US, S=Texas, L=Houston, O=SSL Corporation, CN=SSL.com Root Certification Authority RSA Certificate added: C=PL, O=Krajowa Izba Rozliczeniowa S.A., CN=SZAFIR ROOT CA2 Certificate added: C=JP, O="Japan Certification Services, Inc.", CN=SecureSign RootCA11 Certificate added: C=US, O=SecureTrust Corporation, CN=SecureTrust CA Certificate added: C=US, O=SecureTrust Corporation, CN=Secure Global CA Certificate added: C=JP, O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.", CN=Security Communication ECC RootCA1 Certificate added: C=JP, O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.", OU=Security Communication RootCA2 Certificate added: C=JP, O="SECOM Trust Systems CO.,LTD.", CN=Security Communication RootCA3 Certificate added: C=JP, O=SECOM Trust.net, OU=Security Communication RootCA1 Certificate added: C=US, O="Starfield Technologies, Inc.", OU=Starfield Class 2 Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, S=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O="Starfield Technologies, Inc.", CN=Starfield Root Certificate Authority - G2 Certificate added: C=US, S=Arizona, L=Scottsdale, O="Starfield Technologies, Inc.", CN=Starfield Services Root Certificate Authority - G2 Certificate added: C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign Gold CA - G2 Certificate added: C=CH, O=SwissSign AG, CN=SwissSign Silver CA - G2 Certificate added: C=DE, O=T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH, OU=T-Systems Trust Center, CN=T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 2 Certificate added: C=DE, O=T-Systems Enterprise Services GmbH, OU=T-Systems Trust Center, CN=T-TeleSec GlobalRoot Class 3 Certificate added: C=TR, L=Gebze - Kocaeli, O=Turkiye Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Arastirma Kurumu - TUBITAK, OU=Kamu Sertifikasyon Merkezi - Kamu SM, CN=TUBITAK Kamu SM SSL Kok Sertifik asi - Surum 1 Certificate added: C=TW, O=TAIWAN-CA, OU=Root CA, CN=TWCA Global Root CA Certificate added: C=TW, O=TAIWAN-CA, OU=Root CA, CN=TWCA Root Certification Authority Certificate added: O=TeliaSonera, CN=TeliaSonera Root CA v1 Certificate added: C=FI, O=Telia Finland Oyj, CN=Telia Root CA v2 Certificate added: C=US, S=Illinois, L=Chicago, O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.", CN=Trustwave Global Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, S=Illinois, L=Chicago, O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.", CN=Trustwave Global ECC P256 Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, S=Illinois, L=Chicago, O="Trustwave Holdings, Inc.", CN=Trustwave Global ECC P384 Certification Authority Certificate added: C=TN, O=Agence Nationale de Certification Electronique, CN=TunTrust Root CA Certificate added: C=CN, O=UniTrust, CN=UCA Extended Validation Root Certificate added: C=CN, O=UniTrust, CN=UCA Global G2 Root Certificate added: C=US, S=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust ECC Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, S=New Jersey, L=Jersey City, O=The USERTRUST Network, CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, OU=www.xrampsecurity.com, O=XRamp Security Services Inc, CN=XRamp Global Certification Authority Certificate added: C=RO, O=certSIGN, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA Certificate added: C=RO, O=CERTSIGN SA, OU=certSIGN ROOT CA G2 Certificate added: C=HU, L=Budapest, O=Microsec Ltd., OID.2.5.4.97=VATHU-23584497, CN=e-Szigno Root CA 2017 Certificate added: C=TW, O="Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.", OU=ePKI Root Certification Authority Certificate added: C=US, OU=emSign PKI, O=eMudhra Inc, CN=emSign ECC Root CA - C3 Certificate added: C=IN, OU=emSign PKI, O=eMudhra Technologies Limited, CN=emSign ECC Root CA - G3 Certificate added: C=US, OU=emSign PKI, O=eMudhra Inc, CN=emSign Root CA - C1 Certificate added: C=IN, OU=emSign PKI, O=eMudhra Technologies Limited, CN=emSign Root CA - G1 Certificate added: C=CN, O="iTrusChina Co.,Ltd.", CN=vTrus ECC Root CA Certificate added: C=CN, O="iTrusChina Co.,Ltd.", CN=vTrus Root CA 137 new root certificates were added to your trust store. ```

Does anyone have experience with a sim from 3HK. Bought it because of my vacation to Hongkong.
I bought a "30day pass - greater bay Area 30GB". This one includeds China, Macau and Hongkong.
It asks me to install the my3 app, but it's not available in my current country. Do I need this app or is registering via the received qr code enough? They asked to add personal data via this app.

FCC ID: 2AL7F-K2

### Application Information Submitted on: Apr 27, 2024
Equipment Description: KTV BT SPEAKER
TCB Grant Type: A4: UNII devices & low power transmitters using spread spectrum techniques
Manufacturer: Focus Industrial (HongKong) Development CO.,LIMITED ### Further Details See more data about KTV BT SPEAKER (FCC ID 2AL7F-K2)
Find more Focus Industrial (HongKong) Development CO.,LIMITED devices

Been a while since the last crawl. Too much life responsibilities keep me from running events. I definitely need a drink. Everyone are welcome to join and meet strangers from the interweb.
As per usual I will be wearing a Snoo so I will be easy to spot.
We will start at 7:30pm from Beer Bay Central Pier 4 Formerly at Pier 3.
At around 8:30 we will go to 99 Bottles Shop B, 59a Peel St, Central This is a hole in the wall place with very affordable prices.
At 10pm we will finish at The Globe Garley Building, 45-53A Graham St, Central
Everyone will have individual bills. Credit cards accepted at all locations. Afterwards LKF is only a short walk away for people who want to club.
Meetup link, please RSVP so we have an idea of how many people to expect
Also, please send me your whatsapp number so I can put you into the super secret elite whatsapp group

Hello, just checking to see why image roles aren't working. I have two jpg's that are under 128 kilobytes. Data is straight forward, one column for city (Hong Kong, Bangkok), one column for the image URL. Anyone know why they won't display? I've tried everything.. hosting sites, file types, image sizes, clearing cache, restarting Tableau, etc.
Here are the images:
https://i.ibb.co/S31kbc5/hongkong.jpg
https://i.ibb.co/52q7RRC/bangkok.jpg

For context, I (F17) just moved into the US (previously Vietnamese) for the past 3 months or so. I have quite the normal upbringing, or so I thought. All of this is clues that I gathered throughout my life and through my mom's new phone after she asked me to transfer all her data from her old phone to her new one. I got curious and check out everything.
I'm aware that something was horribly wrong when I was in 3rd grade. We have to move to the Southern part of my city and we stayed there for 3 or 4 years. Mom asked me to help her deep clean the house and I found some document in a cabinet that mom told me not to touch. It was about my dad being an inmate at a prison somewhere. I was shocked, but fear that mom might punish me if i told her about this. I later found out that my dad went to jail for scamming billions of VND out of a big corporation. I also found out that my mom refused to pay for my dad's sentence to be decreased. She later sent us back to the countryside to go to HongKong for business opportunities.
When my mom was in HongKong, she found another men that, in her words, "such a gentelmen" and treats her better than my dad. She is tempted to run away with him, but ultimately chooses to stay true to her words and go back after making some decent money. My dad was released about the same time too. Mom got a brilliant idea, to uproot everything and start over in the US. I'm around 8th grade when my mom told me her plans.
Up until 8th grade, I thought that couples having a huge fight and chasing each other out of the house was normal. It's of course is not. I talked to my friends when my dad kicked all of us out of our house, and my friends looked horrified. I showed them some bruises, and was shocked to find that this is not normal.
I was happy to move to the US, but my dad is not. He tries to sabotage my mom's plan by delaying the postal service. But there is no delaying the inevitable. My dad claimed that he scams to get us money for this US plan, and although I think there is some truth to that, I still doubt his words. He said he loves his children and often asks if we love him, but I only reply yes for him to not bother me any further.
After moving into the US, my mom and dad made a pact to not cheat. I also found out through the messages that my mom only felt pity for my dad, that he is nothing without her. He also doesn't want to lose this family that he has spent his youth building. Both of them agree that they are only in this for the kids (aka me and my brother). That they love us.
But oh well, my dad cheats within one month of seperation with a sex worker.
They didn't treat us so badly or anything, I still got their support for my love of art. They took me to a lot of places for vacations and really widened my view of the world, and worked so hard for me to arrive in the US.
Despite me not having any great memories of my dad, I still feel bad thinking about him this way.
Overall, I'm really conflicted about myself and I can't tell the truth from the lies.
I will update if I comfront my mom and dad in the future. This is a fake account as my main is known by irl people

I'm writing an essay for a uni assignment looking at the voting behaviour of British National (Overseas) migrants from Hong Kong at the next general election and its long-term implications for UK government policy. The problem I've run into is that it's quite difficult to translate political orientation data from Hong Kong (which typically looks at whether respondents are pro-establishment/Beijing or pro-democracy/Localist) into a more typical left-right/auth-lib spatial model. There's also not an awful lot of research on BME voting patterns (Electoral Commission), and even less is known about the voting patterns of Chinese/Hong Kong emigrants who were already in the UK before the exodus wave.
I think people don't realise the impact that BN(O) Hongkongers are going to make in British politics. 144,500 Hongkongers have already arrived in the UK since the BN(O) visa scheme opened in 2021, and government projections expect somewhere in the region of 322,000 Hongkongers to settle in the UK over the next five years (Home Office Impact Assessment). The NGO Hong Kong Watch compiled a number of marginal constituencies with a high concentration of BN(O) migrants; in some cases, the number of BN(O) voters is larger than the current majority held by the incumbent MP.
These Hongkongers are also different from previous exodus waves (e.g., in the early 1990s) in that these new migrants are typically a lot more politically engaged and highly educated, the vast majority of whom (66.8%) were also supportive of the democracy movement in Hong Kong in 2019. This is according to a recent study conducted in June 2023 by the University of Liverpool commissioned by the diaspora group Hongkongers in Britain.
The study also noted that 51.7% of respondents indicated a preference to vote Conservative, followed by 16% for the Lib Dems, and 14% for Labour at the time of collection.
I'm not convinced that this is the way Hongkongers will vote, at least, not in the long run. Traditionally, college-educated, middle-class, urban, and BME are all indicators that a voter is more likely to vote for Laboua progressive leftwing party like Green, Plaid, or SNP. Certainly, BN(O) Hongkongers may be more familiar with the Tories owing to their affinity with Chris Patten (the last governor of British Hong Kong) and Boris Johnson for opening up the BN(O) visa route. There's also the factor of each party's foreign policy towards China and domestic policy towards supporting the diaspora community. Exactly how much each of these factors will ultimately influence Hongkongers' voting behaviour, I have no idea. At any rate, I imagine that BN(O) voters are going to become a crucial minority in future UK elections, meaning we are likely to see a more hardline stance towards China, for example, regardless of which party is in government.
This essay isn't with my home department (philosophy) and I have no idea how to work with data... if you are a recent BN(O) migrant, please please please let me know how you would vote (and why!) Any thoughts on the topic would be greatly appreciated as well!!

OPTIMISM AT IT’s PEAK -
​
 HONGKONG MONETARY AUTHORITY (HKMA) kept rates steady at 5.75%, largely in line with US, who also left interest rates unchanged for the fifth consecutive time.
​
 AU Jibun Bank Japan Services PMI hits 10-month high signaling a sharp expansion in service sector.
​
 AU Jibun Bank Japan Manufacturing shrinks but at the least pace since August 2020.
​
 Australia’s seasonally adjusted unemployment rate fell in February 2024, the lowest since last September.
​
Brazil reduced key rates by 50 bps to 10.75%.
​
​
GLOBAL OUTLOOK –
​
 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) about to sue Apple for violating antitrust laws by blocking rivals to access hardware and software features of iPhone.
​
 Snap Inc.’s Chief Financial Officer, Derek Andersen, sold 96,953 shares of class A company stock.
​
Sundar Pichai, the CEO of Alphabet Inc., has sold totaled over $3.3 million Alphabet’s C stocks.
​
 FCC investigating Retailers like Amazon and others for sale of unlawful electronic devices.
​
 CACI International Inc has been awarded order to modernize U.S. Army’s Global Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network.
​
 Intel is on spending spree for $100bn dollars across various US states.
​
 Synopsys, Inc. announced the completion of the acquisition of Intrinsic ID, a leading provider of Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) IP used in the design of system-on-chips (SoCs). MAJOR FOREX PAIRS:
​
EUUSD retreats below 1.0900 after mixed PMI data
GBP/USD stays below 1.2800 after UK PMIs, BoE decision awaited
USD/JPY climbs back to 151.00
USD/CHF surges to near 0.8960 after SNB announced a 25 bps interest rate
USD/CAD moves downward to near 1.3470 during the Asian session on Thursday, extending its losses for the second successive day.
Australian Dollar extends gains on positive economic data from Australia.
NZD/USD hovers above the psychological support of 0.6100
​
OIL-BITCOIN-GOLD-SILVER:
​
Oil trades with modest gains above mid-$81,00s, bullish potential seems intact
Bitcoin (BTC) is at $66,839.33. This is a 6.01% increase in the last 24 hours, with a market cap of $1,314.08 billion and a 24-hour trading volume of $57.75 billion.
XAU/USD retreats after hitting a fresh record high earlier this Thursday and trades just above the $2,200 round-figure mark during the first half of the European session, still up for the second straight day
XAG/USD aims to recapture 11-month high slightly above $26
​
​
NEWS TODAY:
​
GBP
Monetary Policy Summary
MPC Official Bank Rate Votes
Official Bank Rate
​
CAD
NHPI m/m
​
USD
Unemployment Claims
Philly Fed Manufacturing Index
Current Account
​
CAD
Gov Council Member Gravelle Speaks
​
USD
Flash Manufacturing PMI
Flash Services PMI
Existing Home Sales
CB Leading Index m/m
Natural Gas Storage
FOMC Member Barr Speaks

OPTIMISM AT IT’s PEAK -
​
 HONGKONG MONETARY AUTHORITY (HKMA) kept rates steady at 5.75%, largely in line with US, who also left interest rates unchanged for the fifth consecutive time.
​
 AU Jibun Bank Japan Services PMI hits 10-month high signaling a sharp expansion in service sector.
​
 AU Jibun Bank Japan Manufacturing shrinks but at the least pace since August 2020.
​
 Australia’s seasonally adjusted unemployment rate fell in February 2024, the lowest since last September.
​
Brazil reduced key rates by 50 bps to 10.75%.
​
​
GLOBAL OUTLOOK –
​
 The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) about to sue Apple for violating antitrust laws by blocking rivals to access hardware and software features of iPhone.
​
 Snap Inc.’s Chief Financial Officer, Derek Andersen, sold 96,953 shares of class A company stock.
​
Sundar Pichai, the CEO of Alphabet Inc., has sold totaled over $3.3 million Alphabet’s C stocks.
​
 FCC investigating Retailers like Amazon and others for sale of unlawful electronic devices.
​
 CACI International Inc has been awarded order to modernize U.S. Army’s Global Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network.
​
 Intel is on spending spree for $100bn dollars across various US states.
​
 Synopsys, Inc. announced the completion of the acquisition of Intrinsic ID, a leading provider of Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) IP used in the design of system-on-chips (SoCs). MAJOR FOREX PAIRS:
​
EUUSD retreats below 1.0900 after mixed PMI data
GBP/USD stays below 1.2800 after UK PMIs, BoE decision awaited
USD/JPY climbs back to 151.00
USD/CHF surges to near 0.8960 after SNB announced a 25 bps interest rate
USD/CAD moves downward to near 1.3470 during the Asian session on Thursday, extending its losses for the second successive day.
Australian Dollar extends gains on positive economic data from Australia.
NZD/USD hovers above the psychological support of 0.6100
​
OIL-BITCOIN-GOLD-SILVER:
​
Oil trades with modest gains above mid-$81,00s, bullish potential seems intact
Bitcoin (BTC) is at $66,839.33. This is a 6.01% increase in the last 24 hours, with a market cap of $1,314.08 billion and a 24-hour trading volume of $57.75 billion.
XAU/USD retreats after hitting a fresh record high earlier this Thursday and trades just above the $2,200 round-figure mark during the first half of the European session, still up for the second straight day
XAG/USD aims to recapture 11-month high slightly above $26
​
​
NEWS TODAY:
​
GBP
Monetary Policy Summary
MPC Official Bank Rate Votes
Official Bank Rate
​
CAD
NHPI m/m
​
USD
Unemployment Claims
Philly Fed Manufacturing Index
Current Account
​
CAD
Gov Council Member Gravelle Speaks
​
USD
Flash Manufacturing PMI
Flash Services PMI
Existing Home Sales
CB Leading Index m/m
Natural Gas Storage
FOMC Member Barr Speaks

Visiting China, Hongkong, and Taiwan for 6 weeks this year. Any E-sim recommendations I can buy in Us/Canada that’ll work for all 3 places? Looking for phone number and ideally 30GB+ Data. Thanks!